Los Angeles County Safety Police Assn. v. County of Los Angeles

• Decision Date: 25 June 1987
• Citation: 237 Cal.Rptr. 920,192 Cal.App.3d 1378
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: LOS ANGELES COUNTY SAFETY POLICE ASSOCIATION, Petitioner and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Respondents. B022994.

Page 920

237 Cal.Rptr. 920

192 Cal.App.3d 1378

LOS ANGELES COUNTY SAFETY POLICE ASSOCIATION, Petitioner and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Respondents.

B022994.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1, California.

June 25, 1987.

Review Denied Sept. 23, 1987.

Silver, Kreisler, Goldwasser & Shaeffer, Stephen H. Silver and Lesley A. Sive, Santa Monica, for petitioner and appellant

DeWitt W. Clinton, County Counsel and Steven L. Houston, Principal Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles, for respondents.

INTRODUCTION

L. THAXTON HANSON, Acting Presiding Justice.

This appeal arises from the superior court's judgment denying appellant and petitioner Los Angeles County Safety Police Association's petition for writ of mandate. This opinion will refer to the appellant as "petitioner," and to the County of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors as "respondents."

Petitioner filed its petition on March 26, 1986, seeking to have respondents comply with California Penal Code section 830.4, subdivision (h) by renaming "Security officers of the County of Los Angeles" as "Safety police officers of the County of Los Angeles" for all employment-related purposes.

After respondents' answer and petitioner's response, the trial court heard the matter on July 22, 1986, and in its July 28, 1986 Statement of Decision, denied the petition. Petitioner filed its September 9, 1986, notice of appeal from a judgment signed on August 5, 1986.

FACTS

Respondents accept petitioner's factual statement, except that they deny they have failed to comply with Penal Code section 830.4, subdivision (h).

Petitioner, the certified majority representative of employees the respondents identify as "Security officers," is an employee organization as defined by California Government Code section 3501.

Until 1984, pursuant to Penal Code section 830.4, subdivision (h), the peace officers of petitioner's membership were designated as "Security officers of the County of Los Angeles." In 1984, the California Legislature amended section 830.4, substituting the words "Safety police officers" for the words "Security officers" in subdivision (h). ¹ That section defines the duties and authority of the employees involved in this appeal. ²

Respondent Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors establishes the name and title of county employees. Petitioner requested respondent's representatives to change the name, "Security Officers of the County of Los Angeles," to "Safety Police Officers of the County of Los Angeles," according to statutory language. Respondent refused.

Kathie King, a member and former president of petitioner's board of directors, and a Los Angeles County security officer for nine years, submitted a declaration supporting the petition. It stated that changing the employee title would cause petitioner's membership to gain significant non-economic benefits, increased officer safety, improved employee morale, and increased ease in performing the officers' duties.

Elliot Marcus, Acting Deputy Director of Employee Relations for respondent County of Los Angeles, submitted a declaration opposing the petition. It stated that respondent currently deems petitioner's members peace officers while performing their duties. His declaration further stated that since the most recent collective bargaining agreement began, the petitioner's members' duties, wages, hours, and other employment terms and conditions have not changed. Neither their status nor their authority as peace officers under section 830.4, subdivision (h) has changed; they perform the same functions and receive the same employee benefits.

The petition sought a writ of mandate to command respondents to rename petitioner's employee members "Safety Police Officers of the County of Los Angeles." The trial court's July 22, 1986, Statement of Decision denied the petition on three grounds.

First, citing section 4 of Statutes 1984, chapter 610, page ----, which amended section 830.4, the trial court construed that the Legislature intended to vest peace officer powers in county security officers, not to mandate counties to change job titles or civil service classifications.

Second, California Constitution article XI, section 3, vests matters of local concern in the county, and designation of civil servants to act as security officers is a matter of local concern. Los Angeles County charter section 35 empowers respondent Board of Supervisors to classify all positions included in the system.

Third, the trial court found that since the Legislature did not intend its 1984 amendments to section 830.4 to change either the benefits or status of petitioner's members, and because changing those employees' job title would not cause any practical benefits to them, the petitioner sought to enforce a purely theoretical claim for relief.

