American Tobacco Co. v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 06 February 1989
• Docket Number: No. A041641,A041641
• Citation: 207 Cal.App.3d 1025,255 Cal.Rptr. 280
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Previously published at 207 Cal.App.3d 1025 207 Cal.App.3d 1025, 208 Cal.App.3d 480, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 12,120 The AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY, et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California, In and For the County of Contra Costa, Respondent, Ruby Mae STANTON, et al., Real Parties in Interest.

Page 280

255 Cal.Rptr. 280

Previously published at 207 Cal.App.3d 1025

207 Cal.App.3d 1025, 208 Cal.App.3d 480,

Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 12,120

The AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY, et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California, In and For the County of Contra Costa, Respondent, Ruby Mae STANTON, et al., Real Parties in Interest.

No. A041641.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 2, California.

Feb. 6, 1989.

As Modified March 8, 1989.

Review Denied May 23, 1989.

Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, George A. Sears, Gary H. Anderson, C. Douglas Floyd, Sedgwick, Detert, Moran & Arnold, Kevin J. Dunne, W. Bruce Wold, Michael F. Healy, Margaret L. Eaton, Coblentz, Cahen, McCabe & Breyer, Charles Breyer, Richard Patch, Cooper, White & Cooper, Charles W. Kenady, Lillick, McHose & Charles, John W. Ford, Thomas G. Scarvie, Randall S. Farrimond, San Francisco, Hoge, Fenton, Jones & Apel, Lewis L. Fenton, Larry E. Hayes, Monterey, Rogers, Joseph, O'Donnel & Quinn, Joseph W. Rogers, Jr., Pamela Phillips, Thelen, Marrin, Johnson & Bridges, Frederic C. Nelson, Steven L. Hock, James C. Collins, Howard, Rice, Nemerovski, Canady, Robertson & Falk, Martin R. Glick, H. Joseph Escher, III, Todd E. Thompson, San Francisco, for petitioners

George W. Kilbourne, Martinez, Sanders, Dodson, Rives, McLaughlin & Pegnim, Pittsburg, Bryce C. Anderson, Concord, for real parties in interest.

KLINE, Presiding Justice.

Petitioners, manufacturers of tobacco products, each of whom is a defendant in one or more of eleven lawsuits pending in respondent court, seek a writ of mandate and/or prohibition to compel the lower court to set aside its orders denying petitioners' motions for judgment on the pleadings in the actions filed by the real parties in interest. As we explain, petitioners are entitled to judgments on the pleadings; accordingly, we shall grant the petition.

BACKGROUND

The real parties in interest (who, for the sake of simplicity, shall be referred to as "plaintiffs") consist of individuals and the heirs of individuals who became ill, and in some cases died, allegedly as a result of being exposed to tobacco, asbestos and other toxic substances produced by petitioners and the other named defendants. Plaintiffs filed eleven separate lawsuits for damages for personal injuries and wrongful death; in each case the petitioners moved for judgment on the pleadings, asserting that Civil Code section 1714.45 immunized them from liability founded on use of their tobacco products. ¹ The superior court denied the motions, reasoning that since petitioners refused to admit their products were "inherently unsafe" and had failed to produce evidence to that effect, they had not satisfied the conditions of section 1714.45. Petitioners requested this court to issue a stay and grant a writ of mandate and/or prohibition to compel the lower court to grant the judgment of the pleadings. We granted a stay pending our resolution of the petition.

DISCUSSION

The sole question to be decided is whether section 1714.45 precludes the maintenance of plaintiffs' actions for damages due to injuries or death allegedly resulting from the use of petitioners' tobacco products.

Section 1714.45 provides in full:

"(a) In a product liability action, a manufacturer or seller shall not be liable if:

"(1) The product is inherently unsafe and the product is known to be unsafe by the ordinary consumer who consumes the product with the ordinary knowledge common to the community; and

"(2) The product is a common consumer product intended for personal consumption, such as sugar, castor oil, alcohol, tobacco, and butter, as identified in comment i to Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.

"(b) For purposes of this section, the term 'product liability action' means any action for injury or death caused by a product, except that the term does not include an action based on a manufacturing defect or breach of an express warranty.

"(c) This section is intended to be declarative of and does not alter or amend existing California law, including Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 1972) 8 Cal.3d 121, 104 Cal.Rptr. 433, 501 P.2d 1153, ² and shall apply to all product liability actions pending on, or commenced after, January 1, 1988."

