Armstrong v. Allstate Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 19 June 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-00928,97-00928
• Citation: 712 So.2d 788
• Parties: 23 Fla. L. Weekly D1504 Lillian ARMSTRONG, Appellant, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 788

712 So.2d 788

23 Fla. L. Weekly D1504

Lillian ARMSTRONG, Appellant, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Appellee.

No. 97-00928.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

Second District.

June 19, 1998.

Richard L. Purtz of Goldberg, Goldstein & Buckley, P.A., Fort Myers, for Appellant.

Bonita Kneeland Brown of Fowler, White, Gillen, Boggs, Villareal & Banker, P.A., Tampa, for Appellee.

THREADGILL, Judge.

In this declaratory judgment action, the appellant, Lillian Armstrong, challenges the entry of a final summary judgment in favor of the appellee, Allstate Insurance Company, in this dispute about uninsured motorist (UM) coverage. We reverse.

On March 21, 1994, Armstrong was a passenger in a vehicle owned and operated by Decker, when it became involved in an accident with another vehicle owned and operated by Fraser. Armstrong was injured as a result of the accident, which she claims was the fault of both drivers. Decker was insured by Allstate at the time of the accident, but Fraser had no insurance coverage whatsoever. Armstrong eventually recovered the limits of Decker's liability coverage under his Allstate policy for his negligence. She then, however, sought to recover the limits of Decker's UM coverage under the same policy for Fraser's negligence, because she had no UM coverage of her own. When Allstate rejected Armstrong's claim in that regard, she filed the instant action, seeking a declaration as to the existence of UM coverage under these circumstances. After Armstrong filed an amended complaint, Allstate filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Armstrong was precluded, as a matter of law, from collecting both liability and UM benefits under the same policy for injuries arising from the same accident. Upon determining that there were no disputed issues of material fact, and concluding that Allstate was entitled to a summary judgment as a matter of law, the trial court entered a final summary judgment in favor of Allstate. Armstrong filed a timely notice of appeal.

On appeal, Armstrong contends that insurance policies should be interpreted in a manner which provides the broadest coverage, and that it is the public policy of this state to protect citizens, through the availability of UM coverage, from physical harm caused by uninsured drivers. She thus argues that, in this instance, she is a class II insured under Decker's policy for purposes of both liability and UM coverage and, since there is no exclusion in the policy to prohibit her recovery of UM benefits--even though she has already collected the $10,000 limits of Decker's liability coverage for his negligence--she should not be barred from collecting UM benefits for Fraser's negligence. Armstrong claims she is entitled to UM benefits under these circumstances, because Fraser's negligence, when combined with Decker's negligence, caused her to suffer damages in excess of the $10,000 limits of Decker's liability coverage.

Allstate contends that to permit UM coverage in this instance would violate the provisions of Decker's policy, which limit coverage to $10,000 for any one person involved in any one occurrence or accident. Allstate also claims that public policy with respect to UM coverage, as expressed in existing Florida law, would be violated as well.

Uninsured motorist coverage was created by the legislature for the benefit of injured persons, and not for the benefit of insurance companies. See Foremost Ins. Co. v. Warmuth, 649 So.2d 939 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). See also Brown v. Progressive Mut. Ins. Co., 249 So.2d 429 (Fla.1971). In Foremost, the Fourth District cited Mullis v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 252 So.2d 229, 234 (Fla.1971), wherein the supreme court declared that, with regard to UM protection, it is the public policy of this state that every insured is entitled to recover whatever damages he or she would otherwise be able to recover if the uninsured motorist causing the damages had maintained a policy of liability insurance. Foremost, 649 So.2d at 941. Section 627.727, Florida Statutes (1993), which provides for UM coverage and specifies the damages recoverable from a UM carrier, embodies that public policy. Section 627.727 allows an insured, who has been injured by an uninsured motorist, the same recovery under his or her UM coverage, as he or she would have obtained had the uninsured tortfeasor been insured to the same extent as the insured's UM coverage. See Dewberry v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 363 So.2d 1077 (Fla.1978); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Morales, 533 So.2d 952 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). The UM carrier, in essence, becomes the uninsured tortfeasor's insurer, with limits as set forth in the insured's UM policy. Foremost, 649 So.2d at 940. In this instance, it is undisputed that Armstrong is a class II insured under Decker's policy. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Quirk, 583 So.2d 1026, 1028 (Fla.1991)(a class II insured is a lawful occupant of an insured vehicle, who is not a named insured or resident family member of a named insured under the policy insuring the subject vehicle). As a class II insured, Armstrong is entitled to liability and UM coverage under that policy. Id. Thus, to deny her the right to recover her damages from Fraser under Decker's UM coverage, without more, is a violation of this state's public policy.

The foregoing notwithstanding, a class II insured cannot treat the same automobile as both insured and uninsured for purposes of collecting both liability and UM benefits under the same policy, for injuries arising out of a single-car accident involving only one tortfeasor. See Travelers Ins. Co. v....