Anderson v. State

• Decision Date: 18 May 2012
• Docket Number: No. SC11–3.,SC11–3.
• Citation: 87 So.3d 774
• Parties: Candie Marie ANDERSON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

87 So.3d 774

Candie Marie ANDERSON, Petitioner,

v.STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. SC11–3.

Supreme Court of Florida.

March 15, 2012.

Rehearing Denied May 18, 2012.

James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Michael S. Becker, Assistant Public Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, FL, for Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, Pamela J. Koller and Wesley Harold Heidt, Assistant Attorneys General, Daytona Beach, FL, for Respondent.

LEWIS, J.

Candie Marie Anderson seeks review of the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Anderson v. State, 48 So.3d 1015 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010), on the basis that it expressly and directly conflicts with the decisions of Brown v. State, 764 So.2d 741 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), and Haygood v. State, 17 So.3d 894 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009), on a question of law. We have jurisdiction. Seeart. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.

Facts

Candie Anderson entered a no contest plea to the charges of burglary of a dwelling, grand theft, and falsification of ownership to a pawnbroker. The trial court adjudicated her guilty of all three counts and sentenced her to five years imprisonment. However, the court suspended her sentence on the condition that she complete two years of community control followed by probation. The trial court also ordered her to pay monetary restitution to the victims of her crimes.

Before a meeting between Anderson and her probation officer, an arrest warrant had been issued for Anderson based on an alleged violation of her probation resulting from a failure to pay restitution. Due to Anderson's failure to pay restitution, the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV) had also suspended her driver's license. One of the victims of Anderson's crimes informed the probation officer she had seen Anderson driving while her license was suspended. Based on this tip, the probation officer checked the driving record of Anderson and confirmed Anderson's license suspension.

Upon Anderson's arrival at the meeting, the probation officer arrested her for violation of her probation due to her failure to pay restitution. As the probation officer patted down Anderson, she discovered that Anderson had possession of automobile keys. Anderson admitted to the probation officer that the keys belonged to her and that she had driven a vehicle to the meeting. At the time Anderson drove the vehicle to the meeting, she allegedly did not have actual knowledge that her license was suspended, and she contended that she had not received a written notice of the suspension. She was charged with driving with a suspended license pursuant to section 322.34, Florida Statutes (2011). After her arrest, Anderson paid the required restitution, and the DHSMV reinstated her license. However, Anderson still faced a charge of violation of probation based upon the charge of driving with a suspended license.

During Anderson's violation of probation hearing, defense counsel contended that the trial court should not find a violation of probation because the State had failed to satisfy the requirements of section 322.34(2), as it had not proven that Anderson had actual knowledge of her suspended license before she drove to the meeting with her probation officer. The driving record of Anderson indicated that the DHSMV mailed a written notice of the license suspension to the address on file for Anderson. The mailing was confirmed when the State entered the driving record of Anderson into evidence, which reflected that the DHSMV sent notice that was in compliance with section 322.251(1), Florida Statutes (2011).

Anderson testified that the address to which the DHSMV mailed the notice of suspension was her place of residence at the time of the license suspension and the DHSMV's mailing. Defense counsel, however, contended that the fact that the DHSMV had mailed a written notice to Anderson's address could not sustain a finding of actual knowledge of suspension and, therefore, did not support a finding of a violation of probation for driving with a suspended license. The trial court, however, found that the mailing was sufficient to place Anderson on notice of her suspended license. Therefore, the court held that she violated her probation, and it reinstated her original sentence that had been suspended.

