Curphey v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County

• Citation: 337 P.2d 169,169 Cal.App.2d 261
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Decision Date: 31 March 1959
• Parties: Theodore J. CURPHEY, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent. Civ. 23739.

Page 169

337 P.2d 169

169 Cal.App.2d 261

Theodore J. CURPHEY, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent.

Civ. 23739.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1, California.

March 31, 1959.

Hearing Denied May 27, 1959.

Joseph A. Ball, Long Beach, and Frederick O. Field, Los Angeles, for petitioner.

William B. McKesson, Dist. Atty., Los Angeles, for real party in interest.

Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, Los Angeles, for respondent.

NOURSE, Justice pro tem.

Petitioner, the duly appointed coroner of the County of Los Angeles and an officer in the classified civil service under the charter of the county, seeks a writ of prohibition to restrain the respondent court from trying him upon an accusation returned by the grand jury of the county under section 3060 of the Government Code, charging him with wilful and corrupt misconduct in office.

There is but one question presented by the petition and the answer thereto, to-wit: Is an appointed classified civil service officer of the County of Los Angeles subject to removal from office under an accusation filed by the grand jury pursuant to section 3060 of the Government Code? If the answer to this question is in the negative, the respondent court does not have jurisdiction to try the petitioner upon the accusation returned by the grand jury. We have reached the conclusion that the answer to the question must be in the negative.

It is undisputed that petitioner is an officer of the county, appointed to his office under the provisions of the county's charter and is subject to discharge or reduction in rank in the manner provided for by the charter.

It is respondent's contention that petitioner as an officer of the county is subject to the provisions of sections 3060 and 3070 of the Government Code and the he may be removed from office by proceedings had under those sections or by proceedings had in accordance with the provisions of the charter. On the other hand appellant contends that the charter has superseded the general law and specifically the provisions of sections 3060-3070 of the Government Code and that the petitioner may only be removed in accordance with the terms of the charter.

The solution to this question depends upon the construction placed upon section 7 1/2, article XI, of the Constitution of this state. by this section to provide, in addition article XI reads as follows:

'Any county may frame a charter for its own government consistent with and subject to the Constitution * * * and relating to matters authorized by provisions of the Constitution, * * *

'If a majority of said qualified electors, * * * shall vote in favor of such proposed charter, it shall be deemed to be ratified, and shall be forthwith submitted to the Legislature, * * * for its approval or rejection as a whole, * * * if approved by a majority vote of the members elected to each house, such charter shall become the charter of such county and shall become the organic law thereof relative to the matters therein provided, * * * and shall supersede all laws inconsistent with such charter relative to the matters provided in such charter. * * *

'It shall be competent, in all charters, framed under the authority given by this section to provided, in addition to any other provisions allowable by this Constitution, and the same shall provide, for the following matters: * * *

'2. For * * * coroners * * * for the * * * appointment of said officers * * * and, * * * for the manner of their appointment; * * *

'4. For * * * their removal; * * * provided, that the provisions of such charters relating to the powers and duties of boards of supervisors and all other county officers shall be subject to and controlled by general laws; * * *

'Whenever any county has framed and adopted a charter, and the same shall have been approved by the Legislature, as herein provided, the general laws adopted by the Legislature in pursuance of Sections 4 and 5 of this article, shall, as to such county, be superseded by said charter as to matters for which, under this section it is competent to make provision in such charter, * * *.' (Emphasis added.)

The charter of the County of Los Angeles established a Civil Service Commission charged with the formulation, promulgation and enforcement of a civil service program for classified officers and employees of the county. By the provisions of the charter the commission is empowered to prescribe and enforce rules for the classified service which are given the force and effect of law. The rules must provide for the means and manner for the discharge of demotion of classified officers and employees and must provide for such discharge or demotion only after the officer has been notified of the specific grounds and particular facts upon which the discharge or reduction is based and a finding by the commission after hearing that the discharge or demotion is justified. ¹

The manner of appointment or removal of a county officer is not a matter of statewide concern but of local concern, and control over it may be and has by section 7 1/2 of article XI of the Constitution been placed under the control of the county under its charter. Pearson v. County of Los Angeles, 49 Cal.2d 523, at page 536, 319 P.2d 624, at page 631.

In the case just cited it was contended by the respondent County of Los Angeles that an officer of the county who had been convicted of a felony was automatically removed from office under the provisions of sections 1028 and 1770 of the Government Code. in holding that these sections were not applicable to civil service employees of the county, Mr. Justice Schauer speaking for the Court said in part as follows 'Defendants contend, however, that the Government Code sections set forth principles governing a matter of statewide concern, and therefore are controlling in this case irrespective of the provisions of section 7 1/2 of article XI. It is settled that local rules or regulations as to matters which a county is constitutionally empowered to regulate by charter supersede general state laws on the subject, except as to matters of statewide concern where the state has occupied the field. [Citations.] But the general laws in question here do not appear to be part of an overall legislative design to occupy an entire field of law in a matter of statewide concern, as was the case with the laws relating to eminent domain [citations], or workmen's compensation [citations]. Rather, the statutes here involved relate to but a narrow segment of the field of public employees, a filed which the local governments have been granted the constitutional power to regulate.

'It may be conceded that the state has an interest in establishing qualification standards for peace officers at all levels of government, and, as noted hereinabove, the power of the Legislature to prescribe such qualifications for county officers is specifically preserved by section 5 of article XI. However, as also noted previously, section 7 1/2 of article XI authorizes charter provisions which empower 'boards of supervisors, by ordinance' to fix and regulate the manner of appointment and removal of deputies and other attaches, and specifies that such charter provisions, and necessarily the ordinances enacted thereunder, shall control over general laws on the subject which are enacted pursuant to section 5 of article XI. If sections 1028 and 1770 of the Government Code are held to control valid charter provisions relative to removal of peace officers, then any other general law relating to removal of public employees would also control over charter provisions, and a similar result would logically follow as to charter provisions and general laws relating to appointment of such officers and employees. Such a construction would render nugatory the constitutional provisions empowering local governments to control the manner of appointment and removal of their officers and employees. It thus follows that insofar as general qualification statutes attempt to regulate appointment and removal of local officials, they are subordinate to provisions of freeholders' charters, and valid ordinances enacted thereunder.' (Emphasis added.) See also Hedlund v. Davis, 47 Cal.2d 75, at page 79, 301 P.2d 843, at page 846.

It has been uniformly held that the provisions of a freeholder's charter, granted a city pursuant to sections 8 and 8 1/2 of article XI of the Constitution, relative to the removal or discharge of an appointed and classified officer of the city supersedes and general laws relative to the removal of such an officer upon accusation by a grand jury. Craig v. Superior Court, 157 Cal. 481, 108 P. 310; Dinan v. Superior Court, 6 Cal.App. 217, 91 P. 806. ²

Respondent seeks to escape the force of the decisions in Pearson v. County of Los Angeles, supra, and the...