Anthis v. Copland

• Decision Date: 16 February 2012
• Docket Number: No. 85230–8.,85230–8.
• Citation: 173 Wash.2d 752,270 P.3d 574
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: Bonnie ANTHIS, individually, and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Harvey Allen Anthis, Respondent, v. Walter William COPLAND, Petitioner.

173 Wash.2d 752

270 P.3d 574

Bonnie ANTHIS, individually, and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Harvey Allen Anthis, Respondent,

v.Walter William COPLAND, Petitioner.

No. 85230–8.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued June 14, 2011.Decided Feb. 16, 2012.

Hal Jay Geiersbach, Shannon M.W. Kraft, Geiersbach & Kraft PSC, Bonney Lake, WA, Sean P. Cecil, Lisa M. Worthington–Brown, Attorney at Law, Diana Marie Dearmin, Paul Fogarty, Dearmin Fogarty PLLC, Seattle, WA, for Petitioner.

John Graham Schultz, Andrea Jean Clare, Leavy Schultz Davis & Fearing PS, Kennewick, WA, for Respondent.

John C. Dempsey, Margaret A. McCann, AFCSME, Washington, DC, for amicus counsel American Federation of State County and Municipal Employees.Paul Anthony Neal, Attorney at Law, Olympia, WA, for amicus counsel Washington State Patrol Troopers Association.CHAMBERS, J.

[173 Wash.2d 753] ¶ 1 Bonnie Anthis won a civil suit against Walter Copland for the wrongful death of her husband, Harvey Anthis. Anthis sought to collect Copland' only known asset, his retirement pension, to satisfy the judgment. Copland, a retired police officer, argued that his Law Enforcement Officers' and Firefighters Retirement System (LEOFF) pension money cannot be garnished even after it has been deposited into his personal bank account. The trial court disagreed and ruled that the money in the account could be garnished. Copland appealed, and the Court of Appeals certified the question to this court. We accepted certification and now affirm the trial court.

Facts

¶ 2 Sometimes lives are altered, even destroyed, so suddenly and unexpectedly as to defy explanation. Copland, a retired police officer from the city of Tacoma, spent the day with a friend, John Stevens, in Kennewick, Washington. They spent some time at the Burbank Tavern in nearby Walla Walla County and then returned to Stevens' house in Kennewick. In re Copland, No. 09–47782, 2010 WL 4809327, at *1 (Bankr.W.D.Wash. Sept. 23, 2010) (unpublished).

¶ 3 On the way, Copland stopped to buy whiskey and vodka. At Stevens' house Stevens' longtime friend Anthis joined the pair. The three passed the afternoon on Stevens' outdoor deck drinking and eating and enjoying conversation about upcoming fishing trips. That evening, in events described as “stunning both in their rapidity and unexpectedness,” Copland said to Anthis, “ ‘I could shoot and kill you,’ ” and Anthis responded, “ ‘bring it on.’ ” Id. Copland produced a .22 derringer and placed it up to Anthis' right temple. No argument preceded the exchange, and Anthis did not move. Stevens saw the flash, heard the shot, and saw Anthis fall off his chair to the floor. Copland then returned to his seat, put the gun in his back pocket, placed his head in his hands and said, “ ‘Oh, my God, I've killed Al.’ ” Id. In a flash, two lives were destroyed.

¶ 4 Copland was convicted of first degree manslaughter and is serving time in prison. See State v. Copland, noted at 140 Wash.App. 1006, 2007 WL 2254420. Separately, the Estate of Harvey Anthis obtained a civil judgment against Copland for the shooting death of Anthis. See Anthis v. Copland, noted at 146 Wash.App. 1020, 2008 WL 2933716. After the civil judgment was upheld, Anthis attempted to collect Copland's pension funds. Copland claimed his pension funds were exempt from garnishment or attachment. The trial court disagreed and ruled that the funds were not exempt once deposited into Copland's personal bank account. Copland appealed the trial court's ruling to the Court of Appeals. Br. of Appellant at 2. Copland also filed bankruptcy and attempted to discharge the estate's judgment. Resp't's Suppl. Br. (Ex. 1) at 7. The Court of Appeals stayed Copland's case pending determination of whether the bankruptcy proceedings precluded the Court of Appeals from asserting jurisdiction. See id. at 1–3. The parties provided documentation showing that the bankruptcy proceeding did not preclude the Court of Appeals from asserting jurisdiction. See id.; see also Appellant's Suppl. Br. App. (Decl. of Lisa Worthington–Brown). The Court of Appeals lifted the stay but certified the matter to this court, and we accepted certification. ¹ We affirm the trial court.

