Zank v. Larson

• Citation: 552 N.W.2d 719
• Decision Date: 05 September 1996
• Docket Number: No. C3-95-1132,C3-95-1132
• Parties: Darlene ZANK, Respondent, v. Gary Arthur LARSON, Respondent, City of St. Paul, Petitioner, Appellant.
• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)

Page 719

552 N.W.2d 719

Darlene ZANK, Respondent, v. Gary Arthur LARSON, Respondent City of St. Paul, Petitioner, Appellant.

No. C3-95-1132.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Sept. 5, 1996.

Syllabus by the Court

Statutory immunity applies to a determination by the city as to the duration of an all red clearance interval at an intersection within the city limits.

Timothy Marx, City Attorney, Gail Langfield, Assistant City Attorney, St. Paul, for Appellant.

Todd P. Young, St. Paul, for Respondent Zank.

Kay Nord Hunt, Ehrich L. Koch, Minneapolis, for Respondent Larson.

Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.

OPINION

STRINGER, Justice.

We determine whether statutory immunity under the discretionary function exception of Minn.Stat. § 466.03, subd. 6 (1994) applies to a determination by the City of St. Paul as to the sequence of traffic control signals at an intersection within the city limits. Following an accident at an intersection controlled by the city, respondent Darlene Zank sued respondent Gary Larson and appellant the City of St. Paul, alleging that Larson was negligent in failing to yield the right of way at the intersection and that the city was negligent in maintaining defective traffic control signals at the intersection. The city asserted various defenses, including immunity from liability, and moved for summary judgment arguing that its determination regarding signal interval timing at the intersection was protected by statutory immunity. The district court denied the city's motion for summary judgment, the city sought an immediate appeal, and the court of appeals affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment in a divided opinion. We reverse, concluding that the city's determination as to the timing of traffic control signals is protected by statutory immunity, and the city is therefore entitled to summary judgment.

On January 16, 1990, a motor vehicle accident occurred at the intersection of three streets: Dale Street running in a north/south direction, Front Street running in an east/west direction, and Como Avenue running in a northwest/southeast direction. Zank was traveling southbound on Dale Street and intended to make a right turn onto Front Street and proceed westbound. To make her turn onto Front Street, she had to cross Como Avenue. Zank claims that she had a green light as she was coming south on Dale but, as she entered the intersection, the light changed to yellow. As she crossed Como Avenue, her car was struck on the right side by Larson's truck, traveling southeast on Como. Larson maintains that he had a green light when he entered the intersection and that he was following a truck that entered the intersection before he did. Larson apparently did not see Zank's car until immediately before the impact and alleges that he was unable to avoid the accident. As a result of the accident, Zank suffered severe and permanent injuries to her head, neck, and back.

At the time of the accident, vehicles headed south on Dale Street toward the intersection had a green light for 22 to 25 seconds followed by a yellow light change interval of 3.5 seconds, and finally a clearance interval of one second when all lights at the intersection simultaneously indicate red. ¹ The purpose of the yellow and red lights is to clear the intersection of vehicles before conflicting traffic movements can proceed into the intersection. Zank alleges that the city is maintaining a nuisance and that the design of the intersection and the timing of the traffic control signals were contributing factors to her accident. David Daubert, a professional engineer, opined in an affidavit that when Zank entered the intersection on the yellow light, the red clearance interval did not give her sufficient time to clear the intersection before the traffic on Como could proceed on a green light into the intersection.

The city, on the other hand, submitted an affidavit by the city's traffic signal timing engineer asserting that the one-second duration of the all red clearance interval at this intersection was sufficient for traffic to safely clear the intersection. The engineer further stated that the determination of how to time traffic control signals is made when the intersection is initially designed and involves the traffic design engineer, the traffic signal timing engineer, and the traffic maintenance engineer. State and federal guidelines, the volume of traffic, vehicle approach speed, the impact of signal timing on traffic flow, the configuration of the intersection, driving behavior, changing climate conditions, and the uniformity of signal timing throughout the city are taken into account, with the primary concern the "safe and efficient movement of people and goods."

Ordinarily, interlocutory appeal is not available from the denial of summary judgment, McGowan v. Our Savior's Lutheran Church, 527 N.W.2d 830, 832 (Minn.1995), but an exception to this rule arises when the trial court denies summary judgment on the basis of statutory immunity. See Minn.R.Civ.App.P. 103.03; McGovern v. City of Minneapolis, 475 N.W.2d 71, 73 (Minn.1991); Anderson v. City of Hopkins, 393 N.W.2d 363, 364 (Minn.1986). On appeal from denial of summary judgment, this court must determine whether any genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the district court erred in applying the law. State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn.1990). The determination of whether governmental action is protected by statutory immunity is a question of law. Snyder v. City of Minneapolis, 441 N.W.2d 781, 786 (Minn.1989).

Minnesota Statutes section 466.03, subdivision 6 (1994), provides that a municipality is immune from tort liability for "[a]ny claim based upon the performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty, whether or not the discretion is abused." In determining whether particular government activity is protected by statutory immunity, we have interpreted the discretionary function exception narrowly and have focused on its underlying purpose--to preserve the separation of powers by preventing courts from passing judgment "on policy decisions entrusted to coordinate...