Apger v. New York Cent. R. R.
| Decision Date | 31 December 1941 |
| Citation | 310 Mass. 495,38 N.E.2d 652 |
| Parties | PAUL G. APGER v. NEW YORK CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY. HARRY SIBERT v. SAME. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
November 7, 1941.
Present: FIELD, C.
J., DONAHUE, QUA DOLAN, & RONAN, JJ.
Motor Vehicle Operation, Nonresident, Interstate commerce. Constitutional Law, Interstate commerce, Equal protection of laws. Interstate Commerce. Federal Motor Carrier Act.
The operation of a motor vehicle of a nonresident in interstate commerce upon a public way in the Commonwealth on a day in 1938 more than thirty days after its first entry here in that year, without registration here and without the permit, although with the insurance, required by G. L.
(Ter. Ed.) c. 90 Section 3, St. 1933, c. 188, was illegal.
That a nonresident owner of a motor truck had a permit from the department of public utilities under G.L.c. 159B, as appearing in St. 1938 c.
483, Section 1, did not relieve him of the requirement of obtaining a permit from the registrar of motor vehicles under c. 90, Section 3, St. 1933, c. 188. The requirement of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 90, Section 3, as amended by St.
1933, c. 188, that a nonresident obtain a permit from the registrar of motor vehicles for operation of a motor vehicle in the Commonwealth in certain circumstances, as applied to the owner of a motor truck engaged in interstate commerce, was not beyond the power of the Commonwealth because of the enactment of the Federal motor carrier act, nor an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce in violation of the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution, nor did it deny to the truck owner the equal protection of the law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
TWO ACTIONS OF TORT. Writs in the Municipal Court of the City of Boston dated December 6, 1938.
Upon removal to the Superior Court, the actions were heard by Forte, J.
J. Schneider, (J.
E. Reilly with him,) for the plaintiffs.
Joseph Wentworth, for the defendant.
The plaintiff in the first case brought this action of tort to recover for personal injuries and for damage to his motor truck and trailer, which were struck by a freight train, operated by the defendant, as the truck, driven by the plaintiff, was proceeding over a grade crossing on a public way in Cambridge at about noon on October 16, 1938. The plaintiff in the second case was riding in the truck at the time of the accident and received personal injuries for which he seeks damages. He had full knowledge of all matters concerning the registration of the truck, and no contention is made but that both of these cases must stand or fall together. The cases were heard in the Superior Court upon the report of an auditor and other evidence, and the judge in each case found for the defendant. The plaintiffs excepted to the denial of their request that G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 90, Section 3, as amended by St. 1933, c. 188, is violative of the commerce clause, art. 1, Section 8, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States "as it imposes upon interstate commerce an unreasonable burden and denies equal privileges and immunities to the citizens of other States."
Apger, hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff, was a resident of Akron, Ohio, during all of 1938, and he did not during that year reside in this Commonwealth or have any regular place of business here. His motor truck and trailer were duly registered by him in Ohio "and with the Interstate Commerce Commission" but neither the truck nor the trailer was registered under the laws of this Commonwealth and no permit had been issued to him under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 90, Section 3, as amended by St. 1933, c. 188. See now St. 1939, c. 335. We assume in favor of the plaintiff that the motor truck was transporting goods in interstate commerce at the time of the accident. The first trip that this truck made in this Commonwealth during 1938 occurred on January 18, and thereafter, and up to the time of the accident, it made eighteen trips each of a day's duration. Our law, in force at the time of the accident, limited the privilege of a nonresident to operate his motor vehicle upon the highways of this Commonwealth to a period of thirty days in any one year, commencing from the time he first operated upon the public ways in that year unless, after this period, he registered his automobile here or unless he
"maintains in full force a policy of liability insurance" and "unless the owner or operator of such motor vehicle or trailer, while operating the same during such additional time, has . . . a permit issued by the registrar which then authorizes the operation of such vehicle without registration under this chapter." St. 1933. c. 188. The plaintiff had liability insurance but no permit. The necessity for permit under this chapter was not eliminated by the permit which had been issued to the plaintiff by the department of public utilities in accordance with G.L.c. 159B, inserted by St. 1938, c. 483. The operation of this truck more than thirty days after January 18, 1938, without the required permit was illegal. VanDresser v. Firlings, 305 Mass. 51 . Boettjer v. Clark, 305 Mass. 59. Conningford v. Cote, 308 Mass. 472 .
All residents of the Commonwealth are required to secure registration of their motor vehicles, and no registration can be secured until the applicant has obtained liability insurance or furnished a bond that will run for the period for which registration is sought and which is to be used to secure the payment of certain damages that might be incurred by third persons from the operation of the motor vehicle. All nonresidents, at the time of the plaintiffs' accident, were permitted to operate their motor vehicles upon our highways for a limited period, and, after that, they were required to secure a permit from the registrar of motor vehicles which would not be issued unless the applicant had obtained a contract of insurance similar to that required of residents. In this way the public policy of the Commonwealth requiring compulsory liability insurance from resident owners was extended to nonresidents who desired to continue the operation of their vehicles upon our ways after the lapse of the limited period. The purpose of the permit was to produce readily available tangible evidence that the owner of the automobile furnished insurance for the protection of the public. It might be thought that many of the thousands of nonresident owners of automobiles, especially those who sojourn here during the summer season and who come from States that do not require compulsory insurance, might not secure such insurance for operation of their vehicles here; at least the Legislature could so find and prescribe the permit as the method to compel them to obtain such insurance. Of course, there may be instances where the nonresident has such insurance, but in the absence of a permit he had no right after the limited period to operate his vehicle upon our ways. The Legislature could believe that such instances were comparatively few and that the safety of the public upon the ways would be better promoted and protected if all nonresidents after the prescribed period were required to have a permit. The Legislature had wide discretion in devising a plan that would eliminate the evil of uncompensated injuries caused to travellers by owners of automobiles who were unable to satisfy the claims of the victims of their negligence, and the plan requiring permits from all nonresidents after the limited period of operation is not to be struck down as it is not an unreasonable means for suppressing the use of uninsured vehicles, even if it included those few who might have already had such insurance. Purity Extract & Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226 U.S. 192. Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248 U.S. 297. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 272 U.S. 365, 388. Milliken v. United States, 283 U.S. 15, 24. Semler v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 613. Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central Railroad, 299 U.S. 334, 353.
The question here raised is not likely again to be presented, because in the year following this accident, the Legislature, by St. 1939, c. 325, amended G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 90, Section 3, by permitting the operation of vehicles owned by nonresidents without requiring them to register here or to secure permits, provided they have secured liability insurance to satisfy the claims that may arise from the operation of the vehicle.
It is urged that the provision of the statute requiring of nonresidents a permit to operate for any time beyond this thirty-day period does not apply to one like the plaintiff who is engaged exclusively in interstate commerce, and that, if it does, it violates the commerce clause of the Federal
Constitution. Prior to the enactment of the Federal motor carrier act, U.
S. C. Sup. IV, Title 49, Sections 301-327, it had been uniformly held that a State, in the interest of public safety and for conserving its public ways, had the power to regulate the operation of motor vehicles thereon including those engaged in interstate commerce as well as those conducting the business of transporting persons or property between points within the State, provided that the regulations applied indiscriminately to both interstate and intrastate commerce and that no unreasonable or unnecessary burden was thereby directly imposed upon interstate commerce. In reference to interstate vehicles, a State could require the registration of such vehicles and the licensing of their operators (Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.
S. 610; Kane v.
New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160: Morris v. Duby, 274 U.S. 135), the securing of a certificate of public convenience and necessity (...
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