Ariz. State Hospital/Arizona Cmty. Prot. & Treatment Ctr. v. Klein

• Decision Date: 05 February 2013
• Docket Number: No. 1 CA–SA 12–0244.,1 CA–SA 12–0244.
• Citation: 296 P.3d 1003,653 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 33,231 Ariz. 467
• Parties: ARIZONA STATE HOSPITAL/ARIZONA COMMUNITY PROTECTION AND TREATMENT CENTER, Petitioner, v. The Honorable Andrew G. KLEIN, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, in and for the County of Maricopa, Respondent Judge, Charles P., Real Party in Interest.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

231 Ariz. 467

296 P.3d 1003

653 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 33

ARIZONA STATE HOSPITAL/ARIZONA COMMUNITY PROTECTION AND TREATMENT CENTER, Petitioner,

v. The Honorable Andrew G. KLEIN, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, in and for the County of Maricopa, Respondent Judge,Charles P., Real Party in Interest.

No. 1 CA–SA 12–0244.

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1, Department E.

Feb. 5, 2013.

Thomas C. Home, Arizona Attorney General By Greg D. Honig, Assistant Attorney General, Aubrey Joy Corcoran, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, Attorneys for Petitioner.

Maricopa County Office of the Legal Advocate By Mary Beth Mitchell, And Daniel R. Raynak, Phoenix, Attorneys for Real Party in Interest.

OPINION

JOHNSEN, Judge.

¶ 1 In this special action we hold that Arizona Rule of Evidence 702 applies to testimony by a mental-health expert at a trial on a petition for discharge filed by a person committed under the Arizona Sexually Violent Persons Act (“SVPA”), Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 36–3701 to –3717 (West 2013).¹ Petitioner is the Arizona Community Protection and Treatment Center (“Center”), in which real-party-in-interest Charles P. is detained for treatment pursuant to the SVPA. The Center challenges the superior court's order setting a pretrial hearing pursuant to Rule 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), to determine whether the Center's mental-health expert may testify at the trial on Charles's petition for discharge.

¶ 2 We accept jurisdiction of the Center's petition for special action but deny relief. We agree with the superior court that Rule 702 applies to expert testimony offered at a discharge proceeding conducted pursuant to A.R.S. § 36–3714. We also hold that whether to set a pretrial hearing to consider the admissibility of the expert testimony is a matter within the discretion of the superior court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 3 In 2000, after Charles P. served a 10–year prison sentence for attempted molestation of a child, the superior court found he was a sexually violent person under the SVPA and committed him to the Center for treatment. Thereafter, pursuant to A.R.S. § 36–3708(A), Center psychologists performed annual reviews of his treatment progress. In a report dated June 2, 2011, Ryan Goldenstein, Psy. D., and June M. Stapleton, Ph.D., observed that Charles had “made only minimal progress” since his most recent annual evaluation and concluded that if he were transferred to “a less restrictive environment, community safety would be at risk.”

¶ 4 Charles subsequently petitioned the court for an absolute discharge pursuant to A.R.S. § 36–3714. Charles's petition disagreed with Goldenstein's and Stapleton's report and argued he no longer “fit the criteria for designation” as a sexually violent person. The superior court set an evidentiary hearing on his discharge petition pursuant to A.R.S. § 36–3714(C).

¶ 5 The Center designated Goldenstein as its mental-health expert witness for the discharge hearing. Goldenstein's vitae shows he received master's and doctorate degrees in clinical psychology from the American School of Professional Psychology at Argosy University in Phoenix in 2008 and 2010, respectively. He received a bachelor's degree in psychology in 2005 from Minnesota State University, Moorhead, and has been employed by the Center since 2010. In an affidavit, Goldenstein stated his “primary responsibility” with the Center “is to conduct the annual examination” of sexually violent persons, prepare reports based on those evaluations and testify about his conclusions.

¶ 6 Prior to the discharge hearing, Charles filed a motion asking the court to set a hearing to evaluate Goldenstein's competence and the methodology he used in concluding Charles should not be discharged. Charles argued Goldenstein had not “utilize[ed] generally accepted scientific methods” in evaluating him and lacked “the clinical experience necessary to make an evaluation without utilizing proper scientific methods.” He argued Goldenstein should be precluded from testifying because he “does not use any actuarials” in performing his annual evaluations of persons committed under the SVPA, and instead uses “unguided clinical judgment, which has been universally rejected in the scientific community as being unreliable.” Charles further told the court that he would offer evidence that peer-reviewed studies have determined the methodology Goldenstein uses is “severely flawed.”

