Spencer v. Sytsma
| Decision Date | 07 April 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 02SA342.,02SA342. |
| Parties | Lisa M. SPENCER, Plaintiff, v. Douglas W. SYTSMA and Ralph Kuiper, Defendants. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied April 28, 2003.1
Fogel, Keating, Wagner, Polidori, Shatner, Struthers & Heron P.C., Alan C. Shafner, Kristin D. Sanko, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Plaintiff.
George D. Browning & Associates, Matthew J. Hogsett, Westminster, Colorado, Attorneys for Defendant Ralph Kuiper.
No Appearance on or Behalf of Defendant Douglas Sytsma.
We issued a rule to show cause to determine whether claims against two defendants, involved in two separate accidents, can be joined when venue would be improper for one without joinder. We hold that where defendants did not act in concert, venue requirements must be satisfied for each.
Lisa Spencer brought this suit to recover damages for injuries that she allegedly suffered as a result of two separate car accidents, each of which occurred in Colorado Springs. In the first accident, Douglas Sytsma, a resident of Denver County, made a U-turn in front of Respondent's car allegedly causing her to collide with him. In the second accident, Ralph Kuiper, a resident of El Paso County, allegedly rear-ended Spencer's car, pushing it into the rear of another vehicle stopped for traffic.
Spencer claimed she suffered virtually identical injuries in the two accidents, including severe headaches and a disc protrusion which resulted in spinal surgery. Spencer filed a complaint against both defendants in Denver County, alleging that each defendant was negligent in the operation of his vehicle, that such negligence caused her injuries, and that as a result of both accidents she suffered mental and emotional pain and suffering, permanent injuries, permanent disabilities, a loss of wages, a loss of earning capacity, and a loss of enjoyment of life.
In response to Spencer's complaint, Kuiper filed a Motion for Change of Venue and Severance of Claims. Kuiper argued that because he is a resident of El Paso County, and the accident occurred there, venue is only proper for him in El Paso County. Further, Kuiper alleged that the claims should be severed as they arose from two entirely separate accidents. Sytsma joined in Kuiper's request for a motion for change of venue, but objected to severance of the claims.
The trial court denied the Motion for Change of Venue and Severance of Claims. The trial court reasoned that because the right to relief asserted against both defendants arises out of the same injury, permissive joinder was proper. Furthermore, the court stated that the claims should not be severed because one finder of fact could better apportion damages than two sitting separately.
Kuiper petitioned this court and we issued a rule to show cause why the trial court should not grant a change of venue. We now make that rule absolute.
This case presents us with the question of whether we should give primacy to rules of venue or rules of joinder, when deciding where a plaintiff may bring a claim. If we consider venue first, joinder may not be appropriate in cases where it would be otherwise. On the other hand, if we determine joinder first, then venue requirements may not be satisfied for all defendants, even unrelated ones. Thus, our rules seem dissonant in a case such as this one, where plaintiff seeks to file claims against two defendants in a county where venue is not appropriate for each defendant. "The Rules of Civil Procedure should be liberally construed, and, when required, the supreme court has a duty to harmonize the Rules of Civil Procedure which appear dissonant under certain circumstances." Denver Air Center v. Dist. Court, 839 P.2d 1182, 1185 (Colo.1992). As there is no clear answer to this question, we must turn to the reasoning underlying these rules to determine how best to harmonize them to achieve a fair and just result.
In the following analysis, we examine the plain language of, and the rationale behind, both the rules of venue and joinder. We then apply these rules to the facts at issue to determine that while Spencer may properly join the defendants, she must also satisfy venue requirements for each.
