Anderson v. State, 71686

• Decision Date: 19 March 1986
• Docket Number: No. 71686,71686
• Citation: 178 Ga.App. 355,343 S.E.2d 411
• Parties: ANDERSON v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 411

343 S.E.2d 411

178 Ga.App. 355

ANDERSON v. The STATE.

No. 71686.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

March 19, 1986.

Wendell Eric Anderson, pro se.

Lewis R. Slaton, Dist. Atty., Joseph J. Drolet, Richard E. Hicks, Ann Poe Mitchell, Asst. Dist. Attys., for appellee.

SOGNIER, Judge.

Appellant was convicted of kidnapping and aggravated assault, and appeals pro se.

1. Appellant contends the trial court erred by granting the State's oral motion in limine to prevent appellant from questioning witnesses about the victim's past sexual conduct. (Appellant was charged with rape, but convicted of the lesser offense of aggravated assault). Although the court initially granted the State's motion, it later reversed its ruling and allowed appellant's counsel to cross-examine witnesses about the victim's past sexual conduct. Hence, this issue is moot.

2. Appellant contends the trial court erred by admitting into evidence his statement to a police detective, which appellant contends was involuntary because he was arrested illegally and was threatened by the police. The issue of an illegal arrest was not raised below, and this court will not consider questions raised for the first time on appeal. Bowen v. State, 173 Ga.App. 361, 362(4), 326 S.E.2d 525 (1985).

At a hearing outside the presence of the jury detective H.E. Miller testified that after tracing to appellant the tag number on the car used during commission of the offenses, Miller went to appellant's home and spoke to his mother and some other relatives. Appellant was not home but later the same day he contacted the police and went voluntarily to the police station to talk to Miller. Appellant was advised fully of his Miranda rights (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694); he was coherent and was not intoxicated; he was not threatened and no promises were made to him; and he did not request a lawyer. Although appellant refused to sign a waiver, he was asked if he wanted to make a statement and appellant stated he did, as he wanted to tell the police exactly what happened. Miller testified that appellant then made a detailed statement indicating he and a friend aranged to have sex with the victim for money and followed her to a rest stop on I-85. Appellant told Miller that when the victim refused to have sex with him (appellant), his friend hit the victim with a pistol and appellant then had sex with the victim. Appellant testified at the hearing that he made the statement because the police threatened to beat it out of him and he was scared.

Based on testimony presented at the hearing we find no error in admitting appellant's statement into evidence. Factual and credibility determinations as to voluntariness of a confession made at a suppression hearing must be accepted by appellate courts unless such determinations are clearly erroneous. Griswold v. State, 159 Ga.App. 22, 23(2), 282 S.E.2d 679 (1981). We find no error here.

3. Appellant contends it was error to permit two State witnesses to testify as medical experts. The first witness, Dr. Jeffery Goldberg, testified that he graduated from Rutgers University and New Jersey Medical School. He had completed his internship and was in resident training in obstetrics and gynecology at Emory University Hospital when he examined the victim in this case. The second witness, Carlton Higgins, was an emergency medical technician (EMT) who had fulfilled the State of Georgia requirements for becoming an EMT by completing 150 training hours plus clinical time. Higgins had also fulfilled the requirements to become an advanced EMT paramedic, which consisted of 450 hours training plus clinical time.

It is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial judge as to whether a witness has such learning and experience in a particular profession as to entitle him to be deemed prima facie an expert. Redd v. State, 240 Ga. 753, 755(2), 243 S.E.2d 16 (1978); Morris v. State, ...