Arlington Props., Inc. v. Brown (Ex parte Arlington Props., Inc.)
Decision Date | 18 June 2010 |
Docket Number | 2090038. |
Citation | 83 So.3d 503 |
Parties | Ex parte ARLINGTON PROPERTIES, INC.(In re Arlington Properties, Inc. v. Cantrell Brown). |
Court | Alabama Court of Civil Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Joseph M. Willoughby, Gadsden, for petitioner.
Misty S. Ledbetter of Legal Services Alabama, Inc., Anniston, for respondent.
Arlington Properties, Inc. (“Arlington”), petitions this court for a writ of mandamus directing the Etowah Circuit Court to grant its motion to dismiss Cantrell Brown's appeal from the Etowah District Court's judgment in favor of Arlington on Arlington's unlawful-detainer complaint. We grant the petition and issue the writ.
On June 24, 2009, Arlington filed in the Etowah District Court a complaint asserting an unlawful-detainer claim against Brown. After a trial, the district court rendered a judgment in favor of Arlington on July 21, 2009. In the judgment, the district court stated that Brown had until August 4, 2009, to appeal the judgment. The judgment was not entered into the State Judicial Information System until July 27, 2009, and, thus, it was deemed “entered” on that date. Rule 58, Ala. R. Civ. P. On August 4, 2009, Brown filed a notice of appeal to the Etowah Circuit Court. On August 12, 2009, Arlington filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, alleging that the notice of appeal had not been timely filed. On October 7, 2009, the circuit court denied that motion. Arlington filed its petition for a writ of mandamus to this court on October 14, 2009.
“
“ Ex parte Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 888 So.2d 478, 480 (Ala.2003).”
Ex parte Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 31 So.3d 661, 663 (Ala.2009).
In its petition, Arlington argues that, pursuant to Ala.Code 1975, §§ 6–6–350 and 35–9A–461, Brown's notice of appeal to the circuit court was required to have been filed within seven days after the entry of the district court's judgment, that Brown's appeal was not filed within that seven-day period, and that, therefore, Brown's appeal is due to be dismissed as untimely filed. Specifically, Arlington points out that the Etowah District Court's practice is to handwrite, sign, and date orders in open court, to notify the losing party of his or her right to appeal and of the time within which the appeal must be perfected, and, generally, to deliver the order to the clerk's office that same day. Based on those facts, Arlington contends that the time to appeal should have run from the date the judgment was rendered, i.e., July 21, 2009, not the date it was entered into the State Judicial Information System, i.e., July 27, 2009.
Brown, on the other hand, argues that, pursuant to Rule 58(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., the district court's judgment was entered on July 27, 2009. He further argues that, because the time in which to file an appeal is less than 11 days, pursuant to Rule 6, Ala. R. Civ. P., intermediate Saturdays and Sundays must be excluded from the computation of the 7–day period. Rule 6(a) provides, in pertinent part:
Based on his assertion that Rule 6 applies in this case, Brown concludes that his notice of appeal was filed 6 days after the district court's judgment was entered and, thus, was timely filed.
We initially note that Arlington's argument that the time for appeal ran from the date the district court's judgment was rendered is without merit. Both §§ 6–6–350 and 35–9A–461 provide that the time for appealing from an unlawful-detainer judgment runs from the “entry” of the judgment. There is a “distinction between the substantive, judicial act of rendering a judgment and the procedural, ministerial act of entering a judgment.” See Committee Comments to Amendment to Rule 58 Effective September 19, 2006, quoted in Bolden v. Wise Alloys, LLC, 5 So.3d 1287 (Ala.Civ.App.2008). Rule 58(c) specifically provides that a judgment is deemed entered as of the date it is entered into the State Judicial Information System. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court's judgment was entered on July 27, 2009.
We cannot, however, end our analysis here. We must determine whether Rule 6(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., applies to the computation of the time in which to appeal in this case because, if it does not apply, Brown's notice of appeal was not timely filed.1
“The Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be applied if applying them would offend restrictions imposed by our Constitution.” Ex parte General Motors Corp., 800 So.2d 159, 164 (Ala.2000) (Lyons, J., concurring specially). “The Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated by Court under authority granted by the Alabama Constitution of 1901, amd. State v. Bragg, 710 So.2d 417, 418 (Ala.1998). That section of the constitution, now Art. VI, § 150, Ala. Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp.), provides, in pertinent part:
“The supreme court shall make and promulgate rules governing the administration of all courts and rules governing practice and procedure in all courts; provided, however, that such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive right of any party nor affect the jurisdiction of circuit and district courts or venue of actions therein....”
Sections 6–6–350 and 35–9A–461 both provide for a seven-day period in which to file a notice of appeal to the circuit court from an unlawful-detainer judgment entered in the district court. Thus, those statutes grant appellate jurisdiction to circuit courts to review an unlawful-detainer judgment only if the notice of appeal is filed within that seven-day period. The application of Rule 6 would extend that period and, consequently, the jurisdiction of the circuit courts to decide appeals when the notice of appeal is filed more than seven days after the judgment was entered. Because such a result would be offensive to our constitution, we must conclude that Rule 6 is inapplicable to appeals to the circuit court in unlawful-detainer actions.
In State v. Ladner & Co., 346 So.2d 1160, 1161 (Ala.Civ.App.1977), this court considered the question “whether a taxpayer who fail[ed] to perfect an appeal from a final tax assessment, pursuant to Tit. 51, § 140, [Ala.Code 1940 (Recomp.1958),] may thereafter have the assessment set aside by a Rule 60(b) [, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] motion.” The taxpayer argued that “a final assessment of taxes is as conclusive as a judgment of the circuit court” and, thus, could be “altered as any other judgment.” 346 So.2d at 1161. The State argued that Tit. 51, § 140, Ala.Code 1940 (Recomp. 1958), provided the exclusive method for contesting a tax assessment, i.e., an appeal to the circuit court, that the taxpayer had not followed that procedure, and, thus, that the trial court was without jurisdiction to entertain the taxpayer's Rule 60(b) motion. Id. This court agreed, stating:
In Mitchell v. State, 351 So.2d 599 (Ala.Civ.App.1977), a case that also challenged a final tax assessment, the taxpayer filed his notice of appeal beyond the 30 days provided by Tit. 51, § 140. The taxpayer argued that his appeal was timely filed pursuant to Rule 6(a) and 6(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., because the 30–day period expired on a Sunday and because he had received notice of the final assessment by mail.2 351 So.2d at 601. This court, citing Ladner, disagreed with the taxpayer, stating:
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Arlington Props., Inc. v. Brown (Ex parte Arlington Props., Inc.), 2090038.
...Inc., and directing the Etowah Circuit Court to dismiss the appeal to that court filed by Cantrell Brown. See Ex parte Arlington Props., Inc., 83 So.3d 503 (Ala.Civ.App.2010). Brown then petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review this court's opinion. The suprem......