Roy v. City of Everett
| Citation | 118 Wn.2d 352,823 P.2d 1084 |
| Decision Date | 06 February 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 56705-1,56705-1 |
| Parties | Sheila ROY, individually, and as parent and guardian for Lakara Ticeson, Respondent, v. CITY OF EVERETT, a Washington municipal corporation; Everett Police Department; Al Shelstad, Chief of Everett Police Department; Detective K.G. Thiessen; Officer M.B. Campbell; John Doe; and Lieutenant Peter Hegge, Petitioners, and County of Snohomish; Snohomish County Prosecuting Attorney Seth Dawson; Snohomish County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Randall W. Yates, Snohomish County Prosecuting Attorney John Roe; and Personal Representative, Estate of Milton Glenn, Defendants. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Washington |
Katrina C. Pflaumer, Mair, Abercrombie, Camiel & Rummonds, Peter K. Mair, Seattle, for respondent.
Richard L. Andrews, Bellevue City Atty., Lori Molander, Asst., David E. Kahn, Asst., Bellevue, amicus curiae for petitioners on behalf of Washington State Ass'n of Mun. Attys.
Christine Lamson, Michael W. Gendler, Seattle, amicus curiae for respondent on behalf of Northwest Women's Law Center, The American Civil Liberties DOLLIVER, Justice.
Union of Washington and Washington State Coalition Against Domestic Violence.
Sheila Roy brought this action on behalf of herself and her daughter in May 1986, following a reign of terror beginning in October 1983, during which Milton Glenn relentlessly and violently pursued and abused her. Roy sought damages against Snohomish County, members of its prosecutor's office, the City of Everett and members of its police department, and Glenn's estate. (Glenn had killed himself during his final assault on Roy on October 5, 1984.) The claim against Snohomish County and its prosecutors was dismissed on the grounds of prosecutorial immunity. Petitioners here are the City of Everett, the Everett Chief of Police and certain Everett police officers.
In her complaint, plaintiff alleged defendants failed to protect her, which failure constituted negligence, gross negligence, wanton misconduct, and outrage; violated their duties under RCW 10.99.070, the domestic violence act; failed to train and supervise; violated equal protection provisions of the Washington Constitution and RCW 49.60; and violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Her complaint does not allege any misconduct by the police in the course of an arrest or other, on-the-scene action such as entering the home to break up a fight. Rather, plaintiff claims there was a year-long pattern by the Everett Police Department of nonenforcement of the law and failure to take adequate steps to protect her from her assailant. The issue here is whether the year-long pattern of inaction is immunized under RCW 10.99.070. We hold it is not.
Defendants moved for summary judgment asserting they were immune from suit under RCW 10.99.070. The statute provides:
A peace officer shall not be held liable in any civil action for an arrest based on probable cause, enforcement in good faith of a court order, or any other action or omission in good faith under this chapter arising from an alleged incident of domestic violence brought by any party to the incident.
The trial court denied defendants' motion for summary judgment under the claim of immunity. In its memorandum opinion, the trial court concluded:
[T]o rely on that language [RCW 10.99.070] to completely immunize the defendants ... would undercut the purpose of the Domestic Violence Act which is to recognize the necessity of early intervention in domestic violence cases.... If I am to give substance to the immunity provisions of the statute, I must construe it narrowly because of the wording of the intent section. When RCW 10.99.010 and 10.99.070 are read together, the latter grants immunity only for conduct in the course of an arrest or other on the scene action such as entering a home to break up a fight ...
Memorandum Decision on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Memorandum Decision), at 2-3. The court further ruled that:
Defendant City and police officers' immunity under RCW 10.99.070, construed in light of the entire Domestic Violence Act, is limited to conduct in the course of an arrest or other on-the-scene action such as entering a home to break up a fight. Since Plaintiff Roy's suit is not based on such conduct, it is not barred by the immunity section of the domestic violence law, and therefore defendant's motion on that issue is denied.
Order on Parties' Motion for Summary Judgment (Order), at 1. The court also rejected the defendants' claim that qualified immunity precluded their liability for Roy's claims because "[m]aterial issues of fact exist as to whether defendants' conduct was objectively reasonable ..." Order, at 1-2.
