People v. Black

• Citation: 648 P.2d 104,32 Cal.3d 1,184 Cal.Rptr. 454
• Decision Date: 29 July 1982
• Docket Number: Cr. 22228
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Parties: , 648 P.2d 104 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jeffrey David BLACK, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 454

184 Cal.Rptr. 454

32 Cal.3d 1, 648 P.2d 104

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jeffrey David BLACK, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 22228.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

July 29, 1982.

Alex Reisman, San Francisco, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for defendant and appellant.

Quin Denvir, State Public Defender, and Kathleen Kahn, Deputy State Public Defender, as amici curiae on behalf of defendant and appellant.

George Deukmejian, Atty. Gen., Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., William D. Stein and Edward P. O'Brien, Asst. Attys. Gen., Thomas A. Brady, Ina Levin Gyemant and Mark S. Howell, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

BROUSSARD, Justice.

The second sentence of Welfare and Institutions Code section 707.2 ¹ provides that "[n]o minor who was under the age of 18 years when he committed any criminal offense ..." and who was tried as an adult shall be sentenced to the state prison unless he has first been remanded to the California Youth Authority to evaluate his suitability for commitment to the Youth Authority. This case presents the question whether a person who was under 18 years when the offense was committed but who has turned 18 by the time of sentencing is entitled to be remanded to the Youth Authority for evaluation and report.

As we shall see, youthful offenders are subject to the supervision of the Youth Authority well beyond the age of 18 years. We conclude that, as used in section 707.2, "a minor who was under the age of 18 years when he committed any criminal offense" includes not only persons who are sentenced prior to their 18th birthday but also offenders who committed the offense prior to their 18th birthday, but are older at the time of sentencing so long as they are within the age of persons subject to training and treatment by the Youth Authority. Such a person therefore must be remanded for evaluation and report concerning his amenability to training and treatment by the Youth Authority prior to being sentenced.

Appellant Jeffrey Black was charged in a juvenile court petition with two counts of violating Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a) (assault with a deadly weapon) plus an enhancement pursuant to Penal Code section 12022.7 (infliction of great bodily injury). After a hearing, pursuant to section 707, appellant was found not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the Juvenile Court Law, and he was remanded to the adult court. On January 15, 1980, appellant pled nolo contendere to a violation of Penal Code sections 236 (false imprisonment) and 245, subdivision (a), and admitted certain enhancement allegations (Pen.Code, §§ 12022.7 and 12022, subdivision (b) [use of a deadly weapon in the commission of a felony] ), on the condition that other allegations would be dismissed and that the sentences would run concurrently. On January 25, 1981, the Penal Code section 12022, subdivision (b) allegation was dismissed and defendant stipulated to a consecutive sentence. At the request of the prosecutor, and with the concurrence of defendant's lawyer, the court vacated the sentencing date of February 15 and reset the matter for February 22 to allow for completion of the presentence report by the probation department. Defendant's 18th birthday was February 19, 1980.

On February 22, 1980, the trial judge rejected defendant's request under section 707.2 to be sent to the Youth Authority for evaluation and report prior to sentencing. Instead, defendant was sentenced to three years and eight months in state prison.

Well-established principles of statutory construction compel the conclusion that a person in appellant's position must be remanded to the Youth Authority for an evaluation and report prior to sentencing. The fundamental rule is that a court "should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law." (Select Base Materials v. Board of Equalization (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645, 335 P.2d 672.) In determining such intent "[t]he court turns first to the words themselves for the answer." (People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.2d 175, 182, 217 P.2d 1 [cert. den.] 340 U.S. 879, 17 S.Ct. 117, 95 L.Ed. 639.) "If possible, significance should be given to every word, phrase, sentence and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose." (Select Base Materials v. Board of Equalization, supra, at p. 645, 335 P.2d 672.) "[A] construction making some words surplusage is to be avoided." (Watkins v. Real Estate Commissioner (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 397, 400, 6 Cal.Rptr. 191.) When used in a statute words must be construed in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute where they appear, and the various parts of a statutory enactment must be harmonized by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole. (Moyer v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230-231, 514 P.2d 1224; Johnstone v. Richardson (1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 41, 46, 229 P.2d 9.) In addition, we consider the legislative history of the statute as well as the historical circumstances of its enactment in determining the intent of the Legislature. (California Mfrs. Assn. v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 836, 844, 157 Cal.2d 676, 598 P.2d 836.)

