Buenavista v. City and County of San Francisco

• Decision Date: 09 February 1989
• Docket Number: A039770,Nos. A039468,s. A039468
• Citation: 255 Cal.Rptr. 329,207 Cal.App.3d 1168
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Cecilia BUENAVISTA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Page 329

255 Cal.Rptr. 329

207 Cal.App.3d 1168

Cecilia BUENAVISTA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Nos. A039468, A039770.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4, California.

Feb. 9, 1989.

Review Denied May 31, 1989.

Law Offices of Caldwell & Johnson, Edwin T. Caldwell, Sarrail & Russell, A Professional Corp., Law Offices of Thomas J. Williams, San Francisco, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Louise H. Renne, City Atty., Dennis Aftergut, Chief Asst. City Atty., Kimberly A. Reiley, Chief Trial Deputy, John A. Peak, Deputy City Atty., San Francisco, for defendants and respondents.

PERLEY, Associate Justice.

Plaintiffs in these consolidated actions (collectively, appellants) appeal from summary judgment entered against them on the motion of defendants City and County of San Francisco et al., (collectively, the city). ¹ Appellants asserted claims under state law and 42 U.S.C. section 1983 (hereinafter section 1983) arising out of a series of attacks by a mental patient following his escape from San Francisco General Hospital (the hospital). The court below ruled that the city was immune under state law by virtue of Government Code section 856.2, subdivision (a)(1) (hereinafter section 856.2), and found that the facts did not support appellants' claims under section 1983. We affirm.

I. FACTS

The events leading to appellants' injuries may be summarized as follows. Eric Jordan (Jordan), a twenty-three year old paranoid schizophrenic with a history of violent behavior, sought admission to the hospital's psychiatric unit in the early morning hours of May 10, 1982. He was escorted to the hospital by the police and upon arrival he was treated with haldol, a tranquilizer. He was then placed in an unlocked area, where he waited with his parents for a hospital employee to process his admission on a 72-hour psychiatric hold under Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150. The area was unsupervised apart from this one employee, who sat absorbed in paperwork with his back to Jordan. Jordan became increasingly agitated, began moving about in the waiting area and asked repeatedly when his room would be ready. Eventually, he walked out of the waiting area and left the hospital. A few minutes after his escape, Jordan initiated a series of brutal, random assaults on people in the neighborhood of the hospital, killing an elderly woman and injuring several others before he could be apprehended.

According to appellants' evidence, this tragedy was the product of preexisting security problems at the hospital's psychiatric unit, and a mishandling of Jordan on the morning in question. Appellant's documentary and testimonial evidence in opposition to summary judgment may be outlined as follows.

Concerns over inadequate safety and security were voiced by the director and staff of the psychiatric unit as early as 1979. The staff complained about inadequate space in a 1979 memorandum to the unit's medical and administrative directors. They stated that: "At times we may have 3 or 4 'hold' patients in the waiting area. This is a very serious hazard to employee's and patient's welfare." In another 1979 memorandum, the unit's director advised the chief of the hospital's department of psychiatry that: "The main PES door can only be locked from the outside.... By putting a lock on the inside, we can close the area when necessary and contain patients, cutting down on AWOL's." A preexisting escape problem may be inferred from this reference to "AWOL's," and the deposition testimony of Dr. Moskowitz and Mr. Mariacher. A 1980 memorandum from the director to the staff promised to "work on" permanent funding for a security officer to be assigned to the unit "during as many hours as needed." However, no interior lock had been installed as of May 10, 1982, and no security guard was present when Jordan escaped.

It appears that the hospital was in violation of one or more state regulations by virtue of the foregoing problems. (See e.g., 22 Cal.Code.Regs. §§ 70209 [adequate space], 70701(a)(3) [appropriate physical resources and personnel], 70837(a) [safety services and procedures].) According to the testimony of Dr. Hopkin, the hospital modified its "elopement precautions policy and procedures" shortly after Jordan's escape. From this it may be inferred that such procedures were inadequate on the morning in question.