Defendants interpret the words in RCW 10.99.070, "any other action or omission", as giving police officers--and the entities for which they work--absolute immunity from any claim based on domestic violence, unless it can be proved the officers acted in bad faith. Under this view neither negligent failure to enforce the law nor failure on the part of a police department to develop procedures to protect victims of domestic violence would suffice to abrogate this immunity. RCW 10.99.070, however, was not enacted in a vacuum. As the trial court correctly noted, it is a part of, and must be read in light of, the general purpose and intent The purpose of this chapter is to recognize the importance of domestic violence as a serious crime against society and to assure the victim of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse which the law and those who enforce the law can provide. The legislature finds that the existing criminal statutes are adequate to provide protection for victims of domestic violence. However, previous societal attitudes have been reflected in policies and practices of law enforcement agencies and prosecutors which have resulted in differing treatment of crimes occurring between cohabitants and of the same crimes occurring between strangers. Only recently has public perception of the serious consequences of domestic violence to society and to the victims led to the recognition of the necessity for early intervention by law enforcement agencies. It is the intent of the legislature that the official response to cases of domestic violence shall stress the enforcement of the laws to protect the victim and shall communicate the attitude that violent behavior is not excused or tolerated. Furthermore, it is the intent of the legislature that criminal laws be enforced without regard to whether the persons involved are or were married, cohabiting, or involved in a relationship.
of the domestic violence act. The statement of intent in RCW 10.99.010 reads
That statement of intent is crucial to the case before us and explains why the "any other action or omission" language must not be interpreted as broadly as the defendants suggest, so broadly that it would vitiate the rest of RCW 10.99.
Over the lengthy period of time during which Milton Glenn terrorized and abused Sheila Roy, she was unsuccessful in stopping the violence. This lack of success might be attributable to any of a number of factors--among them, lack of societal comprehension of the problems relating to domestic violence, lack of enforcement of existing laws by the police, or failure on her own part to follow up on the complaints she made. It is not for us to determine on appeal from a denial of summary judgment for defendants, however, whether Roy may have been partially responsible for the fact that the laws protecting her were not adequately enforced. That is for the jury to decide, after weighing all the evidence. What this court can and must determine is the proper interpretation of RCW 10.99.070.
As we noted in Seven Gables Corp. v. MGM/UA Entertainment Co., 106 Wash.2d 1, 6, 721 P.2d 1 (1986):
In construing statutes, the goal is to carry out the intent of the Legislature. In doing so, it is the duty of the court in interpreting a statute to make the statute purposeful and effective. Any statutory interpretation which would render an unreasonable and illogical consequence should be avoided. Thus, in attempting to effect the intent of the Legislature, an act must be construed as a whole, harmonizing all provisions to ensure proper construction.
(Citations omitted.) Similarly, a unanimous court in Anderson v. Morris, 87 Wash.2d 706, 716, 558 P.2d 155 (1976) stated:
[I]f alternative interpretations are possible, the one that best advances the overall legislative purpose should be adopted.... "The primary objective of statutory construction is to carry out the intent of the legislature." Anderson v. O'Brien, 84 Wn.2d 64, 67, 524 P.2d 390 (1974). Legislative intent is to be determined in the context of the entire statute, interpreted in terms of the statute's general purpose.
Indeed, in In re R., 97 Wash.2d 182, 187, 641 P.2d 704 (1982), this court went so far as to state:
In resolving a question of statutory construction, the spirit and intent of the law should prevail over the letter of the law. Furthermore, if an act is subject to two interpretations, that which best advances the legislative purpose should be adopted.
(Citations omitted.)
The language of RCW 10.99.070, particularly that portion regarding actions or omissions in good faith by peace officers, is less than a model of clarity. Nonetheless, we fully concur with the observation of the trial court that "to rely on that language to completely immunize the defendants in the instant case would undercut the purpose of the Domestic Violence Act which is to recognize the necessity of early intervention in domestic violence cases." Memorandum Decision, at 2. The trial court properly ordered that:
Defendant City and...
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