Apache County v. Superior Court In and For County of Maricopa, 1
| Decision Date | 26 October 1989 |
| Docket Number | CA-SA,No. 1,1 |
| Citation | 785 P.2d 1242,163 Ariz. 54 |
| Parties | APACHE COUNTY, Arizona, a body politic, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of Arizona, In and For the COUNTY OF MARICOPA, the Honorable Joseph D. Howe, a judge thereof, Respondent Judge, SAMARITAN HEALTH SERVICES, an Arizona corporation, Real Party in Interest. 89-149. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
Samaritan Health Services, Inc. (Samaritan) filed a 294-count complaint against 11 different counties in the Maricopa County Superior Court seeking payment for emergency medical services rendered to 291 allegedly indigent persons. Only 17 of the counts involve patients for which Apache County is alleged to be responsible. Apache County moved for change of venue claiming that joinder of the counts against it was improper under Rule 20(a), Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure. It further asserted that since joinder was improper, Apache County was the only proper venue for the lawsuit. The trial court denied the motion: "... without prejudice to move later to sever for trial or other procedures, or [sic] those parts of this case applicable to Apache County." Apache County filed this special action on June 29, 1989. This court accepted jurisdiction of the special action and granted relief on August 2, 1989, with an opinion to follow. This is the opinion.
A special action is appropriate to test a venue ruling. Yell v. Garrett, 19 Ariz.App. 3, 504 P.2d 544 (1972). Petitioner has no plain, speedy, or adequate remedy by appeal since a denial for change of venue is not appealable. Goff v. Superior Courts in and for Counties of Pima and Maricopa, 2 Ariz.App. 344, 409 P.2d 60 (1965).
The sole issue presented is: Did the trial court err in denying petitioner's request for a change of venue? We hold that the trial court erred in denying the motion for change of venue because joinder under Rule 20(a) was improper.
The State of Arizona requires Samaritan and other private health care providers to provide necessary emergency medical services to all patients regardless of their ability to pay. Guerrero v. Copper Queen Hospital, 112 Ariz. 104, 537 P.2d 1329 (1975). Pursuant to A.R.S. § 11-291, et seq., the counties are obligated to provide or pay for necessary emergency services rendered to the indigent sick of their respective counties. Many of Arizona's rural counties lack necessary medical facilities to treat critically ill or injured patients. These patients are therefore routinely transferred to Samaritan and other health care providers in Phoenix or Tucson for treatment.
Apache County asserts that there is no factual or legal basis for joining the counts against Apache County with the remaining 277 against the ten other counties. Samaritan posits that:
The counties' liability on the individual accounts often depends on simple factual issues, such as the residence or income of a given patient. Once a lawsuit is filed the parties use discovery powers to resolve these simple factual issues. Thousands of patient accounts are litigated yearly in this fashion and virtually all are settled without the need for trial, or, indeed, judicial intervention on any contested motion. Of the scores of these lawsuits involving literally thousands of patients filed by Samaritan's counsel over the past decade, only two patient accounts have proceeded to a trial on the merits. All of the appellate decisions in cases involving Samaritan's counsel were initially resolved on motions for summary judgment ... Since Maricopa County is a defendant in this action, venue is proper in Maricopa County under A.R.S. § 12-401(15), ...
(Response Memorandum of Samaritan at 3-4).
The fact that thousands of patients' accounts are litigated yearly in this fashion and that virtually all are settled without trial or need for judicial intervention is immaterial. This does not justify an improper joinder of parties. A.R.S. § 12-401 states:
No person shall be sued out of the county in which such person resides, except:
....
(15) Actions against counties shall be brought in the county sued unless several counties are defendants, when it may be brought in any one of the counties.
Therefore, if the joinder is proper, venue is appropriate in Maricopa County. Conversely, if joinder is improper, the motion for change of venue should have been granted. A plaintiff cannot control venue by an improper joinder of defendants. Rule 20(a), A.R.C.P., reads:
Permissive joinder. All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action. All persons may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action. A plaintiff or defendant need not be interested in obtaining or defending against all the relief demanded. Judgment may be given for one or more of the plaintiffs according to their respective rights to relief, and against one or more defendants according to their respective liabilities.
Samaritan asserts:
Samaritan's claims against the county defendants arise from and involve the application of the identical statutory basis of liability. The claims involve a varying, but repetitious, set of legal and factual questions, such as whether a patient resided in a given county, whether Samaritan gave the required notice to the county, whether the patient was qualified to receive medical assistance at county expense, and so on. The counties' liability is also premised on the identical statute, A.R.S. § 11-297.01.
....
Samaritan submits that its daily and routine treatment of Arizona's indigent population constitutes a series of transactions or occurrences within the meaning of Rule 20 ... Samaritan's treatment of indigent patients constitutes a series of transactions or occurrences under State mandate, and joinder of these claims is thus permissible.
(Samaritan's Response Memorandum at 5, 8-9). We disagree.
7 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1652 at 373 (1986), states: Rule 20(a) "... simply establishes a procedure under which the demands of several parties arising out of the same litigable event may be tried together, thereby avoiding the unnecessary loss of time and money to the court and the parties that the duplicate presentation of evidence relating to facts common to more than one demand for relief would entail." [Emphasis added] This case does not involve the same litigable event with respect to any of the claims against the defendants. Under the allegations in this case, there will be no duplicate presentation of evidence relating to facts common to more than one demand for relief. In 2 C. Smith, Arizona Practice: Civil Trial Practice § 180 (1986), we read with respect to Rules 18(a) and 20(a):
When there are multiple claims and multiple parties, courts look for a 'common thread' on the side where the parties are multiple; that is one party who is interested in all claims. If there are both multiple plaintiffs and multiple defendants, a common thread must be found on both sides.
Id. at 169 (emphasis added). There is no common thread on the side where the counties are multiple. Each county's sole interest is in the claims for which it is alleged to be responsible.
In Movie Systems, Inc. v. Abel, 99 F.R.D. 129, 130 (D.Minn.1983), the court stated:
On the basis of the files and records, the court finds a misjoinder of party defendants in contravention of the "same transaction" requirement of Rule 20(a). It may be that the complaints assert a right to relief against all defendants arising from similar transactions, but the rule permitting joinder requires that such arise from the same transactions. They don't here. Each of the complaints states a separate cause of action against each of the 1795 defendants. No concert of action is alleged, nor could it be because the operative facts of each transaction are distinct and unrelated to any other. There is no claim that the alleged pirating of microwave signals was done other than independently by each of the 1795 defendants. An allegation of joint action is required. Nassau County Assoc. of Ins. Agents, Inc. v. Aetna Life, 497 F.2d 1151 (2nd Cir.1974); Insull v. New York World Telegram Corp., 172 F.Supp. 615 (N.D.Ill.1959). [Emphasis added]
In the case of Kenvin v. Newburger, Loeb & Co., 37 F.R.D. 473, 474-75 (S.D.N.Y.1965), the court stated with regard to Rule 20(a):
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