Anderson v. Cornejo

• Decision Date: 14 March 2002
• Docket Number: No. 97 C 7556.,97 C 7556.
• Citation: 225 F.Supp.2d 834
• Parties: Sharon ANDERSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Mario CORNEJO, individually and in his official capacity, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

225 F.Supp.2d 834

Sharon ANDERSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Mario CORNEJO, individually and in his official capacity, et al., Defendants.

No. 97 C 7556.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

March 14, 2002.

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Judson H. Miner, Paul L. Strauss, Jeffrey I. Cummings, John F. Belcaster, Bridget Arimond, Miner, Barnhill & Galland, Chicago, IL, Alan J. Shefler, Shefler & Berger, Ltd., Chicago, IL, Cynthia A. Wilson, Sharon K. Legenza, Clyde E. Murphy, Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights, Chicago, IL, Derrick A. Carter, Valparaiso University Law School Faculty, Valparaiso, IN, Edward M. Fox, Ed Fox & Associates, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs.

James M. Kuhn, Asst. U.S. Atty., Chicago, IL, Kenneth L. Cunniff, Kenneth Cunniff, Ltd., Chicago, IL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

HART, Senior District Judge.

As presently constituted, this case has approximately 90 named plaintiffs, all of whom are African-American women with United States citizenship who allegedly were searched by employees of the United States Customs Service at Chicago's O'Hare International Airport ("O'Hare") following their arrival on international flights. The searches of the named plaintiffs allegedly occurred between March 1996 and August 1999.¹ Named as defendants are the United States, the United States Customs Service ("Customs"), and approximately 70 current or former employees of Customs. Management officials, lower-level supervisors, and nonsupervisory employees are sued in their individual capacities.² Presently pending are certain defendants' motions for summary judgment and related procedural motions.

I. ISSUES RAISED

A. Allegations of the Complaint

Following prior rulings on motions to dismiss, for class certification, and for summary judgment, the following claims remain pending in the Seventh Amended Complaint. See Anderson v. Cornejo, 199 F.R.D. 228 (N.D.Ill.2000) ("Anderson IV"); Anderson v. Cornejo, 1999 WL 258501 (N.D.Ill. April 21, 1999) ("Anderson II"). See also Anderson v. Cornejo, 1999) WL 35307 (N.D.Ill. Jan.11, 1999) ("Anderson I").³ Count I is an equal protection claim that Customs inspectors targeted African-American women for non-routine personal searches.⁴ Count III is a Fourth Amendment claim that Customs inspectors lacked sufficient cause or suspicion to seize, detain, and search plaintiffs. Count V is a Federal Tort Claims Act claim against the United States that the conduct of the individual defendants constitutes false imprisonment, assault, and battery. Count VI is a Fourth and Fifth Amendment claim that Customs inspectors⁵ denied due process by not obtaining judicial authorization for the searches and by holding plaintiffs "in communicado."⁶

Count II is an equal protection claim that Managerial and Supervisory Defendants failed to take proper action to prevent or stop the discriminatory selection of African-American women for nonroutine personal searches alleged in Count I. Count IV is a Fourth Amendment claim that Managerial and Supervisory Defendants failed to take proper action to prevent or stop the illegal seizures, searches, and detentions alleged in Count III. Count VII is a Fourth and Fifth Amendment due process claim that Managerial and Supervisory Defendants promulgated and executed a "policy and practice allowing the Customs inspectors, on nothing more than alleged `reasonable suspicion,' (a) to detain plaintiffs for an indefinite and wholly discretionary time-period; (b) to conduct the non-routine personal searches described herein without judicial authorization; (c) while holding the plaintiffs in communicado."⁷ 7th Am. Compl. ¶ 175. Count IX is a claim that Managerial Defendants, Supervisory Defendants, and possibly Customs inspectors conspired together in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) to commit the violations alleged in Counts I, III, and VI, including by establishing criteria for targeting persons to be searched, fabricating search justifications, destroying plaintiffs' Customs declaration cards, and ignoring complaints of discrimination against African-American women. Count X is a claim that Managerial and Supervisory Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1986 by failing to prevent the conspiratorial conduct alleged in Count IX.

