California Portland Cement Co. v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd.

• Decision Date: 23 February 1960
• Citation: 3 Cal.Rptr. 37,178 Cal.App.2d 263
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: CALIFORNIA PORTLAND CEMENT COMPANY, Petitioner and Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD, Harry W. Stewart, as Director of Employment, Glenn V. Walls, as Chairman, and Arnold B. Morse and Ernest Webb, as Members of California Unemployment Appeals Board, Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 23878.

Page 37

3 Cal.Rptr. 37

178 Cal.App.2d 263

CALIFORNIA PORTLAND CEMENT COMPANY, Petitioner and Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD, Harry W. Stewart, as Director of Employment, Glenn V. Walls, as Chairman, and Arnold B. Morse and Ernest Webb, as Members of California Unemployment Appeals Board, Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 23878.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 3, California.

Feb. 23, 1960.

As Corrected March 17, 1960.

Wallace K. Downey, Los Angeles, for appellant.

Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., of the State of California, and Irving H. Perluss, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondents.

VALLEE, Justice.

Appeal by California Portland Cement Company from a judgment denying its petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board to set aside its decision affirming a decision of a referee which affirmed a ruling of the Department of Employment charging petitioner's account with unemployment insurance benefits paid to Silas Carter, a former employee.

The facts are not in dispute.

Petitioner operates a large cement mill near Mojave. Silas Carter was employed as a laborer in the mill on March 27, 1956. On April 6, 1956, he voluntarily quit his employment, stating he was leaving for other work. He was re-employed on May 1, 1956. He continued to work until May 25, 1956. On May 28, 1956, he sent word through another employee that he had quit on May 25, stating he was returning to a job with a former employer.

At the time he was employed by petitioner, Carter stated in writing that from July 1947 to August 1953 he worked for Los Angeles Spring and Wire Manufacturing Company as a coiler and machine operator at $2.50 an hour, except for a period between September 1950 and sometime in 1952, and he was laid off in August 1953; from September 1953 to April 1954 he was a student at National Schools in Los Angeles; from October 1954 to February 1955 he worked for Ciro Brothers, Greenfield, California, as a caterpillar operator at $2 an hour, and he left to go north; from March to November 1955 he worked for Emerson Mill and Logging Company at Willow Creek, California, as a truck driver and 'cat' operator at $2.50 an hour, and he left because of floods; from December 1955 to March 1956 he worked for M. and R. Sheep Ranch in Mojave as a 'cat' operator at $300 a month, and he left because the pay was not enough.

Carter did not seek unemployment insurance benefits until April 21, 1957, when he registered with the Department of Employment. On May 6, 1957, he received benefits for the week ending May 4, 1957. On May 6, a notice of claim filed and computation of benefits was sent by the department to petitioner as an employer in the base period. On May 6 petitioner 'furnished timely information to the department upon receipt' of the notice, requested a ruling from the department, alleging Carter had left its employ voluntarily and without cause, and sought relief from charges to its reserve account. The department endeavored to obtain information from Carter as to his reasons for leaving petitioner's employ by sending a letter to him dated May 27, 1957. The letter was not answered. On June 13, 1957, the department denied the relief sought, holding that Carter left his employment with petitioner with good cause and that its reserve account would be subject to benefit charges. ¹

Petitioner appealed to a referee before whom a hearing was had. ² The foregoing facts were established together with evidence that Carter was receiving $2.01 an hour at the time he left his employment with petitioner on May 25, 1956, having been promoted from the position of laborer to plug driller, and that in addition he was receiving fringe benefits which were equivalent to $.31 an hour. There was also evidence that steady, year-around, year-after-year work was available to Carter at all times during his employment and thereafter; that his work was satisfactory; that there were no layoffs at petitioner's plant; that it was the most modern in the cement industry, with the best of safety, sanitary conditions, and conveniences, with a health and welfare program provided by Blue Cross at petitioner's expense, a pension plan, paid vacations, and seven paid holidays a year; and that shift differential work allowing from 6 to 9 cents an hour greater pay was available if the employee desired it.

Neither the director nor Carter appeared, or offered any evidence, at the hearing before the referee. The referee found that petitioner 'made no request to the department to obtain information from the department records as to claimant's employment subsequent to his working for' petitioner; that petitioner had failed to make a prima facie showing that Carter had left his employment with petitioner voluntarily and without good cause, and affirmed the ruling of the department.

