Anderson v. State

• Decision Date: 29 July 2011
• Docket Number: No. 09–0507.,09–0507.
• Citation: 801 N.W.2d 1
• Parties: Michael ANDERSON, Appellant,v.STATE of Iowa, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

801 N.W.2d 1

Michael ANDERSON, Appellant,

v.STATE of Iowa, Appellee.

No. 09–0507.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

July 29, 2011.

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Patricia A. Reynolds, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kyle P. Hanson, Assistant Attorney General, Stephen H. Holmes, County Attorney, and Mary Howell Sirna, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.WATERMAN, Justice.

“Ours not to reason why, ours but to read, and apply. It is our duty to accept the law as the legislative body enacts it.” Holland v. State, 253 Iowa 1006, 1011, 115 N.W.2d 161, 164 (1962) (Thompson, J.). ¹ In this case we must decide whether a convicted sex offender incarcerated after revocation of his probation is entitled to credit against his prison sentence for time spent living at home under supervised probation wearing an electronic monitoring device on his ankle. The district court denied the credit, and a divided court of appeals affirmed. Although it is counterintuitive to count days living at home against a state prison sentence, we conclude the plain language of Iowa Code section 907.3(3) (2007), requires credit for the time Anderson was committed to electronic monitoring and home supervision during his probation. We therefore vacate the decision of the court of appeals, reverse the district court ruling, and remand for entry of an order providing that sentencing credit.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Defendant, Michael Leroy Anderson, was charged by trial information with two counts of second-degree sexual abuse. On April 15, 2004, Anderson entered an Alford plea of guilty to two counts of enticing away a minor, a class “D” felony. The district court accepted the plea and entered judgment. The district court sentenced Anderson to two five-year prison terms, to be served consecutively, but suspended both sentences and placed him on probation with the Second Judicial District Department of Correctional Services (DCS) for five years on each count.

Anderson's first probation requirement was to undergo sex-offender treatment, residing “at the Marshalltown Residential Facility until such time as maximum benefits ha[d] been derived.” Anderson could leave for work, but otherwise had to remain at the facility. Anderson was discharged from the Marshalltown facility on March 5, 2005, subject to the remaining conditions of his probation. Any benefits he received from his sex-offender treatment proved short-lived.

The DCS placed Anderson on electric monitoring and home supervision. An electronic monitoring device was attached to his ankle to be worn at all times. Probation officer Ellen Barker was assigned to his case, and he had to check in with her daily. Anderson was required to maintain employment, and he worked six days a week. The DCS allowed him one hour to return home from work in order to run errands. He could obtain permission to leave his house in the evening for entertainment, such as attending movies; and with permission, he could remain out until 1 a.m. and travel outside the county. At home, Anderson had unlimited access to television, internet, and video games.

Another probation requirement prohibited Anderson from contact with children age sixteen or younger. On March 3, 2006, Barker filed a report of violation, stating Anderson had “numerous contacts with sixteen-year-old girls.” Specifically, Anderson, then age thirty-seven, told Barker he was getting calls from both the parents of his “girlfriend,” S.R., and the Iowa Falls police threatening to press charges if he did not stay away from her. He claimed he thought S.R. was age twenty. Barker obtained the police report indicating S.R. was age sixteen, met Anderson over the internet on the website Mate1.com, got together with him five or six times, and had spent the night at his house. The report also noted Anderson had provided Bacardi rum to S.R.'s sixteen-year-old friend. On March 10, Barker went to Anderson's home to warn him against contacting minors. Later that evening, Barker received a tip from the police that S.R. was at Anderson's home. Barker went there with two officers and found S.R. hiding naked in a spare bedroom under the bed. A search of Anderson's computer revealed he frequented pornography websites, dating websites, and chat rooms, and he downloaded pictures of clothed children.

On May 24, the district court revoked Anderson's probation and reinstated the prison terms not to exceed ten years. He received sentencing credit for the time he spent in the Marshalltown residential facility, but not for the time he lived at home under electronic monitoring and supervision. Anderson filed an application for postconviction relief seeking such credit. The district court denied Anderson's application, concluding the statutory scheme only provided sentencing credit for time spent in a jail-like facility. The district court reasoned his electronic monitoring and home supervision did not restrict his liberty in a manner similar to jail and that awarding him sentencing credit would “eviscerate the difference between probation and incarceration” and “lead to an absurd result.” The court of appeals affirmed with a dissent. We granted Anderson's application for further review.