¶ 7 In opposing Charles's request, the Center argued that under the SVPA, a witness need only qualify as a “competent professional” pursuant to A.R.S. § 36–3701(2) to testify at a discharge hearing. It also argued that contrary to Charles's assertion, Goldenstein does not employ unguided clinical judgment, but instead uses “research guided clinical judgment.” The Center added that Charles's challenges to Goldenstein's education, experience and competency properly went to the weight to be accorded his testimony, not to its admissibility under Rule 702.

¶ 8 The superior court ordered a hearing pursuant to Rule 702 and Daubert to determine whether to admit Goldenstein's testimony, then granted a stay to allow the Center to petition for special action relief.

DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction.

¶ 9 The Center's petition for special action argues the superior court erred by ordering a pretrial hearing to determine the admissibility of Goldenstein's testimony. Exercise of special action jurisdiction is discretionary but proper when the petitioner has no plain, adequate or speedy remedy by appeal. State ex rel. Romley v. Martin, 203 Ariz. 46, 47, ¶ 4, 49 P.3d 1142, 1143 (App.2002). Exercise of jurisdiction is appropriate in matters of statewide importance, issues of first impression, cases involving purely legal questions, or issues that are likely to arise again. Id.

¶ 10 Whether Rule 702 and Daubert apply to mental-health testimony offered in a hearing on a petition to discharge a committed person is a matter of statutory construction and therefore is purely a legal question. Further, according to the Center, Goldenstein is the primary evaluator for 77 other committed persons, five of whom have moved for Daubert hearings. Thus, the issue likely will arise again. For all of these reasons, we accept jurisdiction of the Center's petition for special action.

B. Admissibility of Expert Testimony Under the SVPA.

1. General principles.

¶ 11 By statute, at a hearing to consider a committed person's petition for discharge, the State “has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the person's mental disorder has not changed and that the person remains a danger to others and is likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if discharged.” A.R.S. § 36–3714(C).² The same statute anticipates that testimony by “competent professional[s]” will be offered at such a hearing. Id. (committed person seeking discharge may retain or seek appointment of “a competent professional” to perform an evaluation; after committed person requests discharge hearing, he or she may “be examined by a competent professional” chosen by State).

¶ 12 The Center's petition for special action asks us to consider the power of the superior court to determine who may provide mental-health testimony at a discharge hearing and the discretion of the court to determine the nature of the proceeding by which it will exercise that power. When construing a statute, we first look to its plain language. In re Maricopa County Superior Court No. MH 2002–000767, 205 Ariz. 296, 298, ¶ 9, 69 P.3d 1017, 1019 (App.2003). Clear and unequivocal statutory language determines the statute's meaning. Janson ex rel. Janson v. Christensen, 167 Ariz. 470, 471, 808 P.2d 1222, 1223 (1991). Each word, phrase, clause and sentence must be given meaning so that no part of the statute will be void or trivial and the meaning determined must avoid absurd results. Stein v. Sonus USA, Inc., 214 Ariz. 200, 204, ¶ 17, 150 P.3d 773, 777 (App.2007) (citation omitted). Related statutes must be construed together. Staples v. Concord Equities, L.L.C., 221 Ariz. 27, 29, ¶ 9, 209 P.3d 163, 165 (App.2009). And we apply principles of statutory construction when we construe court rules. State v. Baca, 187 Ariz. 61, 63, 926 P.2d 528, 530 (1996).

2. Rule 702 applies in a discharge hearing.

¶ 13 With certain exceptions not relevant here, the Arizona Rules of Evidence “apply to proceedings in courts in the State of Arizona.” Ariz. R. Evid. 101(a). Consistent with that mandate, the SVPA expressly provides that the Arizona Rules of Evidence apply to discharge hearings conducted by the superior court. A.R.S. § 36–3704(B) (“The Arizona rules of evidence and the Arizona rules of civil procedure apply to proceedings under this article.”).

¶ 14 Among the Arizona Rules of Evidence is Rule 702, which governs the admissibility of testimony by an expert witness. As amended in 2012, and as applicable here, Rule 702 states:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:

(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and

(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

¶ 15 Without acknowledging Rule 101(a) or § 36–3704(B), the Center argues Rule 702 does not apply to mental-health testimony offered at a hearing on a committed person's petition for discharge. Instead, it argues that under the SVPA, the court must allow the testimony of any witness who qualifies as a “competent professional” pursuant to A.R.S. § 36–3701(2). That statute defines “competent professional” as

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