Petitioner appealed from the decision of the referee to the appeals board which affirmed the decision of the referee. ³ Mandamus was then sought in the superior court where the controversy was submitted on the record of the administrative tribunal. The findings of the court were in accord with those of the administrative officers. The judgment affirmed the appeals board.

The parties agree that the burden was on petitioner to produce evidence before the referee which established a prima facie case that Carter left his employment with petitioner voluntarily and without good cause. An employer is entitled to have his reserve account credited with benefits paid to a former employee only if the employee quit his job voluntarily and without good cause. The employer assumes the risk of nonpersuasion.

Petitioner claims he produced evidence which established a prima facie case that Carter left his employment voluntarily and without good cause. Respondents assert petitioner failed to carry its burden of proof. They say 'good cause' includes 'causes personal to the claimant though unconnected with the employer,' and that 'an employer has not established a prima facie case when he is able to prove only that the leaving was not 'attributable to him' or 'his fault' by virtue of having favorable working conditions and facilities. An essential element of a prima facie case is lacking, i. e., that there was no good personal cause.' Thus, they say, petitioner did not establish a prima facie case since it merely established that Carter left his employment for a cause not attributable to it. Petitioner replies that "personal reasons' must be compelling before they are considered 'good cause," and that the 'compelling reasons test has been consistently applied by the Appeals Board from the beginning of nnemployment insurance,' citing a number of its decisions.

An employer whose reserve account is charged with any payment made to a claimant has a direct pecuniary interest therein and may seek judicial review of the action of the appeals board. Chrysler Corp. v. California Employment Stabilization Comm., 116 Cal.App.2d 8, 14, 253 P.2d 68. The appeals board is a statutory agency with state-wide jurisdiction; it does not have constitutional authority to make final determinations of fact. Any person deprived of a property right by the board is entitled to a limited trial de novo in the superior court. Thomas v. California Employment Stabilization Comm., 39 Cal.2d 501, 503-504, 247 P.2d 561. In reviewing a decision of the trial court, the reviewing court, on facts such as these, determines only whether the decision is supported by the record. Ashdown v. State of California, 135 Cal.App.2d 291, 299, 287 P.2d 176.

The inquiry is one of law: whether, on the undisputed facts, petitioner made a prima facie showing that Carter left his employment with petitioner voluntarily and without good cause. 4 Cal.Jur. 488, § 606; Haynes v. Unemployment Compensation Comm., 353 Mo. 540, 183 S.W.2d 77, 80.

The purpose of the unemployment insurance law for the compulsory setting aside of funds to be used for a system of unemployment insurance is to alleviate the burden on the unemployed, and ultimately on the state in the form of poor relief assistance, resulting from indigence due to involuntary unemployment through no fault of the employee, and to reduce unemployment and the suffering caused thereby to a minimum. It is to insure a diligent worker against the vicissitudes of enforced unemployment not voluntarily created by the worker without good cause. Unemp. Ins. Code, § 100. ⁴ The statute is remedial and must be construed for the purpose of accomplishing its objects. Garcia v. Industrial Accident Comm., 41 Cal.2d 689, 693, 263 P.2d 8. However, in the liberal construction to be accorded the statute so as to afford all the relief which its language indicates the Legislature intended to grant, the interpretation should not exceed the limits of the statutory intent. California Employment Comm. v. Kovacevich, 27 Cal.2d 546, 549, 165 P.2d 917.

Section 976 of the Unemployment Insurance Code requires an employer to contribute to the Unemployment Fund for each calendar year with respect to wages paid for employment. Section 1026 provides that the director shall maintain a separate account for each employer, and shall credit his account with all the contributions paid on his behalf; the unemployment compensation benefits paid to an unemployed individual during any benefit year shall be charged against the account of his employer during his base period. The base period is the year ending in the calendar quarter that precedes the beginning of the benefit year by 4 to 6 full months, depending on the month in which the benefit year begins. § 1275. The benefit year begins with the week for which a person first files a valid claim. § 1276. Petitioner was a base-period employer, i. e., one who paid the claimant wages during his benefit year. § 1275. The charge of unemployment compensation benefits to an employer's account required by section 1026 is made in...