II. Standard of Review.

We review statutory interpretation issues raised in postconviction relief actions for correction of errors at law. Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 519–20 (Iowa 2003).

III. Principles of Statutory Interpretation.

Anderson argues both Iowa Code sections 903A.5(1) and 907.3(3) entitle him to receive credit for time served under electronic monitoring and home supervision. The State argues the legislature only intended to award defendants sentencing credit for time served in a jail-like setting.

When tasked with interpreting a statute we have stated:

“[O]ur primary goal is to give effect to the intent of the legislature.” State v. Anderson, 782 N.W.2d 155, 158 (Iowa 2010). “That intent is evidenced by the words used in the statute.” State v. Kidd, 562 N.W.2d 764, 765 (Iowa 1997). “When a statute is plain and its meaning clear, courts are not permitted to search for meaning beyond its express terms.” State v. Chang, 587 N.W.2d 459, 461 (Iowa 1998). In the absence of legislative definition, we give words their ordinary meaning. In interpreting criminal statutes, however, we have repeatedly stated that provisions establishing the scope of criminal liability are to be strictly construed with doubts resolved therein in favor of the accused.

State v. Hearn, 797 N.W.2d 577, 583 (Iowa 2011) (other citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Rodenburg, 562 N.W.2d 186, 189 (Iowa 1997) (construing sentencing credit provision using “the legal maxim that when statutory language is not ambiguous, or when a statute is plain and its meaning is clear, this court need not search for legislative intent or a meaning beyond the expressed language”); 3 Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 58:4, at 120 (7th ed.2008) (statutes impinging on liberty interests are subject to strict construction).

IV. Iowa Code Section 903A.5(1).

Anderson argued he is entitled to credit for time served monitored at home based on Iowa Code section 903A.5(1), which awards sentencing credit to any “inmate ... confined to a county jail or other correctional or mental facility at any time prior to sentencing, or after sentencing but prior to the case having been decided on appeal.” ² The district court and court of appeals correctly determined Anderson is not entitled to sentencing credit under section 903A.5(1).

Anderson's electronic monitoring and home supervision does not make him an “inmate ... confined to a county jail or other correctional or mental facility” within the meaning of section 903A.5(1). In Rodenburg, we noted, “The statutory words here are plain and unambiguous and clearly only allow credit for time served in state correctional institutions or detention facilities.” 562 N.W.2d at 189. We held the defendant was not entitled to sentencing credit for time spent in police custody at a hospital because the hospital was not a “jail or other correctional facility.” Id. Similarly, Anderson's home is not a “jail or other correctional facility.” Section 903A.5(1) does not entitle Anderson to sentencing credit for time spent under home supervision and electronic monitoring.

V. Iowa Code Section 907.3(3).

A. The Statutory Scheme. Sentencing credits are also allowed under Iowa Code section 907.3(3), which provides:

By record entry at the time of or after sentencing, the court may suspend the sentence and place the defendant on probation upon such terms and conditions as it may require including commitment to an alternate jail facility or a community correctional residential treatment facility to be followed by a term of probation as specified in section 907.7, or commitment of the defendant to the judicial district department of correctional services for supervision or services under section 901B.1 at the level of sanctions which the district department determines to be appropriate and the payment of fees imposed under section 905.14. A person so committed who has probation revoked shall be given credit for such time served.

(Emphasis added.) The court of appeals concluded this provision did not require Anderson to receive credit for his time spent under home supervision monitored electronically with the ankle bracelet. We disagree.

This court, in 1982, construed an earlier version of this statute to hold a defendant was not entitled to sentencing credit for time spent on probation because no provision specifically authorized such a sentencing credit. Trecker v. State, 320 N.W.2d 594, 595 (Iowa 1982) (“Denial of credit is appropriate under circumstances where the restrictions imposed cannot be equated with incarceration.”). The court of appeals majority relied on Tre...