Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman

• Decision Date: 10 March 1998
• Docket Number: 97-5031 and 97-5074,Nos. 97-5009,s. 97-5009
• Citation: 130 F.3d 464
• Parties: ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, INC., et al., Appellees v. Daniel R. GLICKMAN, Secretary, United States Department of Agriculture, et al., Appellants National Association for Biomedical Research, Intervenor-Appellant
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Page 464

130 F.3d 464

327 U.S.App.D.C. 235

ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, INC., et al., Appellees v. Daniel R. GLICKMAN, Secretary, United States Department of

Agriculture, et al., Appellants

National Association for Biomedical Research, Intervenor-Appellant

Nos. 97-5009, 97-5031 and 97-5074.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued Sept. 12, 1997.

Decided Dec. 9, 1997.

Rehearing En Banc Granted March 10, 1998.

Animal welfare group and four individuals sued United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) under Administrative Procedure Act (APA), alleging that USDA regulation concerning treatment of primates failed to comply with requirements of governing statute, the Animal Welfare Act (AWA). The United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Charles R. Richey, J., 943 F.Supp. 44, held that regulation was invalid. USDA appealed. The Court of Appeals, Sentelle, Circuit Judge, held that plaintiffs lacked constitutional standing.

Vacated and remanded with instructions.

Wald, Circuit Judge, issued dissenting opinion.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 96cv00408).

John S. Koppel, Attorney, United States Department of Justice, argued the cause for the federal appellants, with whom Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, Washington, DC, at the time the briefs were filed, and Michael Jay Singer, Attorney, United States Department of Justice, were on the briefs.

Harris Weinstein, Washington, DC, argued the cause and filed the briefs for intervenor-appellant National Association for Biomedical Research.

Katherine A. Meyer, Washington, DC, argued the cause for appellees, with whom Valerie J. Stanley, Rockville, MD, was on the briefs.

Andrew L. Frey, Washington, DC, was on the brief for amicus curiae Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America.

Leslie G. Landau, San Francisco, CA, Susan Hoffman, and Tiffany R. Hedgpeth were on the brief for amicus curiae The Jane Goodall Institute for Wildlife Research, Education and Conservation. Barry J. Cutler, Washington, DC, and Joseph R. Austin, Los Angeles, CA, entered appearances.

Before: WALD, SENTELLE and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge WALD.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge:

An animal welfare group and four individuals sued the United States Department of Agriculture and some of its officials (collectively, "USDA" or "the Department") under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (1988). These plaintiffs argued that a USDA regulation concerning the treatment of primates failed to comply with the requirements of the governing statute, the Animal Welfare Act ("AWA" or "the Act"), and asked the district court to set the regulation aside. After concluding that the plaintiffs had standing to sue, the district court entered judgment invalidating the challenged regulation and ordered USDA to promulgate a new regulation in compliance with the Act. See Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 943 F.Supp. 44 (D.D.C.1996). USDA appealed.

After reviewing the record, we conclude that all of the plaintiffs (now appellees) lack constitutional standing to pursue their claims. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the district court and remand with instructions to dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction.

I.

This appeal is but the latest chapter in the ongoing saga of Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc.'s ("ALDF") effort to enlist the courts in its campaign to influence USDA's administration of the Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2131 et seq. Congress enacted the Act in 1966 to ensure the humane care and treatment of various animals used in research or for exhibition or kept as pets. 7 U.S.C. § 2131. Pursuant to a 1985 amendment, the Act requires the Secretary of USDA ("Secretary") to "promulgate standards to govern the humane handling, care, treatment, and transportation of animals by dealers, research facilities, and exhibitors." 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(1). Such standards must include "minimum requirements ... for a physical environment adequate to promote the psychological well-being of primates." 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(2)(B).