"The purpose of venue requirements is to impose a territorial limitation on the forum in which an action may be commenced." Denver Air Center, 839 P.2d at 1184. Venue requirements are imposed for the convenience of the parties, and are a procedural, not a substantive issue. 77 Am.Jur.2d Venue § 1 (2002). Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 98, Place of Trial, outlines where venue is proper for various actions. For tort actions, Rule 98 states that "an action shall be tried in the county in which the defendants, or any of them, may reside at the commencement of the action," or it "may also be tried in the county where the tort was committed." C.R.C.P. 98(c)(1) and (5). Thus, were we looking only at venue, Rule 98 would mandate that trial be held against Kuiper in El Paso County because he lives in El Paso County and that is where the accident occurred. For Sytsma, however, venue would be proper in either Denver or El Paso Counties because Sytsma resides in Denver County and the accident with Spencer occurred in El Paso County. However, venue may also be in the county where "any" of the defendants reside. Thus, whether venue is proper for Kuiper in Denver County depends on whether we look at venue before or after we determine whether parties may be joined.
Our permissive joinder rule allows for a plaintiff to join defendants in an action, "if there is asserted against [the defendants] jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action." C.R.C.P. 20(a). Joinder is encouraged for purposes of judicial economy; "[p]roper apportionment can be more justly accomplished by one jury than by two juries sitting separately, each faced with the argument that the greater portion of the injury was caused by the defendants other than the ones in the case at trial." Sutterfield v. Dist. Court, 165 Colo. 225, 230, 438 P.2d 236, 240 (1968). Thus, the courts are to give the permissive joinder rule its broadest possible reading. Id. Permissive joinder, however, is still discretionary with the trial court. Draper v. School Dist. No. 1, 175 Colo. 216, 218, 486 P.2d 1048, 1049 (1971).
Spencer filed her complaint against both defendants in Denver county, arguing that the right to relief against both defendants arose out the same occurrence-her single permanent injury. An injury caused by more than one event is a "single occurrence" for purposes of joinder under C.R.C.P. 20(a). Sutterfield, 438 P.2d at 239. Absent other considerations, the trial court's denial of Kuiper's motion to sever would be appropriate in this case: it would allow for a more expedient and efficient resolution of the case, as a single jury will be able to more effectively apportion damages between the two defendants than two juries sitting separately. This outcome would benefit both the plaintiff and the defendants because the damages will be considered together, avoiding the possible results of double recovery, or conversely, no recovery at all. However, whether the defendants may be joined also depends on whether venue must be proper for each defendant.
While joinder will increase the efficiency of the resolution of causes of action, our rules also provide for venue to be placed in a location that is convenient for the defendant. This consideration holds no less weight merely because a defendant is joined with another who lives in a different county. Thus, we must weigh these rules in deciding whether the court must honor the venue requirements for each defendant.
Some states have held that venue requirements must be addressed before joinder. The Missouri Supreme Court addressed this issue in a case with facts almost identical to those involved here. State ex rel. Jinkerson v. Koehr, 826 S.W.2d 346 (Mo.1992). The plaintiffs in that case were also involved in two separate car accidents. Id. at 346. The first accident occurred in St. Louis County with defendant Jinkerson. Both plaintiffs and Jinkerson were residents of St. Louis County. Id. The second accident occurred in the City of St. Louis with defendant Matthews, a resident of St. Louis County. Id. Plaintiffs brought suit against Matthews in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis and then joined Jinkerson in that action. Id. Jinkerson objected to the joinder and filed a motion to dismiss for lack of proper venue, among other things. Id. at 347.
The Missouri Supreme Court first decided that joint liability was not appropriate. Id. at 348. Additionally, the court held that Jinkerson was not liable under the theory that a person who negligently causes an accident is liable for all foreseeable damages caused by that accident. Id. As there was no joint liability, the court held that the plaintiffs should not be allowed to join the two actions. Id. Furthermore, the court stated, "[s]imply joining the two separate causes of action in a single petition does not create venue over both actions." Id.
In deciding Jinkerson, the court relied in large part upon State ex rel. Turnbough v. Gaertner, 589 S.W.2d 290 (Mo.1979). In that case, the court rejected the contention that "by joining two or more separate causes of action in a single petition ..., venue as to all is created in any county wherein any one of the several defendants resides even though there would not have been venue as to one (or more) of the counts if filed separately in that county." Id. at 291-92. The court explained that decision by citing to its Rule Civ. Proc....
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