Aranguena v. Triumph Mining Company

• Citation: 63 Idaho 769,126 P.2d 17
• Decision Date: 13 May 1942
• Docket Number: 7003
• Parties: BESSIE ARANGUENA, Appellant, v. TRIUMPH MINING COMPANY, Employer, and STATE INSURANCE FUND, Surety, Respondents
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Idaho

126 P.2d 17

63 Idaho 769

BESSIE ARANGUENA, Appellant, v. TRIUMPH MINING COMPANY, Employer, and STATE INSURANCE FUND, Surety, Respondents

No. 7003

Supreme Court of Idaho

May 13, 1942

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW-DISEASE-ACCIDENT-FINDINGS OF BOARD-REVIEW-EVIDENCE-EXPERT TESTIMONY-OPINION EVIDENCE.

1. The findings of the Industrial Accident Board adverse to appellant upon disputed and contradictory facts if supported by competent substantial evidence are binding on the Supreme Court, but if not so supported, whether such findings are binding is a "question of law," which must be resolved against the order of the board where there is a lack of substantial probable evidence.

2. In compensation proceedings for death of claimant's husband caused by coronary thrombosis and overexertion, evidence supported finding that mine in which decedent was working had bad air and lack of ventilation.

3. The rule that positive expert testimony will prevail over negative expert testimony does not imply that negative expert testimony may not be considered by triers of fact, but that in weighing testimony as between those who testify to a positive and those who testify to a negative, testimony of the one who testifies to the positive should have greater weight than the one who testifies to the negative.

4. Ordinarily, more weight should be given the testimony of one who testifies from first hand knowledge than to testimony of one who testifies from a hypothetical state of facts.

5. Order of Industrial Accident Board denying compensation to widow for death of miner caused by coronary thrombosis occurring while working in portion of mine having bad air and poor ventilation, based on negative opinion testimony of heart specialist who had never seen deceased that bad air and exercise had nothing to do with death, made in face of positive testimony to the contrary of two physicians one of whom had performed autopsy on deceased, was contrary to law.

6. Death of miner by coronary thrombosis and overexertion while working in mine containing such bad air and having such poor ventilation that the men were perspiring, was compensable as resulting from "accident."

APPEAL from the Industrial Accident Board.

Appeal from an order of the Industrial Accident Board denying compensation. Reversed and remanded with instructions.

Reversed and remanded with instructions. Costs to appellant.

James &amp James, for Appellant.

To constitute "accident" within Workmen's Compensation Act, it is not necessary that the workmen trip or fall, or that machinery fail, but an "accident" occurs in doing what workman habitually does, if any unexpected, undesigned, unlooked for, or untoward event or mishap, connected with or growing out of the employment takes place. (Pinson v. Minidoka Highway District, 61 Idaho 731 (5) (106 P.2d 1020.)

The death of a person, pre-disposed to heart disease, brought about or accelerated by bad air conditions or high altitude, is an industrial accident. (Carroll v. Industrial Accident Commission, 195 P. 1097 (Colo.) (2); Nicholson v. Round-Up Coal Mining Co., 257 P. 270 (Mont.) (10); Knock v. Industrial Accident Commission, 253 P. 712 (Cal.) (2).)

Expert's testimony as to his opinion is not evidence of fact in dispute, but is only advisory, and is admissible only to assist triers of fact to understand and apply the testimony of other witnesses. From this it follows that a conflict in the opinion of experts does not create a conflict in the evidence. (Evans v. Cavanagh, 58 Idaho 324, 73 P.2d 83 (1), a very similar case; Suren v. Sunshine Mining Co. (Idaho) 70 P.2d 399 (58 Idaho 101, at 108); Watkins v. Cavanagh, 107 P.2d 155 at 156, (61 Idaho 720).)

Positive expert testimony will prevail over negative expert testimony. (In re. Soran, 57 Idaho 483 (5) (67 P.2d 906).)

Frank L. Benson, for Respondents.

The mere showing of a bad air condition is not sufficient to justify compensation. It must be proven that such air condition was the approximate cause of the death or disability. (Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Kerr (Ky), 263 S.W. 342; Meade Fiber Corp. v. Starnes (Tenn), 247 S.W. 989; Gordon v. Travelers Ins. Co. (Tex), 287 S.W. 911; Taggart v. Ind. Com'n. (Utah), 12 P.2d 356.)

Where there is conflict in medical testimony finding of the Board on medical questions will not be disturbed. (Rand v. Lafferty Transportation Co., 60 Idaho 507, 42 P.2d 786.)

