Ange v. Sovereign Camp of Woodmen of the World

• Citation: 91 S.E. 586,173 N.C. 33
• Decision Date: 28 February 1917
• Docket Number: 14.
• Parties: ANGE v. SOVEREIGN CAMP OF WOODMEN OF THE WORLD.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina

91 S.E. 586

173 N.C. 33

ANGE v. SOVEREIGN CAMP OF WOODMEN OF THE WORLD.

No. 14.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

February 28, 1917

Appeal from Superior Court, Washington County; Whedbee, Judge.

Action by Jesse Ange against the Sovereign Camp of the Woodmen of the World. From a judgment of nonsuit, plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded.

See also, 171 N.C. 40, 87 S.E. 955.

In action against fraternal insurer for injuries received in initiation into a subordinate lodge, member being electrically shocked as part of proceedings, question of defendant's liability held for jury.

A fraternal insurer is liable for negligent wrong committed by subordinate lodge in initiating a member, where such wrong was within the scope of its authority.

W. M Bond, Jr., of Denver, Colo., for appellant.

G. V Cowper, R. H. Lewis, Jr., and R. A. Whitaker, Jr., all of Kinston, for appellee.

HOKE J.

From the testimony introduced by plaintiff and the admissions in the pleadings, it appeared or there were facts in evidence tending to show that the defendant, the Sovereign Camp of the Woodmen of the World, was a corporation duly organized and doing an insurance business on the fraternal plan as a principal or controlling feature, and that the Jamesville lodge was a branch or subordinate lodge of defendant through which, with others of like kind, individuals were admitted as members of defendant lodge under an initiation or ceremony as prescribed by a ritual, prescribed and issued by the defendant, the sovereign lodge, to its subordinates or branches; that, on the _______ day of June, 1915, plaintiff, having applied for admission as member in defendant lodge, was being initiated by the local lodge at Jamesville and, as a part of the ceremony then exercised, plaintiff was blindfolded and carried into a room, was placed on a machine similar to a pair of platform scales, and told to pull a certain lever which would register his strength, as this was required by the lodge and by the defendant, the Sovereign Camp; that plaintiff thereupon pulled the lever as directed and immediately received a severe shock of electricity which threw him out on the floor and caused him serious and painful injuries; "that plaintiff was then carried to his room, was confined to his bed for some time, had several fits, has suffered serious and permanent injuries, and has since been unable to work. It was further shown that another individual had been admitted as member of defendant lodge a short time before the night in question, and that he too was placed on said machine and received an electric shock similar to that described by plaintiff.

A number of witnesses testified to the good health of plaintiff prior to his initiation, and that, since then, he has been under the care and attention of various doctors; that he had had fits and been unable to perform his work, etc. Upon this the evidence chiefly relevant to the issue as the case is now presented, we are of opinion that plaintiff's exception to his honor's judgment of nonsuit must be sustained.

It is now fully established that corporations may be held liable for negligent and malicious torts, and that responsibility will be imputed whenever such wrongs are committed by their employés and agents, in the course of their employment and within its scope. Moore v. Railroad, 165 N.C. 439, 81 S.E. 603, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 866; Huffman v. Railroad, 163 N.C. 171, 79 S.E. 307; Seward v. Railroad, 159 N.C. 241, 75 S.E. 34; Marlowe v. Bland, 154 N.C. 140, 69 S.E. 752, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1116; Sawyer v. Railroad, 142 N.C. 1, 54 S.E. 793, 115 Am. St. Rep. 716, 9 Ann. Cas. 440; Jackson v. Telegraph Co., 139 N.C. 347, 51 S.E. 1015, 70 L. R. A. 738; Daniel v. Railroad, 136 N.C. 517, 48 S.E. 816, 67 L. R. A. 455, 1 Ann. Cas. 718; Denver, etc., R. R. v. Harris, 122 U.S. 601, 7 S.Ct. 1286, 30 L.Ed. 1146; Levi v. Brooks et al., 121 Mass. 501.

In many of the cases and in reliable textbooks, the term "course of employment" is stated and considered as sufficiently inclusive, but whether one or the other descriptive term is used they have the same significance in importing liability on the part of the principal when the agent is engaged in the work that his principal has employed or directed him to do, and the conduct of the agent complained of occurs in the effort or endeavor to accomplish it. When such conduct comes within the description and constitutes an actionable wrong, the corporation principal, as in other cases of principal and agent, is liable not only for "the act itself, but for the ways and means employed in the performance thereof."

In Reinhardt on Agency, § 335, the position and the reason for it is very well stated as follows:

"If a legal wrong is committed by an accountable being, the party injured may obtain redress therefor in damages. If the wrong was committed by his authorized agent, or servant, the result is the same. By 'authorized agent' it is not meant to imply that the wrongful act itself must be authorized by the principal or master, or that any presumption of that nature must be indulged before the principal can be held responsible; it is sufficient if the agent was authorized to perform the act in the performance of which the wrong was committed, for the principal is responsible, not only for the act itself, but for the ways and means employed in the performance thereof. The principal may be perfectly innocent of any actual wrong or of any complicity therein, but this will not excuse him, for the party who was injured by the wrongful act is also innocent; and the doctrine is that where one of two or more innocent parties must suffer loss by the wrongful act of another, it is more reasonable and just that he should suffer it who has placed the real wrongdoer in a position

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