Amato v. Ward

• Decision Date: 29 March 1977
• Citation: 41 N.Y.2d 469,393 N.Y.S.2d 934,362 N.E.2d 566
• Parties: , 362 N.E.2d 566 In the Matter of Robert AMATO, Appellant, v. Benjamin WARD, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Correctional Services, et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 934

393 N.Y.S.2d 934

41 N.Y.2d 469, 362 N.E.2d 566

In the Matter of Robert AMATO, Appellant, v. Benjamin WARD, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Correctional Services, et al., Respondents.

Court of Appeals of New York.

March 29, 1977.

Jane E. Bloom, Poughkeepsie, for appellant.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. (Joseph Henneberry, Samuel A. Hirshowitz and Rhonda Amkraut Bayer, New York City, of counsel), for respondents.

BREITEL, Chief Judge.

In this proceeding under CPLR article 78, petitioner Amato, a State prisoner, seeks an order directing respondent correctional authorities to restore six months 'good time', that is, time allowed for good behavior in determining eligibility for conditional release (Correction Law, § 803, esp. subds. 1, 5; Penal Law, § 70.40, subds. 1, 3). Supreme Court dismissed the petition, a divided Appellate Division affirmed, and petitioner appeals.

The issue is whether constitutional mandates of due process of law require that a prisoner be given a hearing, with written advance notice of 'charges' or bases for denying him a full time allowance, before the authorities may, in the exercise of their statutory discretion, deny him good behavior time based on his whole institutional record. Not involved, although confused by petitioner, is the institutional resolution of particular charges of misconduct against a prisoner. Resolution of such charges may require a hearing on notice with the now usual and accepted procedural rights in New York to confront and to call witnesses, and, in appropriate cases, the right to representation.

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed. Due process of law does not mandate a rigid procedure for making good time determinations. Instead, the Constitution requires only that prisoners be not penalized for prison misconduct without notice and hearing on charges of misconduct. Petitioner, indeed, received hearings, more protective than those required by due process of law, on all discrete charges of misconduct in prison. Once those proceeding were concluded prison authorities were entitled to rely upon them as well as everything else in his prison record, good or bad, in granting petitioner less than the maximum allowable good time.

On February 16, 1973 petitioner Amato, having been convicted of manslaughter, second degree, was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term with a maximum of 10 years. Amato was credited, as of the time of sentence, with almost four years of jail time (1,419 days).

Amato's prison record was marked by altercations with the prison authorities, often resulting in disciplinary action. The unfavorable record startly after he was received in the State prison and continued even after his appearance before the time allowance committee. Petitioner was brought before an adjustment committee more than a half dozen times, and, on two occasions, charges were filed against him in a superintendent's proceeding. In each case, disciplinary sanctions were imposed. In the first superintendent's proceeding, one of the sanctions imposed was the loss of 60 days good time. That sanction is not an issue in this appeal.

On or about October 1, 1975, as Amato's conditional release date drew near, he appeared before the prison time allowance committee, in compliance with the applicable regulations (7 NYCRR 261.3(b), (d)). The committee, after reviewing petitioner's 'extremely poor institutional record', recommended that he be allowed two years and eight months good time rather than the then allowable maximum of three years and two months. When Amato appeared before the committee again in December, no change in the recommendation was made.

After the committee's October determination, this proceeding was brought in Supreme Court, Dutchess County, seeking restoration of six months good behavior time. On November 20, 1975, the petition was dismissed, and on May 24, 1976, the Appellate Division affirmed, with two Justices dissenting. Although Amato has since been released on parole, the case presents recurring issues of public interest, and should not be dismissed for mootness (see, e.g., Matter of Beattie v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 39 N.Y.2d 445, 446--447, 384 N.Y.S.2d 397, 398--399, 348 N.E.2d 873, 874).

Petitioner relies on Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935. In the Wolff case, a Nebraska prisoner established that the procedures followed in Nebraska prison disciplinary proceedings were violative of the due process clause of the Federal Constitution. The Nebraska statute provided that loss of good time was an appropriate sanction for 'flagrant or serious misconduct', and the inmate challenged the Nebraska procedures for determining whether he was, in fact, guilty of such misconduct. The Supreme Court held the Nebraska procedures unconstitutional and set forth minimum standards for the conduct of prison disciplinary proceedings (see, also, Wilkinson v. Skinner, 34 N.Y.2d 53, 57--59, 356 N.Y.S.2d 15, 19--21, 312 N.E.2d 158, 160--162, and concurring opn., p. 63, 356 N.Y.S.2d p. 24, 312 N.E.2d p. 164, indicating, before Wolff was decided, that prison disciplinary proceedings must be conducted in a manner consistent with due process).

Petitioner contends, in effect, the Wolff v. McDonnell requires that any prison inmate be given a full-scale hearing before a decision is reached on his good time allowance. The argument, however, confuses, if it does not misstate, the Wolff doctrine. In Wolff, a prisoner was charged with misconduct, given short oral notice and an inadequate hearing on the charge, and deprived of good time as a result. The Supreme Court, it is true, stressed the dur process rights of prisoners involved in disciplinary hearings. It happens that loss of good time was the disciplinary sanction involved in Wolff, but that is only coincidental. The holding of the Wolff case is narrower than petitioners would have it. The Wolff case held that prisoners brought up on particular charges of misconduct in prison, faced with serious sanctions of whatever kind, are entitled to fair written notice and hearings on those charges (419 U.S., pp. 563--564, 94 S.Ct. 2963). It was also said, however, that the Federal Constitution may not be used to impose on the States an inflexible system for enforcing prison discipline (see Id., p. 563, 94 S.Ct. 2963; see, also, Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491--492, 93 S.Ct 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439; Wilkinson v. Skinner, 34 N.Y.2d 53, 58--59, 356 N.Y.S.2d 15, 20--21, 312 N.E.2d 158, 161--162, Supra).

In Wolff, the Supreme Court set forth two basic requirements of due process which must be available to prison inmates charged with misconduct: at least 24 hours advance written notice of the charged violation, and a written statement of the fact finders as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the action taken (418 U.S., pp. 563--564, 94 S.Ct. 2963). The first requirement is designed to enable the inmate to marshal the facts in his defense and to clarify the charges (Id., p. 564, 94 S.Ct. 2963). The second is to provide a written basis for administrative or judicial review of the actions of the prison authorities, if such review is available (Id., pp. 564--565, 94 S.Ct. 2963).

The court declined to go further and provide prisoners with a right to confrontation and a right to counsel in disciplinary proceedings (Id., pp. 567--570, 94 S.Ct. 2963). Even the right to present documentary evidence and to call witnesses is carefully circumscribed: where institutional safety or correctional goals are at stake, prison officials have discretion to permit such presentation of evedence (Id., pp. 566--567, 94 S.Ct. 2963).

In contrast, disciplinary proceedings in the prisons of this State provide prisoners with procedural protections beyond those mandated by the Supreme Court. Whenever a report of misbehavior is made out, an adjustment committee, made up of three employees, investigates the alleged infraction (7 NYCRR 252.1(b), 252.2(a)). The adjustment committee 'shall endeavor to obtain from the inmate as full and complete an...