APARTMENT ASSN. OF LA v. City of LA

• Decision Date: 08 January 2001
• Docket Number: No. S082645.,S082645.
• Citation: 24 Cal.4th 830,14 P.3d 930,102 Cal.Rptr.2d 719
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: APARTMENT ASSOCIATION OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, INC., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent.

102 Cal.Rptr.2d 719

24 Cal.4th 830

14 P.3d 930

APARTMENT ASSOCIATION OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, INC., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent.

No. S082645.

Supreme Court of California.

January 8, 2001.

California Apartment Law Information Foundation, Trevor Grimm and Craig Mordoh, Los Angeles, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Sharon L. Browne, Sacramento, and Stephen R. McCutcheon, Jr., for Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.

James K. Hahn, City Attorney, Pedro B. Echeverria, Chief Assistant City Attorney, Ronald Tuller, Assistant City Attorney, and Miguel A. Dager, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendant and Respondent.

Hart, King & Coldren, Robert S. Coldren and C. William Dahlin, Santa Ana, for Western Manufactured Housing Communities Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, James P. Clark, Joel M. Tantalo; Western Center on Law & Poverty, Richard Rothschild; Bet Tzedek Legal Services and Lauren Saunders, Los Angeles, for the Los Angeles Blue Ribbon Citizens' Committee on Slum Housing, Bet Tzedek Legal Services, the Inner City Law Center, Los Angeles Center for Law and Justice, Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles, Legal Services of Northern California, Los Angeles Housing Law Project, Public Counsel, San Fernando Valley Neighborhood Legal Services, Western Center on Law and Poverty, Esperanza Community Housing Corporation, Southern California Association of Non Profit Housing, Southern California Mutual Housing Association, the Coalition for Economic Survival, Inquilinos Unidos, the St. Francis Center, the Fair Housing Congress of Southern California and SEIU Local 347 as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

Richard Doyle, City Attorney (San Jose), George Rios, Assistant City Attorney, and Robert Fabela, Deputy City Attorney, for the City of San Jose, the California State Association of Counties and the California Association of Sanitation Agencies as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

MOSK, J.

We granted review to decide whether a city ordinance imposing an inspection fee on private landlords violates article XIII D of the California Constitution (article XIII D), added by initiative measure, Proposition 218, in 1996. We conclude that it does not.

In July 1998, the City of Los Angeles put into effect the Los Angeles Housing Code. It is codified as article 1 of chapter XVI of the Los Angeles Municipal Code (§ 161.101 et seq.). Later that month, plaintiffs sued the city for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that Los Angeles Municipal Code section 161.352, imposing an inspection fee on private landlords, is unenforceable because it was enacted without complying with section 6 of article XIII D. The city demurred. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, finding that the fee was not subject to the constitutional requirements. It entered judgment for the city.

In its statement of decision, the trial court recognized that the inspection fee "appears arguably to fall within the wide range of assessments which Proposition 218 was apparently written to encompass." But it added, "In Pennell v. City of San Jose (1986) 42 Cal.3d 365, 375[, 228 Cal. Rptr. 726, 721 P.2d 1111], the California Supreme Court held that a fee charged to cover the costs of operating San Jose's rent control ordinances, and not used to raise general revenue, is not subject to Article XIII A of the California Constitution. The City's ordinance here fits squarely within both the reason and rule of Pennell, The ordinance levies only property used for residential apartment rentals, and the money is used only to pay for regulat[ing such] rentals to insure, among other things, that they do not degenerate into what is commonly called `slum conditions.' The assessment is not imposed on all property owners-only a subset of owners who rent apartments."

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the state constitutional provision invalidated the city ordinance. The court wrote: "There is nothing in Proposition 218 that exempts regulatory fees imposed on residential rental properties. It thus adds nothing to say, as does the City, that the fees are not `imposed upon property owners in general, but only those who voluntarily engage in the business of renting, generate the risks of slum housing, and specially benefit from regular inspections as they contribute to the overall reputability and safety of the housing provided.' Quite plainly, Proposition 218 applies to any `fee' or `charge,' both of which are defined to mean `any levy other than an ad valorem tax, a special tax, or an assessment, imposed by an agency upon a parcel or upon a person as an incident of property ownership, including a user fee or charge for a property-related service.' (Art. XIII D, § 2, subd. (e). . . .) However well intentioned the City's program to abolish slum housing may be, we find it impossible to say that a fee imposed upon the owners of rental units so the City can locate and eradicate substandard housing is anything other than a user fee or charge for a property-related service." (Italics and fn. omitted.)