Standard of Review

¶ 5 Construction of a statute is a question of law reviewed de novo. State v. Wentz, 149 Wash.2d 342, 346, 68 P.3d 282 (2003) (citing City of Pasco v. Pub. Emp't Relations Comm'n, 119 Wash.2d 504, 507, 833 P.2d 381 (1992)). A court interpreting a statute must discern and implement the legislature's intent. State v. J.P., 149 Wash.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003) (citing Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Riveland, 138 Wash.2d 9, 19, 978 P.2d 481 (1999)). Where the plain language of a statute is unambiguous and legislative intent is apparent, we will not construe the statute otherwise. Id. Plain meaning may be gleaned “from all that the Legislature has said in the statute and related statutes which disclose legislative intent about the provision in question.” Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash.2d 1, 11, 43 P.3d 4 (2002) (citing Cockle v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 142 Wash.2d 801, 808, 16 P.3d 583 (2001)). If the statute is still “susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, then a court may resort to statutory construction, legislative history, and relevant case law for assistance in determining legislative intent.” Christensen v. Ellsworth, 162 Wash.2d 365, 373, 173 P.3d 228 (2007) (citing Cockle, 142 Wash.2d at 808, 16 P.3d 583). Exemption statutes should be liberally construed to give effect to their intent and purpose. In re Elliott, 74 Wash.2d 600, 620, 446 P.2d 347 (1968) (citing N. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Kneisley, 193 Wash. 372, 378, 76 P.2d 297 (1938)).

Statutory Construction

a. Plain Meaning of the Statute

¶ 6 Chapter 41.26 RCW lays out the LEOFF retirement system. The statute at issue in this case states:

Subject to subsections (2) and (3) of this section, the right of a person to a retirement allowance, disability allowance, or death benefit, to the return of accumulated contributions, the retirement, disability or death allowance itself, any optional benefit, any other right accrued or accruing to any person under the provisions of this chapter, and the moneys in the fund created under this chapter, are hereby exempt from any state, county, municipal, or other local tax and shall not be subject to execution, garnishment, attachment, the operation of bankruptcy or insolvency laws, or any other process of law whatsoever, and shall be unassignable.

RCW 41.26.053(1). The question is whether this statute exempts the listed benefits from legal process even after the benefits have been distributed to the beneficiary. Copland argues that it does. Br. of Appellant at 5–6. But the statute by its terms does not indicate whether the legislature intended the various exempted rights listed to extend protection to the money after it has been distributed.

¶ 7 Other benefits exemption statutes in Washington are similar, but not identical, to the LEOFF exemption statute. RCW 41.40.052(1) exempts retirement benefits of members of the Public Employees' Retirement System (PERS): ²

Subject to subsections (2) and (3) of this section, the right of a person to a pension, an annuity, or retirement allowance, any optional benefit, any other right accrued or accruing to any person under the provisions of this chapter, the various funds created by this chapter, and all moneys and investments and income thereof, are hereby exempt from any state, county, municipal, or other local tax, and shall not be subject to execution, garnishment, attachment, the operation of bankruptcy or insolvency laws, or other process of law whatsoever, and shall be unassignable.There are several differences in language between the PERS statute and the LEOFF exemption statute. Most significantly, the LEOFF statute exempts both the right “to a retirement allowance” and the right “to ... the retirement ... allowance itself.” RCW 41.26.053(1) (emphasis added). But some exemption statutes exempt only the right “to a ... retirement allowance.” See, e.g., RCW 41.40.052(1) (PERS); RCW 2.12.090 (judicial pension exceptions).

¶ 8 The exemption statute relating to private pension plans contains language similar to the PERS exemption statute:

The right of a person to a pension, annuity, or retirement allowance or disability allowance, or death benefits, or any optional benefit, or any other right accrued or accruing to any citizen of the state of Washington under any employee benefit plan, and any fund created by such a plan or arrangement, shall be exempt from execution, attachment, garnishment, or seizure by or under any legal process whatever.

RCW 6.15.020(3).³ Again, like the PERS statute, this statute exempts only the right “to a ... retirement allowance.” Unlike the LEOFF statute, it does not exempt the right to the allowance itself.

¶ 9 Yet another statute lays out exemptions for federal benefits:

Unless otherwise provided by federal law, any money received by any citizen of the state of Washington as a pension from the government of the United States, whether the same be in the actual possession of such person or be deposited or loaned, shall be exempt from execution, attachment, garnishment, or seizure by or under any legal process whatever....

RCW 6.15.020(2). The difference in this language is immediately apparent; it plainly states that federal pensions are exempt whether they are “in the actual possession of [the pensioner] or be deposited or loaned.” That language is conspicuously absent in the nongovernment benefits subsection (3) above, which is essentially the same as the public employee statute in giving an exemption for the “right” to a “retirement allowance.” RCW 6.15.020(3).

¶ 10 Copland in his briefing relies in part on the fact that the LEOFF exemption statute contains different language—“the right to the retirement allowance itself...