Although the word "minor" ordinarily connotes one who is under 18 years of age (see Civ.Code, § 25), such construction would defeat the legislative purpose as shown by other language of the section, the purpose of the section, consideration of other related statutes and the history of the provision.

We first look at the language of the statute itself. Due to the juxtaposition of the word "minor" with the phrase "who was under the age of 18 years when he committed any criminal offense," the word "minor" in section 707.2 should be interpreted to avoid redundancy to provide that a person who has turned 18 after the offense but prior to sentencing must be remanded to the Youth Authority for evaluation and report prior to being sentenced to the state prison. If "minor" is read in this section as limited to those under 18 years of age at the time of sentencing, the phrase "who was under the age of 18 years when he committed any criminal offense" becomes surplusage because a person under 18 when sentenced must have been under 18 years when he committed the offense. However, if the word "minor" is read to mean one who is within the age group of those who may be subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the Youth Authority, no redundancy results.

Our search for the intent of the Legislature is aided by observation of the obvious purpose of section 707.2. The section is designed to aid the court in making its determination as to the proper sentence of the youthful offender. (See People v. Grisso (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 380, 386, 163 Cal.Rptr. 547.) Whether or not the defendant is under age 18 at time of sentencing, requiring the evaluation and report furthers that legislative purpose because it can only assist the court in making an informed decision as to the proper sentence.

Obviously, a finding that a youthful offender is not a proper subject to be dealt with under the Juvenile Court Law does not preclude remanding him to the Youth Authority for evaluation and report. To the contrary, the finding is one of the factors that gives rise to the duty to obtain the evaluation report. Section 707.2 expressly provides that a "minor" who has been found not a proper subject to be dealt with under the Juvenile Court Law shall not be sent to prison unless the court finds after considering the Youth Authority report that he is not a suitable subject for commitment.

It is equally clear that persons who commit crimes while under 18 years of age may be committed to the Youth Authority even if they are over the age of 18 at the time of sentencing. (§ 1731.5; People v. Olivas (1976) 17 Cal.3d 236, 239, 131 Cal.Rptr. 55, 551 P.2d 375.) The legislative purpose of aiding the court in making an informed decision as to the proper sentence would be eviscerated if the minor could be sentenced directly to state prison without the report merely because he has turned 18 prior to sentencing.

Moreover, were we to hold that only those under 18 years at the time of sentencing are entitled to an evaluation and report, sections 707.2 and 1731.5 ² would be rendered inconsistent. This result would be contrary to the established proposition that sections 707.2 and 1731.5 are in pari materia ³ and are to be harmonized as if one statute. (People v. Eaker (1980) 100 Cal.App.3d 1007, 1016, 161 Cal.Rptr. 417 [cert. den.] 449 U.S. 859, 101 S.Ct. 161, 66 L.Ed.2d 75.)

The first sentence of section 707.2 authorizes the court to remand the "minor" to the Youth Authority for evaluation and report prior to sentencing; section 1731.5 grants the court the option of committing offenders apprehended over the age of 18 to the Youth Authority. However, if the word "minor" is limited to those who are less than 18 years of age at the time of sentencing, the anomalous result, as the Court of Appeal noted in this case, is that "the sentencing court could have committed defendant directly to CYA without a CYA evaluation but could not have obtained such an evaluation under section 707.2 prior to sentence in order to determine whether appellant should be committed to CYA for the reason that defendant was 18 at the time of sentence." Obviously, no such absurd result was intended by the Legislature when it provided for a discretionary remand of a "minor" in the first sentence of section 707.2. Since it is to be presumed that the Legislature intended the word "minor" to have the same meaning in the second sentence of section 707.2 as it does in the first (Golden Gate Scenic Steamship Lines, Inc. v. P.U.C. (1962) 57 Cal.2d 373, 378, 369 P.2d 257), construing "minor" in section 707.2 to include all those within the age of persons subject to commitment to the Youth...