On appeal, the Fifth District affirmed. See Anderson, 48 So.3d at 1018–19. In reaching its decision, the Fifth District construed sections 322.34 and 322.251(1) together. See id. at 1018. It explained that section 322.251(1) outlines the manner in which a notice of suspension is provided, and that those parameters apply to a charge of driving with a suspended license. See id. It also stated that section 322.251(1) permits notice either in person or by mail. See id. The district court then noted the rebuttable presumption of knowledge provided in section 322.34(2), stated that this presumption was unavailable in this case, and held that the unavailability of the presumption did not alter the outcome of this case. See id. at 1018–19. That rebuttable presumption was not available because this case involved a suspension for failure to pay a traffic fine or financial responsibility. See§ 322.34(2). More specifically, the district court concluded that the State, even without the application of the rebuttable presumption, established the knowledge element when it presented evidence of the DHSMV's mailing of written notice of Anderson's license suspension to her correct address at the time of the mailing. See Anderson, 48 So.3d at 1019.

This review followed. At issue is whether the Fifth District misconstrued the knowledge requirement of section 322.34(2) in light of the decisions in Brown and Haygood. In those decisions, the districtcourts held that, in instances where section 322.34(2)'s rebuttable presumption does not apply, the State must prove that an individual has actually received notice of a license suspension to establish knowledge of that suspension. See Haygood, 17 So.3d at 896;Brown, 764 So.2d at 743–44.

Standard of Review and Principles of Statutory Construction

This case concerns a matter of statutory interpretation and construction, which is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. See City of Parker v. State, 992 So.2d 171, 176 (Fla.2008). Legislative intent is the polestar that guides the interpretation and construction of a statute. See E.A.R. v. State, 4 So.3d 614, 629 (Fla.2009). A court primarily discerns legislative intent by looking to the plain text of the relevant statute. See id. A court gives a statute its plain meaning when the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a definite meaning. See Maddox v. State, 923 So.2d 442, 450 (Fla.2006). When the meaning of a statute is ambiguous, a court may turn to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction. See E.A.R., 4 So.3d at 629.

One rule of statutory construction is the doctrine of in pari materia. See id. This principle requires courts to construe statutes that relate to the same subject matter together to harmonize those statutes and give effect to legislative intent. See id. Similarly, a statute is to be read as a consistent whole, and a court should accord meaning and harmony to all of its parts, with effect given to every clause and related provision. See Larimore v. State, 2 So.3d 101, 106 (Fla.2008).

Applicable Statutes and Case Law

Under section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes (2011), any person who drives while his or her license is cancelled, suspended, or revoked, with knowledge of this fact, may be convicted of driving while a license is cancelled, suspended, or revoked, which is classified as either a misdemeanor or a felony of the third degree. The text of section 322.34(2)-(4) is as follows:

(2) Any person whose driver's license or driving privilege has been canceled, suspended, or revoked as provided by law, except persons defined in s. 322.264, who, knowing of such cancellation, suspension, or revocation, drives any motor vehicle upon the highways of this state while such license or privilege is canceled, suspended, or revoked, upon:

(a) A first conviction is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.

(b) A second conviction is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.

(c) A third or subsequent conviction is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

The element of knowledge is satisfied if the person has been previously cited as provided in subsection (1); or the person admits to knowledge of the cancellation, suspension, or revocation; or the person received notice as provided in subsection (4). There shall be a rebuttable presumption that the knowledge requirement is satisfied if a judgment or order as provided in subsection (4) appears in the department's records for any case except for one involving a suspension by the department for failure to pay a traffic fine or for a financial responsibility violation.

(3) In any proceeding for a violation of this section, a court may consider evidence, other than that specified in subsection (2), that the person knowingly violated this section.

(4) Any judgment or order rendered by a court or adjudicatory body or any uniform traffic citation that cancels, suspends, or revokes a person's driver's license must contain a provision notifying the person that his or her driver's license has been canceled, suspended, or revoked.

(Emphasis added). In section 322.251(1), Florida Statutes (2011), the Florida Legislature delineated what constitutes notice of a cancellation, suspension, or revocation:

All orders of cancellation, suspension, revocation, or disqualification issued under the provisions of this chapter, chapter 318, chapter 324, or ss. 627.732–627.734 shall be given either by [1] personal delivery thereof to the licensee whose license...