ISSUES

Petitioner on appeal claims that:

1. County of Los Angeles security officers lack authority to exercise their peace officer powers until they are renamed;

2. The trial court erroneously interpreted the Legislature's intent regarding Penal Code section 830.4, subdivision (h);

3. The definition of persons who may exercise peace officer powers is a matter of statewide concern; and that

4. County security officers will gain significant benefits by being renamed safety police officers.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The lack of substantial evidentiary dispute about petitioners' duties makes the proper interpretation of statutory language a question of law which this court reviews de novo, independent either of the trial court's ruling or of its rationales. (Ames v. Board of Education (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 906, 916, 195 Cal.Rptr. 453. See also Merrill v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1969) 71 Cal.2d 907, 917, 80 Cal.Rptr. 89, 458 P.2d 33.)

DISCUSSION

A.

Petitioner erroneously argues that unless respondents rename the employees those employees will lack authority to exercise peace officer powers pursuant to Penal Code section 830 et seq. The purpose of Penal Code section 830 et seq. is "to authorize the named persons to exercise the statutory powers of a peace officer." (Dyas v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 628, 635-636, fn. 3, 114 Cal.Rptr. 114, 522 P.2d 674.) Failure of a category of peace officers to appear on any of the lists in Penal Code chapter 4.5, however, does not deprive it of peace officer authority. "[P]eace departments could exist and law enforcement powers be exercised by organizations not named in the section." (Boxx v. Board of Administration (1980) 114 Cal.App.3d 79, 85, 170 Cal.Rptr. 538.)

B.

Respondents claim that the home rule provisions of the California Constitution bar the relief petitioner requests. Citing Curphey v. Superior Court (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 261, 337 P.2d 169, respondents argue that California Constitution article XI, section 4 ³ provides Los Angeles County, as a charter county, with exclusive control over their civil service systems, and particularly over classifying employee titles.

Curphey, however, involved a county whose charter expressly granted it the right to control the appointment and removal of its officers. Curphey simply upheld the county's right to remove classified civil service officers by proceedings under the charter, rather than permitting removal by a jury pursuant to the California Government Code.

This result conformed to the purpose of granting a charter--"granting complete autonomy to the county in those local affairs for which it is competent to provide for in a charter"--under the California Constitution. It also avoided the difficulty that could arise if removal proceedings under a grand jury reached a different result than removal proceedings under a civil service commission. (Id., at 268-269, 337 P.2d 169.)

Curphey thus involved different issues than those in the case before us. First, the instant case involves renaming a class of county employees, not the removal of an individual. Second, the naming of these employees, as we discuss below, is a matter of statewide, not local, concern. Third, the case at bench involves no potential for alternative forums to reach inconsistent findings in adjudicating a removal proceeding.

The rules concerning what constitutes a matter of statewide as opposed to local concern are familiar. "As to matters which are of statewide concern, ... home rule charter cities remain subject to and controlled by applicable general state laws regardless of the provisions of their charters...." (Bishop v. City of San Jose (1969) 1 Cal.3d 56, 61, 81 Cal.Rptr. 465, 460 P.2d 137.) The applicability of a state statute turns on whether it addresses matters of statewide or strictly local concern. (Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 136, 185 Cal.Rptr. 232, 649 P.2d 874.) The courts decide this issue under the facts of each case. (Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1963) 60 Cal.2d 276, 294, 32 Cal.Rptr. 830, 384 P.2d 158.) The California Constitution's home rule provisions do not place police departments of charter cities beyond the reach of statutes addressing matters of statewide concern, even where those statutes affect local regulation. (Baggett v. Gates, supra, 32 Cal.3d 128, 139, 185 Cal.Rptr. 232, 649 P.2d 874.) These rules apply to charter counties. (Sonoma County Organization of Public Employees v. County of Sonoma (1979) 23 Cal.3d 296, 316, 152 Cal.Rptr. 903, 591 P.2d 1.)

The statute renaming the petitioner's employees does not affect any of the areas which California Constitution article XI, sections 1 and 4 provide that counties will determine. Sections 1 and 4 give the county the responsibility of providing for the appointment, compensation, terms and removal of an elected sheriff, and elected district attorney, and of "other officers." Renaming security officers as safety police officers falls under none of these areas constitutionally reserved to county charter provisions. Neither does it affect matters...