It also appears from appellants' evidence that the hospital's staff made several mistakes in their handling of Jordan. Based on the records of a prior admission, the hospital's personnel knew or should have known that he could be dangerous. However, rather than mollify Jordan, he was engaged in a shouting match upon arrival by one of the employees. The evidence suggests that the effects of haldol can be "unpredictable," that haldol is known to cause a condition of restlessness in schizophrenics and that this condition can manifest in violence. However, Jordan was left unsupervised and unrestrained after this medication was administered. The evidence also suggests that Jordan was given twice the proper dosage. A doctor has opined that Jordan would not have gone on his rampage but for the injection of haldol.

The situation thus presented is that of a "disaster waiting to happen," and a mental patient who desires confinement but is treated in a way that compels him to escape. Viewed in the light most favorable to appellants, ² the foregoing evidence could support findings of gross negligence or reckless disregard on the part of the city and its employees.

The city's motion for summary judgment was based on three uncontested facts: that Jordan was confined to the hospital on a 72-hour hold; that he was an escaped psychiatric patient when he committed the attacks; and that he had no prior relationship with any of his victims.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Claims Under State Law

We agree with the trial court that the city is immune from any claims under state law by virtue of section 856.2, which provides that "[n]either a public entity nor a public employee is liable for: [p ] (1) [a]n injury caused by an escaping or escaped person who has been confined for mental illness or addiction." Since a person on a 72-hour psychiatric hold is "confined" for purposes of section 856.2 even if he or she is left unrestrained and unattended (Los Angeles County-U.S.C. Medical Center v. Superior Court (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 454, 461, 463, 202 Cal.Rptr. 222), this case falls squarely within the statute and appellant's state law claims must fail. ³ Neither the city's negligence nor regulatory violations associated with its facility would negate its immunity under section 856.2. (Id. at pp. 462-463, 202 Cal.Rptr. 222; Forde v. County of Los Angeles (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 477, 480, 134 Cal.Rptr. 549.) A finding of gross negligence or reckless indifference would not change the result. (See Clayton v. City of Sunnyvale (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 666, 671, 133 Cal.Rptr. 306.) It is "assume[d] as a matter of course that there is a basis for liability to which the immunity is relevant." (Forde v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 64 Cal.App.3d at p. 481, 134 Cal.Rptr. 549.)

A commentator has suggested that despite the immunity conferred under section 856.2, "liability might obtain for injuries inflicted on third parties by the escaped mental patient if an independent basis of fault existed, apart from any wrongful act or omission that made the escape possible." (Van Alstyne, California Government Tort Liability Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 1980) § 4.51, p. 407.) This suggestion is based on an expansive reading of Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334, which held that state psychiatrists could be liable for negligent failure to warn an individual threatened by their patient, notwithstanding their statutory immunity from any claim based on failure to have the patient committed. Appellants argue that, like the failure to warn in Tarasoff, the injection of haldol creates an "independent basis" for the imposition of liability in this case.

We reject this contention for three reasons. First, we are unaware of any case that has applied Tarasoff in the foregoing manner to a claim covered by section 856.2. Second, unlike the patient in Tarasoff, Jordan did not threaten any specific individual. Third, even if the above-described principle could be gleaned from Tarasoff, the evidence is that Jordan would not have escaped but for the treatment with haldol. Therefore, as noted by the trial court, administration of the drug was not "independent" of conduct that made the escape possible.

We conclude that appellants' causes of action under state law are barred by section 856.2.

B. Claims Under Section 1983

In support of their section 1983 ⁴ claims, appellants alleged deprivation of their constitutional rights to life and liberty by actions and omissions of the city under color of state law. (See Ellsworth v. City of Racine (7th Cir.1985) 774 F.2d 182, 187 [due process "encompasses a right to be free from 'unjustified intrusions on personal security' "].) The state immunity statute does not shield the city from liability under section 1983. (Martinez v. California (1980) 444 U.S. 277, 284, 100 S.Ct. 553, 558, 62 L.Ed.2d 481.) However, the evidence discloses neither a "special relationship" between the city and Jordan's victims, nor a basis for attributing the overdosage of haldol to a municipal policy or custom. As a consequence, appellants' section 1983 claims must also fail.

State courts look to federal law to determine what conduct will support an action under section 1983. (Bach v. County of Butte, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 560, 195 Cal.Rptr. 268.) A host of federal precedents indicate that injuries inflicted by a private party do not give rise to section 1983 liability in the absence of a "special relationship" between the state and the victim. (...