In 1991, pursuant to section 2143(a), the Secretary promulgated rules on the handling, care and treatment of primates. See 9 C.F.R. § 3.75 et seq. The rule at issue in this appeal requires regulated entities to "develop, document, and follow an appropriate plan for environment enhancement adequate to promote the psychological well-being of nonhuman primates." 9 C.F.R. § 3.81. According to that rule, such a plan "must be in accordance with the currently accepted professional standards as cited in appropriate professional journals or reference guides, and as directed by the attending veterinarian," and must address several specified topics, including "[s]ocial grouping" and "[e]nvironmental enrichment." Id.

In 1991, ALDF, along with three individuals and two other organizations, filed a lawsuit challenging several USDA regulations promulgated under the AWA, including section 3.81. The plaintiffs' principal argument was that, by permitting the regulated entities to develop their own environmental enhancement plans, the regulations failed to include "minimum requirements" as mandated by the AWA, see 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(2), and instead impermissibly delegated promulgation of these requirements to the regulated entities. The district court ruled for the plaintiffs, and set aside the challenged regulations. See Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Secretary of Agriculture, 813 F.Supp. 882 (D.D.C.1993). We reversed, holding that all of the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the regulations. Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 29 F.3d 720, 722 (D.C.Cir.1994) ("ALDF II" ). ¹

ALDF mounted a second challenge to section 3.81 in 1996. This time, it was joined by a different group of individual co-plaintiffs: Roseann Circelli, Mary Eagan, Marc Jurnove, and Audrey Rahn. Ruling on the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, the district court again invalidated section 3.81, and ordered the Secretary to promulgate a new regulation in compliance with the "minimum requirements" mandate of the AWA.

II.

Under Article III of the Constitution, the "judicial power" of the United States is restricted to the resolution of "cases" and "controversies." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. In order to limit the docket of federal courts to "disputes ... which are traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process" and to restrict federal courts "to a role consistent with a system of separated powers," Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 758, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1951, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted), our Article III jurisprudence has identified a cluster of doctrines, " 'standing[,] mootness, ripeness, political question, and the like,' by which we test the fitness of controversies for judicial resolution." Louisiana Environmental Action Network v. Browner, 87 F.3d 1379, 1382 (D.C.Cir.1996) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 3324, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984)) (additional citations and internal punctuation omitted).

In furtherance of the limitations of Article III, the standing doctrine requires would-be federal litigants to demonstrate an (1) injury in fact; (2) which is caused by, or is fairly traceable to, the alleged unlawful conduct; and (3) which is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision of the court. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 471-72, 102 S.Ct. at 757-59; see also Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, ----, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 1161, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136-37, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements, FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231, 110 S.Ct. 596, 607-08, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990), and may not pursue its claims before the federal judiciary if it fails to demonstrate any one of them. Florida Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 662-63 (D.C.Cir.1996) (in banc). Neither the individual appellees nor the Animal Legal Defense Fund have successfully borne that burden. We consider first the individual appellees Circelli, Jurnove and Eagan. ² We assume their factual allegations to be true for purposes of this appeal. See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. at 2136-37.

A.

Roseann Circelli, Marc Jurnove and Mary Eagan have viewed primates housed in isolation at local zoos. Circelli saw an orangutan who could neither see nor hear other primates, and who sat quietly by himself in a corner. Circelli Affidavit p 8. Jurnove saw a large male chimpanzee who was kept in isolation from other primates, and whose hands and feet were covered with scars and cuts. Jurnove Affidavit p 8. Eagan has seen primates housed in isolation as well, "including one baby baboon and another primate named Charlie." Eagan Affidavit p 4.

These appellees, all of whom enjoy visiting animals in captivity, say they have suffered aesthetic and recreational injuries resulting from their observation of these primates. Under some circumstances, interference with the observation and study of animals may constitute injury in fact for standing purposes. ³ Humane Soc'y of the U.S. v. Babbitt, 46 F.3d 93, 97 (D.C.Cir.1995). It is not apparent, however, that these appellees have met their burden of demonstrating a cognizable injury in fact. "[G]eneral emotional 'harm,' no matter how deeply felt, cannot suffice for injury-in-fact for standing purposes." Id. at 98. It is part of the price of living in society, perhaps especially in a free society, that an individual will observe conduct that he or...