Aman v. Edmunds Cent. School Dist. No. 22-5
| Decision Date | 07 October 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 44-1,No. 17821,A,44-1,17821 |
| Citation | 80 Ed.LawRep. 200,494 N.W.2d 198 |
| Parties | 80 Ed. Law Rep. 200 Rudolph AMAN, Kathryn Aman, Walter Aman, Herbert E. Aman and Eureka School Districtppellants, v. EDMUNDS CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 22-5, Appellee. . Considered on Briefs |
| Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
Craig E. Smith of Neumayr & Smith, Gettysburg, for appellants.
Terence A. O'Keefe of Siegel, Barnett & Schutz, Aberdeen, for appellee.
Amans and Eureka School District appeal from a circuit court order affirming partial acceptance of a petition for a minor boundary change. We reverse and remand to the circuit court with directions to reverse Edmunds' partial acceptance of the petition and direct the school district to accept or reject the petition in whole.
In April, 1991, Rudy and Kathy Aman (Amans) filed a petition with the Edmunds Central School District (Edmunds) for a minor boundary change. They sought to transfer 1,560 acres from the Edmunds District to the Eureka School District (Eureka). The land sought to be transferred was co-terminus with the common boundary of the two school districts as required by SDCL 13-6-84.1. The petition was signed by a majority of the voters residing in the area proposed for transfer as required by statute.
Amans did not know where on the property their residence would be located; therefore, Edmunds denied the petition in May, 1991, but left the petition "on file" until Amans finalized their place of residence. In August, 1991, Amans notified Edmunds of their purchase of the west one-half of section 15, township 125 north, range 72. Edmunds then reconsidered the petition and approved transfer of only the residence portion of the property, some 7.5 acres, to Eureka. Eureka had previously accepted the petition in its entirety, all 1,560 acres.
Amans filed with the fifth circuit timely notice of appeal of both actions of the Edmunds School Board. The appeals were consolidated by agreement of counsel. The circuit court held a de novo trial and upheld Edmunds' partial acceptance of the petition.
Amans appeal, raising four issues. We have consolidated two of the issues into one issue which is dispositive of this case. We will not address the other issues raised.
DID THE CIRCUIT COURT ERR IN AFFIRMING THE EDMUNDS CENTRAL SCHOOL BOARD'S REDUCTION OF THE AMOUNT OF LAND INCLUDED IN THE PETITION.
Appeals from actions of school boards are guided by SDCL 13-6-85 and chapter 13-46. The clearly erroneous standard of review applies when the question is one of fact. Maasjo v. McLaughlin Sch. Dist. # 15-2, 489 N.W.2d 618, 621 (S.D.1992); Kellogg v. Hoven Sch. Dist. No. 53-2, 479 N.W.2d 147, 150 (S.D.1991); Jager v. Ramona Bd. of Educ., 444 N.W.2d 21, 26 (S.D.1989). Questions of law however, are fully reviewable by this court. In re SDDS, Inc., 472 N.W.2d 502, 507 (S.D.1992); In re State & City Sales Tax Liability of Quality Serv. Railcar Repair Corp., 437 N.W.2d 209, 210-11 (S.D.1989); Permann v. Dep't of Labor, Unemp. Ins. Div., 411 N.W.2d 113, 117 (S.D.1987). The construction of a statute is a question of law. Vellinga v. Vellinga, 442 N.W.2d 472, 473 (S.D.1989); In re Famous Brands, Inc., 347 N.W.2d 882, 884 (S.D.1984); Nash Finch Co. v. South Dakota Dep't of Revenue, 312 N.W.2d 470, 472 (S.D.1982).
School boards have been given the authority to approve or disapprove petitions for minor boundary changes into or out of their respective school districts.
SDCL 13-6-86.1 provides:
The school boards, within sixty days of receipt of the petition, shall by resolution, approve or disapprove the request of the petitioners and notify the petitioners in writing whether or not the petition is approved. If the request of the petitioners is approved, a copy of the petition and the resolution of approval shall be delivered by the school board to the board of county commissioners having jurisdiction over the school district losing territory and to the board of county commissioners having jurisdiction over the school district to which the area is to be annexed. (Emphasis added.)
In reviewing statutes, this court will construe them according to their plain and ordinary meaning. Cimarron Ins. Co. v. Croyle, 479 N.W.2d 881, 886 (S.D.1992); Appeal of AT & T Info. Sys., 405 N.W.2d 24, 27 (S.D.1987); Oahe Conservancy Subdistrict v. Janklow, 308 N.W.2d 559, 561 (S.D.1981). We assume statutes mean what they say and that the legislature meant what it said. Famous Brands, 347 N.W.2d at 885; Crescent Elec. Supply Co. v. Nerison, 89 S.D. 203, 210, 232 N.W.2d 76, 80 (1975).
The language in SDCL 13-6-86.1 is clear and unambiguous; the school board "shall ... approve or disapprove." The word "shall" is mandatory, not discretionary language. Helmbolt v. Lemars Mut. Ins. Co. Inc., 404 N.W.2d 55, 59 (S.D.1987); Cf. State v. Bunnell, 324 N.W.2d 418, 420 (S.D.1982); Stephens v. Jones, 24 S.D. 97, 100-01, 123 N.W. 705, 707 (1909). If the legislature had intended school boards to have more discretion, it would have used discretionary language.
The language of the statute limits the action of the boards to either approval or disapproval of the petition submitted. Where the legislature intended statutory requirements to be a minimum or a partial list, it has expressly stated the factors are not limited. 1 Here, the statute makes no provision for partial approval or disapproval of a petition. The statute has no provision allowing a school board to alter a petition. Nor is there any statute in SDCL title 13 on education, aside from appeal under SDCL 13-6-89, establishing a procedure to reconcile the situation we have in this case--one school district modifies a petition and another accepts it as submitted. Hypothetically, there exists an even more complicated situation--each school board varies the land in the petition and accepts its own altered version. The legislature cannot have intended to allow school boards to alter petitions for minor boundary changes and leave the court system to sort out the variants.
Additionally, SDCL 13-6-85 requires a petition for a minor boundary change be signed by the majority of the voters residing in the area to be transferred. 2 When a school district alters the contents of a petition, it negates the consent of the voters. Thus, when a school district alters a petition, that petition is no longer in compliance with SDCL 13-6-85.
The legal maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" means "the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." Black's Law Dictionary 521 (5th ed. 1979). The maxim is a general rule of statutory construction. Argo Oil Corp. v. Lathrop, 76 S.D. 70, 74, 72 N.W.2d 431, 434 (1955). We have cautioned against applying the rule arbitrarily or conclusively as to the meaning of a statute. Id. However,...
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