Aradalou v. New York, New Haven, and Hartford Railroad Co.

• Decision Date: 28 November 1916
• Citation: 225 Mass. 235
• Parties: JOHN ARADALOU v. NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN, AND HARTFORD RAILROAD COMPANY.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

225 Mass. 235

JOHN ARADALOU v. NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN, AND HARTFORD RAILROAD COMPANY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Bristol.

November 28, 1916

October 23, 1916.

Present: RUGG, C.

J., LORING, BRALEY PIERCE, & CARROLL, JJ.

Carrier, Of goods. Bill of Lading. Interstate Commerce. Contract, What constitutes, In writing. Evidence, Of intent, Of customary act, Competency. Equity Jurisdiction, Mistake.

Where a bill of lading for household goods shipped by rail, which were worth more than $10 a hundred pounds but much less than $1,000 a hundred pounds, contained a "release clause" stamped upon it and signed by the shipper, in which before the shipper signed it the agent of the carrier, who had intended to fill in the blank spaces left for the value of the goods with the figures "10.00" before the word "dollars," in filling these blank spaces had left out the decimal point, so that the clause read, "For the purpose of enabling the carrier to apply the proper published rate, as explained in its classification and tariffs, I hereby declare that the value of the property herein described does not exceed

1000 dollars per cwt pounds, and that in case of loss or damage thereto, I will not assert claim against the carrier on a higher basis of value than 1000 dollars for each cwt pounds or fraction thereof in weight of the property so lost or damaged," where each of the corresponding blank spaces in the release clause stamped upon the shipping order was filled in with an "indecipherable scrawl," although the carrier's agent had intended to write the word "ten" before "dollars," and where "there was no talk about the release clause" when the goods were received by the carrier and when the shipping order and the bill of lading were delivered, it was held that the uncommunicated intention of the carrier's agent was immaterial, that both parties were bound by both writings and that the shipper could recover the full value of goods lost by the carrier.

In an action for the loss of the goods mentioned above, which were shipped from one State to another, the settled doctrine was referred to, that a contract limiting the liability of a carrier for the loss of goods entrusted to him, as a part of the agreement as to the rate charged, is in effect an agreement respecting the value of the property shipped and is valid under the provisions for the regulation of rates contained in the statutes of the United States relating to interstate commerce.

In the same case it was held that the findings of fact of the trial judge, made from an inspection of the original documents, that the figures

"1000" were inserted by the defendant's agent before the word "dollars" in the blanks in the bill of lading and that in the corresponding clause stamped on the shipping order the defendant's agent, where he intended to write the word "ten" before "dollars," in each case had "made an indecipherable scrawl," were not subject to revision by this court, which has no jurisdiction to determine facts in actions at law.

Accordingly when the original documents were presented to this court for inspection at the argument, the court refused to pass upon these questions of fact, but held that the findings of the trial judge were justified, and said that there appeared to be no reason to doubt their correctness.

Where the parties to an instrument in writing in attempting to put their agreement in writing express essential terms of their supposed agreement by characters or symbols so illegible that the tribunal of fact before which the instruments presented at a trial cannot determine the signification of the marking and finds it to be an "indecipherable scrawl," the writing is of no effect and no contract is made by it.

In the case above described it was said that, if the release clause stamped on the bill of lading and that stamped on the shipping order should be construed together, the clause in the bill of lading in which the figures "1000" were inserted plainly in each of the blank spaces before the word "dollars" must control.

The uncommunicated intent of one party to a contract when he is reducing to writing the supposed agreement of the parties, which supposed agreement subsequently is signed by both of them, is not admissible in his own favor in an action where the meaning and effect of the contract are in controversy between the parties.

In the case above described it appeared that the release clause in question was stamped upon the bill of lading and the shipping order by a rubber stamp and that the defendant commonly used the stamp only when the value declared by the shipper was ten dollars per hundred weight. There was nothing to indicate that the shipper knew of this custom. Held, that the circumstance of the customary use of the stamp was of no consequence, and that, even if it had been shown that the custom was known to the shipper, it could not have affected the words that were written or omitted in the blank spaces.