Count VIII is a claim for injunctive relief on behalf of a putative class of all persons in the country subjected to non-routine personal searches at international airports. It is labeled as an Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") due process claim based on the various Customs Commissioners' promulgation of the policy and practice alleged in Count VII.⁸

The damages claims of each count are on behalf of the named plaintiffs only.⁹ Classes have been certified for injunctive relief only as to Counts II, IV, VII, VIII, IX, and X.¹⁰ Anderson IV, 199 F.R.D. at 237-45, 264-65, 267.

B. The Motions for Summary Judgment

Managerial Defendants Sam Banks ("Banks"), George Weise,¹¹ Kevin Weeks, Sergei Hoteko, and Robert Trotter have moved for summary judgment on all the individual capacity claims brought against them in Counts II, IV, VII, IX, and X,¹² primarily on the ground that they were not personally involved in any of the alleged misconduct.¹³ Managerial Defendant Patrick Noonan also moves for summary judgment, adopting the briefs of the other Managerial Defendants.¹⁴ The parties have agreed that any ruling as to Counts II, IV, and VII should also be applied to the claims in those counts that are against Supervisory Defendants Mario Cornejo, Larry DiGianntonio, William Desmond, Gloria, Banks, Ronald Zaczek, Gene Taylor, David Gooding, Dominic Biagioni, Michael Johnson, and Mark Woods, except as to selected searches in which one or more of these Supervisory Defendants were directly involved.¹⁵ See Agreed Motion of Certain Defendants to Join in the Pending Motion for Summary Judgment of the Managerial Defendants [Docket Entry 313]. The parties have also agreed that any ruling as to Count IX should apply as to the Count IX § 1985 conspiracy claims against Customs inspectors Olga Martinez, Maria Rocha, Michelle Belcastro, Jennifer Usleber, Melissa Zytowski, Lynda Hall, Guadalupe Corona, Chen W. Yu, and Samuel Ko. See id.

C. Issues Adequately Raised by the Motions

On a motion for summary judgment, the entire record is considered with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the nonmovant and all factual disputes resolved in favor of the nonmovant. Schneiker v. Fortis Insurance Co., 200 F.3d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir.2000); Baron v. City of Highland Park, 195 F.3d 333, 337-38 (7th Cir.1999). The burden of establishing a lack of any genuine issue of material fact rests on the movant. Wollin v. Gondert, 192 F.3d 616, 621-22 (7th Cir.1999); Essex v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 111 F.3d 1304, 1308 (7th Cir.1997). The nonmovant, however, must make a showing sufficient to establish any essential element for which she will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Shank v. William R. Hague, Inc., 192 F.3d 675, 681 (7th Cir.1999); Wintz v. Northrop Corp., 110 F.3d 508, 512 (7th Cir.1997). The movant need not provide affidavits or deposition testimony showing the nonexistence of such essential elements. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Also, it is not sufficient to show evidence of purportedly disputed facts if those facts are not plausible in light of the entire record. See NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-America, Inc., 45 F.3d 231, 236 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1104, 115 S.Ct. 2249, 132 L.Ed.2d 257 (1995); Covalt v. Carey Canada, Inc., 950 F.2d 481, 485 (7th Cir.1991); Collins v. Associated Pathologists, Ltd., 844 F.2d 473, 476-77 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 852, 109 S.Ct. 137, 102 L.Ed.2d 110 (1988). As the Seventh Circuit has summarized:

The moving party bears the initial burden of directing the district court to the determinative issues and the available evidence that pertains to each. "[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ("the burden on the moving party may be discharged by `showing'—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case"). Then, with respect to issues that the non-moving party will bear the burden of proving at trial, the non-moving party must come forward with affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or admissions and designate specific facts which establish that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The non-moving party cannot rest on the pleadings alone, but must designate specific facts in affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or admissions that establish that there is a genuine triable issue. Id. The non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving party]." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

Selan v. Kiley, 969 F.2d 560, 564 (7th Cir.1992).

A dispute exists regarding the precise issues raised by defendants' summary judgment motions. Plaintiffs have moved to strike defendant...