Plaintiffs concede that cigarettes are "common consumer products" within the meaning of subsection (a)(2). However, they argue, and three lower court judges agreed, that the use of the word "if" indicates the statute was intended to be conditional, so that the provision would not apply unless petitioners either stipulated or proved their products are "inherently unsafe" and are "known to be unsafe by the ordinary consumer who consumes the product with the ordinary knowledge common to the community." They further maintain that "tobacco" and the four other products identified in subsection (a)(2) are examples of "common consumer products," not of products that are "inherently unsafe" within the meaning of subsection (a)(1), and that these five products are therefore not automatically immune. Finally, plaintiffs assert that petitioners' interpretation of the statute would result in a significant change in the law, contrary to the language of subsection (c), which evidences the Legislature's intention to codify existing law without change.

In contrast, but with as much reason and force, petitioners maintain they need not prove their products satisfy subsection (a)(1) because the inclusion of the word "tobacco" in subsection (a)(2) is compelling evidence that the Legislature specifically intended tobacco products to be covered by this statute. As petitioners also point out, the legislative reference to "comment i to Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts," which pertains to immunity for certain "unreasonably dangerous" consumer products and identifies the same five products enumerated in section 1714.45, seems to confirm the intention to immunize manufacturers of these particular consumer products.

The words and structure employed by the Legislature convey no "plain meaning." On the contrary, this poorly drafted statute is on its face amenable to two diametrically opposed interpretations, each of which conflicts in some significant way with the words the Legislature used.

In discharging our responsibility to make sense of such antinomies we are compelled to impute to the statute that meaning which comports with the objective the Legislature sought to achieve. (California Mfrs. Assn. v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 836, 844, 157 Cal.Rptr. 676, 598 P.2d 836, and cases there cited.) In determining what the Legislature intended we are bound to consider not only the words used, but also other matters, "such as context, the object in view, the evils to be remedied, the history of the times and of legislation upon the same subject, public policy and contemporaneous construction. (Estate of Jacobs (1943) 61 Cal.App.2d 152, 155, 142 P.2d 454....)" (Alford v. Pierno (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 682, 688, 104 Cal.Rptr. 110.) " 'It is a fundamental rule that a statute should be construed in the light of the history of the times and the conditions which prompted its enactment.' " (People v. Fair (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 890, 893, 62 Cal.Rptr. 632.)

As indicated, the bare words of section 1714.45 are consistent with plaintiffs' position: The statute clearly states that a manufacturer or seller will not be liable if the product meets the conditions set forth in subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2). Subsection (a)(2) states that the product must be a common consumer product intended for personal consumption "such as sugar, castor oil, alcohol, tobacco, and butter...." (Italics added.) The placement of the italicized words suggests the list was only intended to provide examples of common consumer products, not products that are "inherently unsafe" and "known to be unsafe by the ordinary consumer" within the meaning of subsection (a)(1). However, while the unadorned language and organization of the statute are consistent with plaintiffs' position, the legislative history of the statute and "the wider historical circumstances of its enactment," which "are legitimate and valuable aids in divining the statutory purpose" (California Mfrs. Assn. v. Public Utilities Com., supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 844, 157 Cal.Rptr. 676, 598 P.2d 836; People v. Black (1982) 32 Cal.3d 1, 5, 184 Cal.Rptr. 454, 648 P.2d 104) persuade us that the Legislature intended to create the automatic immunity petitioners assert.

Documentary and other evidence produced by petitioners convincingly shows that section 1714.45 was one of the results of a compromise between parties seeking and opposing comprehensive changes in California tort law who had been locked in a long political struggle that had reached stalemate. Shortly before the statute was enacted, representatives of the Association of California Insurance Companies, the Association for California Tort Reform, the California Medical Association, the California Trial Lawyers Association (CTLA) and the California Chamber of Commerce all agreed to a five-year moratorium on initiating, sponsoring or supporting legislation or initiatives on tort reform, insurance regulation or modification of the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975. (Cal.Statutes 1975, 2d Ex.Sess., Ch. 1.)

It was commonly understood that the measure embodying section 1714.45, which enjoyed the active or at least tacit support of all these groups, would provide nearly complete immunity for manufacturers of the five enumerated products. For example, in a letter to CTLA members, the president of that organization explained that:

"... [e]ach of [the enumerated products] is voluntarily and physically consumed by the individual routinely despite the known inherent dangers.

"Since the dangers cannot be further reduced, minimized or alleviated without removing the product from the market, product liability suits would only require or cause their...