In the case above described the defendant contended that it could not be held liable for more than $10 per hundred pounds because the rate charged by the defendant and prepaid by the plaintiff was on that basis.

Held, that, as the plaintiff's only representation of value was that the goods did not exceed $1,000 per hundred pounds in value which was much more than the amount that he sought to recover as their true value, he lost no rights if the defendant by mistake charged too low a rate.

In the same case it was said that it was not necessary to consider what would have been the rights and liabilities of the parties if no declaration of value had been made by the shipper.

In the same case it was said, that if there was a mutual mistake of fact in the wording of the bill of lading, which did not appear to have been the case, the defendant might have been granted relief in a suit in equity to reform the instrument in writing.

CONTRACT upon a bill of lading to recover the amount of $75 alleged to have been the value of household goods shipped over the defendant's line of railroad from New Haven in the State of Connecticut to New Bedford in this Commonwealth, and lost in transit. Writ in the Third District Court of Bristol dated October 6, 1914.

The defendant filed an offer of judgment, consenting to be defaulted and that judgment might be entered against it in the sum of $15 as damages.

On appeal to the Superior Court the case was tried before Lawton, J., without a jury. The evidence is described in the opinion. The judge made a memorandum of decision containing the findings of fact which are stated in the opinion. The defendant asked the judge to rule that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover as damages a sum greater than $15. The judge refused to make this ruling, and made the rulings described in the opinion. He found that the plaintiff was entitled to recover $75 as damages and ordered that judgment be entered for the plaintiff in that sum. The defendant alleged exceptions.

A. W. Blackman, for the defendant. A. Auger, for the plaintiff.

RUGG, C.J. This is an action to recover the value of household goods shipped in interstate commerce by virtue of a contract with the defendant over its line from New Haven, in the State of Connecticut, to New Bedford in this Commonwealth, and lost in transit. The actual value of the goods is conceded to be $75. The plaintiff is entitled to recover that sum unless prevented by an agreement with the defendant or by the terms of the interstate commerce act. The defendant contends that its liability is limited to $10 per hundred weight by virtue of an agreement contained in the so called "release clause," which appears on the bill of lading, marked "Exhibit A," on the shipping order, marked "Exhibit C," and on the "release" attached to the statement of agreed facts marked "Exhibit B," three papers issued at the time of the shipment.

A contract limiting the liability of a carrier for the goods in case of loss, made as a part of an agreement for the rate charged, is valid under the recent acts of Congress regulating rates. Such a contract is in effect an agreement respecting what the property is as to value. That was the rule established by this court. Bernard v. Adams Express Co. 205. Mass. 254. It is the settled doctrine of the United States Supreme Court, whose decisions in this particular are binding upon other courts, that, "where alternate rates fairly based upon valuation are offered, a railroad may limit its liability by special contract." Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway v. Rankin, 241 U.S. 319, 327.

The release clause on each of the three papers was signed in the name of the plaintiff by his agent. The release clause was affixed to each of these papers by a red ink stamp furnished and used by the defendant, which with its blanks was as follows: "For the purpose of enabling the carrier to apply the proper published rate, as explained in its classification and tariffs, I hereby declare that the value of the property herein described does not exceed _____ dollars per _____ pounds, and that in case of loss or damage thereto, I will not assert claim against the carrier on a higher basis of value than _____ dollars for each _____ pounds or fraction thereof in weight of the property so lost or damaged." This controversy arises because of the character of the writing or figures inserted in the blank spaces in these release clauses.

Regarding the way in which these blanks touching the value of the goods were filled, the Superior Court judge found that on Exhibit A which was the bill of lading, the agent of the defendant "writing the paper intended to write 10.00 before the word `dollars.' He made no decimal point, and the limitation in each case on...