State v. Kidd
Decision Date | 23 April 1997 |
Docket Number | No. 96-630,96-630 |
Citation | 562 N.W.2d 764 |
Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Mark Anthony KIDD, Appellant. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and John M. Priester, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Robert P. Ewald, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and Shawn Wehde, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by HARRIS, P.J., and CARTER, SNELL, ANDREASEN, and TERNUS, JJ.
During the execution of a search warrant, police found three sawed-off shotguns bundled together in a sleeping bag in the home of the defendant, Mark Anthony Kidd. Kidd was charged with three counts of unauthorized possession of an offensive weapon. Iowa Code § 724.3 (1995). 1 Kidd argued at trial the simultaneous possession of three offensive weapons constitutes only one violation of Iowa Code section 724.3. The district court rejected this argument and a jury found Kidd guilty on each charge. After Kidd's posttrial motions were denied, he filed this appeal.
Section 724.3 prohibits the knowing "possess[ion] of an offensive weapon." (Emphasis added.) The sole issue on appeal is whether this statute authorizes multiple prosecutions for the simultaneous possession of multiple offensive weapons. The proper meaning of a statute is a legal question. Therefore, our review is at law. Chung v. Legacy Corp., 548 N.W.2d 147, 149 (Iowa 1996); State v. Hippler, 545 N.W.2d 568, 570 (Iowa 1996).
I. The primary goal in statutory construction is to determine and give effect to the legislature's intent. State v. Johnson, 528 N.W.2d 638, 640 (Iowa 1995). That intent is evidenced by the words used in the statute. State v. Adams, 554 N.W.2d 686, 689 (Iowa 1996). In the absence of a legislative definition of a term or a particular meaning in the law, we give words their ordinary meaning. State v. White, 545 N.W.2d 552, 555 (Iowa 1996). The dictionary provides a ready source for ascertaining the common and ordinary meaning of a word. See State v. Romeo, 542 N.W.2d 543, 548 (Iowa 1996) ( ). Where the language of a criminal statute leaves an ambiguity with respect to the unit of prosecution, courts apply the rule of lenity: in cases of ambiguity or doubt as to legislative intent, only one offense may be charged. E.g., Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83, 75 S.Ct. 620, 622, 99 L.Ed. 905, 910 (1955); United States v. Coiro, 922 F.2d 1008, 1014 (2d Cir.1991); People v. Haggart, 142 Mich.App. 330, 370 N.W.2d 345, 354 (1985); see State v. Welton, 300 N.W.2d 157, 160 (Iowa 1981) ().
Based on these guiding principles of statutory construction, we begin our analysis by ascertaining the meaning of the words used in section 724.3. If the statutory language is ambiguous, we must then consider application of the rule of lenity.
II. The statutory language defining the unit of prosecution under section 724.3 is "an offensive weapon." Kidd contends the word "an" is ambiguous and therefore, the rule of lenity should be applied. The State asserts the common meaning of the word "an" denotes a singular unit of prosecution for each weapon possessed. We think the State is correct.
"An" is a euphonic mutation of the article "a." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 75 (1993). The letter "n" allows an audible distinction to be made between the article "a" and the word it precedes. Id. Consequently, the resolution of this appeal turns on an interpretation of the article "a." "A" is defined as an article which is "used as a function word before most singular nouns other than proper and mass nouns when the individual in question is undetermined, unidentified, or unspecified...." Id. at 1 (emphasis added). 2
Based on the ordinary meaning of the word "an," as ascertained from the dictionary, we think the statute refers to possession of a single offensive weapon. Therefore Kidd's possession of each sawed-off shotgun is a separate chargeable offense. Because the meaning of the statute is clear from the words used, the statute is not ambiguous and we have no occasion to consider the rule of lenity.
We note our decision is in accord with the majority of courts which have determined the appropriate unit of prosecution under statutes using the same language. E.g., United States v. Freisinger, 937 F.2d 383, 390 (8th Cir.1991) ( ); United States v. Alverson, 666 F.2d 341, 347 (9th Cir.1982) ( ); Grappin v. State, 450 So.2d 480, 482 (Fla.1984) ( ); State v. Lindsey, 583 So.2d 1200, 1204 (La.App.1991) ( ); State v. Nichols, 865 S.W.2d 435, 437 (Mo.App.1993) ( ); see City of Cedar Falls v. Flett, 330 N.W.2d 251, 257 (Iowa 1983) ( ); cf. Bell, 349 U.S. at 83-84, 75 S.Ct. at 622, 99 L.Ed. at 910-11 ( ); Coiro, 922 F.2d at 1015 ( ); United States v. Kinsley, 518 F.2d 665, 670 (8th Cir.1975) ( ); Dake v. State, 675 So.2d 1365, 1367 (Ala.Crim.App.1995) ( ); State v. Prybil, 211 N.W.2d 308, 312 (Iowa 1973) ( ). But see Haggart, 370 N.W.2d at 354 (...
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