Alonso v. State of California

• Decision Date: 30 July 1975
• Citation: 123 Cal.Rptr. 536,50 Cal.App.3d 242
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 87 A.L.R.3d 678 Julio ALONSO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The STATE of California et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 44695.

Page 536

123 Cal.Rptr. 536

50 Cal.App.3d 242, 87 A.L.R.3d 678

Julio ALONSO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The STATE of California et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 44695.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1, California.

July 30, 1975.

Manuel Lopez, Los Angeles, for petitioner and appellant

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., and Melvin R. Segal, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondents.

INTRODUCTION

HANSON, Associate Justice.

This is an appeal from a superior court judgment denying a writ of mandate brought by petitioner, an alien, seeking a reversal of a decision denying his application for unemployment insurance benefits.

The petitioner, appellant herein, an alien and not a United States citizen, refused to present to employees of the governmental agency charged with the responsibility of monitoring the unemployment insurance payments any documentary evidence from the Immigration and Naturalization Service to verify that he was able to accept employment. Following the required procedures and hearings, he was denied unemployment insurance benefits on the basis that he was not 'available for work' within the meaning of section 1253, subdivision (c) of the Unemployment Insurance Code which provides that a claimant is eligible to receive benefits with respect to any week only if '(h)e was able to work and available for work for that week.'

THE CASE

Applicant/petitioner/appellant Julio Alonso (hereinafter ALONSO) applied for unemployment insurance benefits from the Employment Development Department, previously the Department of Human Resources Development (hereinafter referred to as the DEPARTMENT). ALONSO was denied unemployment benefits because he did not have a regislation card or any documentary evidence from the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service to verify that as an alien he was able to accept employment.

An appeal was taken from the DEPARTMENT'S decision, and a hearing was held before a DEPARTMENT referee. At that hearing ALONSO admitted that he was an alien and not a United States citizen but refused to state whether his entry into the United States was legal on the basis that such evidence was Irrelevant in determining whether he was available for work. He did not rely on the Fifth Amendment. He told the interviewer he had lost his registration card but gave no reason why he failed to obtain a duplicate. Since he refused to produce any information to the referee regarding his status in the country, his request for benefits was denied.

The California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (hereinafter referred to as the BOARD) affirmed the referee's decision and held that ALONSO was disqualified for benefits under section 1253, subdivision (c) of the Unemployment Insurance Code. ¹

Thereafter, ALONSO filed a petition for writ of mandate with supporting documents in the superior court seeking a reversal of the BOARD'S decision. The DEPARTMENT responded and the administrative transcript and pleading were received into evidence. Following a hearing, the superior court denied the writ and, applying the independent judgment test, held that the weight of the evidence supported the findings; that the findings supported the decision of the BOARD; that there was no abuse of discretion; and that, based on the fact that ALONSO had failed to present any kind of proof that the Immigration and Naturalization Service

was aware he was in the United States, he was unavailable for work within the meaning of section 1253, subdivision (c) of the Unemployment Insurance Code.

ISSUES

The broad determinative issues presented on appeal are (1) whether or not there was a constitutional or other impediment to the DEPARTMENT'S requirement that an alien must furnish evidence that the Immigration and Naturalization Service is aware of his presence in the United States, and (2) if such evidence is not furnished by the alien, whether or not the DEPARTMENT could refuse payment of unemployment insurance benefits on the basis that the applicant/alien is unavailable for work within the meaning of section 1253, subdivision (c) of the Unemployment Insurance Code.

DISCUSSION

During oral argument counsel for appellant ALONSO urged that the federal government has preempted the field in matters pertaining to aliens within our borders and that the recent appellate court cases of Dolores Canning Co. v. Howard, 40 Cal.App.3d 673, 115 Cal.Rptr. 435, and DeCanas v. Bica, 40 Cal.App.3d 976, 115 Cal.Rptr. 444, are controlling and dispositive of the case at bench.

