Armour, In re
| Decision Date | 18 November 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 46361,46361 |
| Citation | 59 Ill.2d 102,319 N.E.2d 496 |
| Parties | In re Anthony Ray ARMOUR, a minor, Respondent. The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Anthony Ray ARMOUR, Appellant. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Paul Bradley and Laurence A. Benner, Chicago, for appellant.
William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Bernard Carey, State's Atty., Chicago (James B. Zagel, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Patrick T. Driscoll, Jr., Zenon Forowycz, and Ferdinand M. Minelli, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for the People.
On July 3, 1971, two delinquency petitions, charging attempted robbery and murder, were filed in the juvenile division of the circuit court of Cook County against Anthony Ray Armour, a minor. On July 9, 1971, the court released the minor, who was 17 years old, into his parents' custody and set the adjudication hearing for August 4, 1971. On that date the case was continued on the minor's motion, and after the case had been continued several times more on motions of the State, the minor, the court, and by agreement, the adjudicatory hearing was held on February 29, 1972. The court found the minor delinquent on the charges of attempted robbery and murder and committed him to the Department of Corrections until he will be 21 years old. He appealed, and the appellate court affirmed. (15 Ill.App.3d 529, 305 N.E.2d 47.) We granted the minor's petition for leave to appeal.
A single question appears on this appeal. Section 4--2 of the Juvenile Court Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 37, par. 704--2) states that an adjudicatory hearing shall be set within 30 days of the filing of a delinquency petition. The adjudicatory hearing here was scheduled for August 4, 32 days after the filing of the delinquency petition. The minor argues that the consequence of this failure to meet exactly the provisions of the statute is that he is entitled to be discharged.
The State's position is that the provision simply requires that an adjudicatory hearing be set within 30 days and does not require that the hearing actually be held within 30 days or, in the alternative, that the provision is to be considered as only directory and not mandatory.
Assuming for purposes of the minor's contention that the statute calls for the holding and not simply the setting of a hearing within 30 days, we judge that the circumstance that the adjudicatory hearing was not scheduled to be held within 30 days of the filing of the petition did not deprive the court of jurisdiction.
At the time concerned here section 4--2 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 37, par. 704--2) provided:
(Sections 4--3 and 4--4 provide for notice of the filing of the petition to be given to the minor and other respondents.)
We seek, of course, to determine that the legislative intent was in enacting the statute. 'In determining the intent of the legislature consideration must be given to the entire statute, its nature, objects and the consequences which would result from construing it one way or another.' Carrigan v. Illinois Liquor Control Com., 19 Ill.2d 230, 233, 166 N.E.2d 574, 576.
That the legislature used the word 'shall' in providing for the setting of a hearing within 30 days will not require an interpretation that the provision is mandatory and not directory. In Cooper v. Hinrichs, 10 Ill.2d 269, 272, 140 N.E.2d 293, 295, this court said: ...
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...S.G., 175 Ill.2d at 482, 222 Ill.Dec. 386, 677 N.E.2d at 925. The court distinguished an earlier decision, In re Armour, 59 Ill.2d 102, 104, 319 N.E.2d 496, 498 (1974), which read the term "shall" in the Act as directory, rather than mandatory. S.G, 175 Ill.2d at 481, 222 Ill.Dec. 386, 677 ......
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...indicates a mandatory legislative intention, it may be construed as permissive if the context so indicates. In re Armour (1974), 59 Ill.2d 102, 104, 319 N.E.2d 496. Legislative intent can be ascertained from a consideration of the entire Act, its nature, its object and the consequences that......
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...in the Juvenile Court Act turn on the purpose of the Act—to correct, not punish, juvenile criminal behavior. In In re Armour, 59 Ill.2d 102, 103, 319 N.E.2d 496 (1974), the statute provided an adjudicatory hearing "shall be set within 30 days of the filing of a delinquency petition." The co......