I.

A.

Section 161.102 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code states the reason for enacting the Los Angeles Housing Code: "It is found and declared that there exist in the City of Los Angeles substandard and unsanitary residential buildings and dwelling units the physical conditions and characteristics of which render them unfit or unsafe for human occupancy and habitation, and which conditions and characteristics are such as to be detrimental to or jeopardize the health, safety and welfare of their occupants and of the public.

"It is further found and declared that the existence of such substandard buildings as dwelling units threatens the physical, social and economic stability of sound residential buildings and areas, and of their supporting neighborhood facilities and institutions; necessitates disproportionate expenditures of public funds for remedial action; impairs the efficient and economical exercise of governmental powers and functions; and destroys the amenity of residential areas and neighborhoods and of the community as a whole."

Los Angeles Municipal Code section 161.301, entitled Scope, declares that the Los Angeles Housing Code applies to "all residential rental properties with two or more dwelling units on the same lot, the land, buildings and structures appurtenant thereto," but not to owner-occupied units, on-campus dormitory housing, hotels, motels, or certain other types of housing also specifically exempted.

Division 3.5 of the Los Angeles Housing Code (§ 161.351 et seq.) is entitled Housing Inspection Fees. Section 161.351 limits the scope of division 3.5 to "residential rental properties with two or more dwellings subject to the provisions of this Code." Those properties "will be subject to regular inspection by the General Manager or an authorized representative. Inspections may also be complaint-based." (Ibid.)

Section 161.352 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code, at issue here, sets forth the inspection fee schedule. It provides, in its entirety: "Owners of all buildings subject to inspection shall pay a service fee of $12.00 per unit per year. The fee will be used to finance the cost of inspection and enforcement by the Housing Department. Should the owner fail to pay the required fee, the City of Los Angeles will recover it, plus accrued interest, utilizing any remedies provided by law including nuisance abatement or municipal tax lien procedures established by ordinance or state law. This fee shall be known as the `Systematic Code Enforcement Program Fee.'" (Ibid., boldface omitted.)

B.

In November 1996 the voters approved Proposition 218, the Right to Vote on Taxes Act. (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1996) text of Prop. 218, § 1, p. 108; reprinted as Historical Notes, 2A West's Ann. Cal. Const. (2001 supp.) foll. art. XIII C, § 1, p. 33.) The proposition amended the California Constitution, adding article XIII D. Section 3, subdivision (a)(3) of article XIII D provides that, with certain exceptions not relevant here, "No tax, assessment, fee, or charge shall be assessed by any agency upon any parcel of property or upon any person as an incident of property ownership except: [¶] . . . [¶] . . . as provided by this article." An agency is a local or regional governmental entity. (Id., § 2, subd. (a); Cal. Const., art. XIII C, § 1, subd. (b).)

Section 1 of article XIII D provides that it applies to "all assessments, fees and charges, whether imposed pursuant to state statute or local government charter authority." Fees and charges are defined in subdivision (e) of section 2 thereof. "`Fee' or `charge' means any levy other than an ad valorem tax, a special tax, or an assessment, imposed by an agency upon a parcel or upon a person as an incident of property ownership, including a user fee or charge for a property-related service." (Ibid.)

"Property-related service" is further defined. It "means a public service having a direct relationship to property ownership." (Art. XIII D, § 2, subd. (h).)

Thus, and in summary, article XIII D applies, with certain exceptions not relevant here, to "any levy . . . upon a parcel or upon a person as an incident of property ownership, including a user fee or charge for a property-related service." (Art. XIII D, § 2, subd. (e).) As will appear, the outcome of this case turns on the meaning of this language.

C.

Before us is "a question of law for the appellate courts to decide on independent review of the facts." (Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1997) 15 Cal.4th 866, 874, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 447, 937 P.2d 1350.) Though our reasoning turns on the language of the constitutional stricture, it may be helpful to explain, as did the Court of Appeal in Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of...