In Dolores Canning Co., several employers brought an action against the Labor Commissioner and the Division of Law Enforcement contending that Labor Code section 2805 (prohibiting the employment of an alien who is not entitled to lawful residence if the employment would have an adverse effect on resident workers) was unconstitutional. In affirming the superior court's order permanently enjoining enforcement of the labor statute, the reviewing court concluded that the statute was unconstitutional because the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction in this field barring state action and that the Labor Code provision encroached and interfered with the comprehensive regulatory scheme enacted by Congress in the exercise of its exclusive power over immigration.

In DeCanas et al., several farm workers brought an action bottomed on the same Labor Code section involved in Dolores Canning Co., section 2805, against certain farm labor contractors, alleging the contractors had discharged them from employment and had not rehired them, claiming they had a sufficient labor supply. The plaintiff farm workers asserted that the labor supply consisted of aliens illegally within this country and that the defendant farm labor contractors knowingly hired such illegal aliens in the stead of qualified lawful residents. The trial court sustained defendant farm labor contractors' demurrer without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal, holding that section 2805 of the Labor Code was unconstitutional. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that section 2805 of the Labor Code was in conflict with the national law and policy.

The plaintiff employers in Dolores Canning Co. and the plaintiff farm workers in DeCanas were all United States citizens, with their claims both bottomed on a California Labor Code provision (§ 2805). In the case at bench, plaintiff ALONSO is an admitted alien, found to be illegally in the country by the BOARD decision, ² and not a United States citizen, and seeks a court order to force the DEPARTMENT to pay We, however, acknowledge that the federal government is vested with the exclusive right to regulate immigration and naturalization and a state may not interfere with that exclusive right. (See Hines v. Davidowitz (1941)312 U.S. 52, 66, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581.) We recognize that Aliens in the United States are afforded many, if not most, of the privileges and rights enjoyed by its citizens. For example, they are entitled to the 'equal protection' of the laws encompassed in the Fourteenth Amendment in the states in which they reside (Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886) 118 U.S. 356, 369, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220, 226), and they are persons within the protection of the Fifth Amendment and may not be deprived of life, liberty or property without 'due process of law.' (Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding (1953) 344 U.S. 590, 596, 73 S.Ct. 472, 97 L.Ed. 576, 583.) ³

him unemployment insurance benefits under section 1253, subdivision (c) of the Unemployment Insurance Code and does not involve the Labor Code. Accordingly, we find Dolores Canning Co. and DeCanas to be distinguishable and inapplicable.

In the area of employment, aliens lawfully in the United States have a right to earn a living in the ordinary occupations of the community (Truax v. Raich (1915) 239 U.S. 33, 39, 36 S.Ct. 7, 60 L.Ed. 131), including earning a living fishing in offshore waters in the same way as other state inhabitants earn their living (Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission (1948) 334 U.S. 410, 418--419, 68 S.Ct. 1138, 92 L.Ed. 1478), and may engage in the practice of law in California. (Raffaelli v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 7 Cal.3d 288, 101 Cal.Rptr. 896, 496 P.2d 1264.)

The United States Supreme Court in Graham v. Richardson (1971) 403 U.S. 365, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534, held that a state could not deny welfare benefits to Lawfully resident aliens; that '(u)nder traditional equal protection principles, a State retains broad discretion to classify as long as its classification has a reasonable basis. (Citations.) This is so in 'the area of economics and social welfare.' (Citation.) But the Court's decisions have established that classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality of race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular' minority (citation) for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.' (Graham v. Richardson, supra, 403 U.S. at pp. 371--372, 91 S.Ct. at p. 1852; see also Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State of California, 71 Cal.2d 566, 79 Cal.Rptr. 77, 456 P.2d 645.)

However, the common thread running through the above referenced cases involving employment of aliens is that they refer to 'lawfully resident' aliens. If an alien is here Unlawfully, he has no rights under the Constitution of the United States to equal opportunity of employment as enjoyed by lawfully resident aliens (see Pilapil v. Immigration and Naturalization Service (10th Cir. 1970) 424 F.2d 6, 11) and has no right to work.

It is thus apparent that the language of the Constitution is broad enough to encompass aliens, and constitutional protections usually have een afforded them. However, this has not been invariably the case, and judicial conclusions have varied under different contexts and periods of time. ⁴

Under the unique combination of factors of the case at bench we...