A finding of the Board that deceased died from coronary thrombosis and not from accident will not be disturbed on appeal. (Knight v. Younkin, 51 Idaho 612, 105 P.2d 456.)

Findings of the Board substantiated by facts will not be reversed on appeal. (Const., art. 5, sec. 9, as amended 1937 Laws, p. 498; I. C. A. secs. 43-1407, 43-1408, 43-1409 (As amended 1937 Laws, c. 175, pp. 288, 289); Golay v. Stoddard, 60 Idaho 168, 89 P.2d 1002; Potter v. Realty Trust Co., 60 Idaho 281, 90 P.2d 699.)

GIVENS, C.J. Budge, Morgan, Holden, and Ailshie, JJ., concur.

OPINION

GIVENS, C.J.

--Appellant, widow of deceased, Julian Aranguena, was by the Industrial Accident Board denied compensation for her husband's death on the theory that the same was not accidental.

Deceased was about 50 years old and had been working for the respondent mining company 4 years. He was a strong, vigorous, robust man, never having complained of pain in his heart or chest, and having missed only 3 days because of illness up until August 20, 1940, at which time he was laid off because of a broken ankle. The day of his death, October 9, 1940, was the first day he had returned to work after breaking his ankle. On this day deceased and one McPherson had gone to work at 6:30 p. m. on the 770 foot sub-level, about 2000 feet from the surface of the mine, some 500 or 600 feet from the main inclined shaft. Deceased was braking and operating the clutch of a tugger, which required about 25 to 30 pounds of pressure. At 10:30 deceased and McPherson ate lunch. They returned to work, deceased started coughing, said he felt as if he were going to throw up, walked about 15 feet from the tugger and vomited. McPherson went to him and found deceased on his hands and knees, acting as if he couldn't get his breath, his eyes rolling back. He made no complaint, his face was not discolored, and he died immediately.

An autopsy disclosed an arterial sclerosis and a thrombosis in the right coronary artery, occluding the same about an inch from where the same comes from the aorta. The doctor performing the autopsy stated the thrombosis had been developing for some time, possibly a year. The death certificate gave as the cause of death this thrombosis and over-exertion following the convalescence from the fracture of the ankle. Another doctor was of the opinion the bad air and exertion were the precipitating cause of the fatal occlusion. A heart specialist called by respondent stated categorically in response to a hypothetical question that the fractured ankle, exercise, and bad air had nothing to do with contributing to or causing the death, but stated on cross-examination that while the bad air would cause a person to breathe faster, thus tending to prevent the occlusion of a coronary thrombosis, he would not place a person with coronary thrombosis where there was a shortage of oxygen, and men with arteriosclerosis should not work in a mine.

The board found: "that the air in said raise [where deceased was working] was quite warm and was deficient in oxygen and the men perspired quite freely while engaged in their work; that the ventilation in said raise was not very good" and in finding 5 that: "the death of said Julian Aranguena was caused by thrombosis of the coronary artery and that said disease was not caused, aggravated or accelerated by the work done by the said deceased on the 9th day of October, 1940."

The concluding fact, therefore, that the thrombosis was not caused, aggravated, or accelerated by the work was not a comprehensive finding or conclusion in that it did not cover the effect of the bad air, heat, or lack of ventilation.

Respondent contends the board's findings adverse to appellant upon disputed and contradictory facts, under the statute and the constitution, are binding upon this court. If supported by competent, substantial evidence, that is true. If not, it becomes a question of law; or, if there is a lack of substantial, probable evidence, there is insufficient support for the order. The board having found that there was bad air, lack of ventilation, and that the workmen were sweating because of these conditions, whatever conflict may have existed in regard to this situation becomes of no importance. These findings stand.

Two doctors, one of whom performed the autopsy, concluded these conditions deleteriously affected the thrombosis or embolus and caused it to completely close the coronary artery. While the answers to the hypothetical questions of the other physician, who never saw the deceased, disputed this, the cross-examination devitalized this apparent conflict. The appropriate rule of law has thus been stated in Fackenthall v. Eggers Pole & Supply Co., 62 Idaho 46 108 P.2d 300, at 302:

"We should not overlook the fact that sometimes there may be a difference between degrees of expert testimony and opinion evidence. The expert often testifies as to the effect or result of natural or scientific facts, which have been proven or demonstrated by him or by acknowledged leaders of his profession and which may...