Argonaut Min. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Commission

• Decision Date: 02 May 1951
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: ARGONAUT MINING CO. v. INDUSTRIAL ACC. COMMISSION et al. Civ. 14738.

Page 637

230 P.2d 637

104 Cal.App.2d 27

ARGONAUT MINING CO. v. INDUSTRIAL ACC. COMMISSION et al.

Civ. 14738.

District Court of Appeal, First District, Division 2, California.

May 2, 1951.

Hearing Denied June 28, 1951.

Keith, Creede & Sedgwick, San Francisco (B. K. Wines, San Francisco, of counsel), for petitioner.

Edmund J. Thomas, Jr., T. Groezinger and Robert Ball, San Francisco, for Respondent Industrial Acc. Commission.

NOURSE, Presiding Justice.

Sabino Gonzalez filed an application with the Industrial Accident Commission on December 22, 1948, against petitioner and others. He alleged an injury arising out of and in the course of employment with petitioner, to wit, occupational silicosis. He had worked as a miner for petitioner and others from June, 1923, to December, 1928, exposed to silica hazards. From December, 1928, to August 20, 1948, he engaged in other occupations which did not expose him to silicosis. Gonzalez died before his case went to decision. His dependents then filed an application for an industrial death benefit, which claim was consolidated and heard with the disability claim. Respondent commission made an award on July 21, 1950, finding that on November 23, 1948, Gonzalez sustained a compensable injury consisting of silicosis which caused his death on April 9, 1949. An award was made jointly and severally against petitioner and others.

The death benefit and the accrued temporary indemnity were based upon the rates in effect according to the statutes of 1948. Based upon the statutes in existence in 1948, the total award was for $6,415.20. If the award were based upon the statutes in existence in 1928, petitioner alleges, the total award would have been for $4,334.85.

Petitioner's contentions are twofold. (1) Due process is violated because retroactive effect is given to the 1948 statutes. (2) The commission's award violates the contract impairment clause of the California and United States Constitutions, Const. art. 1, § 16; U.S.C.A. Const. art. 1, § 10, in not following the law in effect in 1928. It concedes that the application was timely filed and that the case is compensable.

With respect to the constitutional inhibition against the legislative impairment of the obligation of contracts, petitioner's position is summarized in the following language: 'At the time Gonzalez was hired by your petitioner, the parties dealt in contemplation of the statutes in existence in 1928. The statutes in existence at that time became an integral part of the contract of employment.' In support of this contention petitioner cites Brown v. Ferdon, 5 Cal.2d 226, 54 P.2d 712. In that case the statute in question purported to remove a civil remedy that had been available for the enforcement of contracts at the time the particular contract was entered into. The court held that the remedy existing at the time the contract was entered into became a part of the contract and could not be later taken away by the legislature.

In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 30 Cal.2d 388, 182 P.2d 159, it was held that certain additional benefits were not to be awarded to the workman when these benefits were provided for after the workman was injured. This was on the ground, however, that the added law was intended to operate only prospectively, and not retrospectively. There is in the opinion the recognition that had the legislature disclosed an intent to have the additional benefits operate retrospectively, the law would have been a valid exercise of police power and not in violation of the inhibitions against the impairment of the obligation of contracts.

Alaska Packers Ass'n v. I. A. C., 1 Cal.2d 250, 34 P.2d 716; Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com., 184 Cal. 26, 192 P. 1021, 12 A.L.R. 1190, and North Alaska Salmon Co. v. Pillsbury, 174 Cal. 1, 162 P. 93, L.R.A.1917E, 642, all deal with the extraterritorial effect of the compensation act. They hold uniformly, however, that the right to, and liability for, compensation established by the act are not founded upon contract, but are statutory rights and duties arising from the employer-employee relationship, and are imposed by the law as incidents of that status. See Campbell, Workmen's Compensation, Vol. I, pp. 20-23, sections 26, 27; Horovitz on Workmen's Compensation, p. 12, et seq.

On the question of due process petitioner cites Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com., 30 Cal.2d 388, 182 P.2d 159. As has been pointed out, this case held that the law in force at the time of the injury is to be taken as the measure of the injured person's right of recovery and thus additional benefits made available by law after an injury could not be granted an injured workman as this would be given retrospective operation to a law which was construed to be prospective in operation only. The question in the instant case is, however, what is the date of injury for the purposes of compensation in cases of occupational disease? Obviously if it is held that for the purposes of compensation the date of injury in cases of occupational disease is that moment in time when the disease results in disability, the the award was proper, as Gonzalez's disability from silicosis occurred after the 1948 statutes.

The contentions of the parties are simple. Petitioner asserts that the date of injury for the purposes of fixing the amount of compensation to be awarded is the last date that the workman was exposed to the silica dust as an employee of petitioner or the date of Gonzalez's employment by petitioner. The commission asserts that in the case of an occupational disease industrial injury does not occur until disability results. Respondents cite Marsh v. Ind. Acc. Com., 217 Cal. 338, 18 P.2d 933, 86...