Aronovitch v. Levy

• Decision Date: 02 January 1953
• Docket Number: No. 35828,35828
• Citation: 56 N.W.2d 570,238 Minn. 237,34 A.L.R.2d 1306
• Parties: , 34 A.L.R.2d 1306 ARONOVITCH v. LEVY.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 570

56 N.W.2d 570

238 Minn. 237, 34 A.L.R.2d 1306

ARONOVITCH v. LEVY.

No. 35828.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Jan. 2, 1953.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Where only strictly legal rights are in controversy and an action is brought within the time prescribed by our statute of limitations the equitable doctrine of laches has no application.

2. Where equitable relief is sought in an action, the doctrine of laches may apply to such equitable relief, even though the statute of limitations has not run so as to bar the main action, where a delay in bringing the action has so adversely affected a party that it would be inequitable to grant the relief.

3. While evidence of prejudice is not always essential before the doctrine of laches may be applied, it is a circumstance of importance in determining whether a party has been guilty of laches that the situation of the parties has changed, or that material witnesses have died, or that because of lapse of time evidence has otherwise been lost, so that the ascertainment of essential facts is made difficult, and the exact facts upon which the rights of the parties depend must necessarily be in doubt.

4. Before the doctrine of laches may be applied on account of prejudice resulting from the death of witnesses, it must appear that such prejudice has been the result of unreasonable delay. Where the death of witnesses occurs before there is unreasonable delay, such death, standing alone, cannot be used as the basis for application of the doctrine.

5. Where the parties contract for a release of all claims for known injuries, the release is a bar to recovery for unknown consequences of known injuries, but is not a bar to recovery for unknown injuries not within the contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting for such release. Where a release expressly covers unknown injuries, it does not bar an action for such unknown injuries if it can be shown that such unknown injuries were not within the contemplation of the parties when the settlement was agreed upon, but if the parties in fact intentionally agree upon a settlement for such unknown injuries such release is binding. Whether the parties intended the release to cover unknown injuries is usually a question of fact.

Durham & Swanson, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Hall Smith & Hedlund and L. Howard Bennett, Minneapolis, for respondent.

KNUTSON, Justice.

Appeal from an order of the trial court granting plaintiff a new trial for errors of law occurring in the court's charge to the jury.

Plaintiff, who was then employed by the Dyckman Hotel as a piano player, was injured on August 21, 1945, when he slipped and fell down a stairway on his way to a barbershop in the hotel. After the fall, defendant called Dr. Emil Robitshek, who helped plaintiff up the stairs, and they then went to the office of Dr. R. G. Allison, where X rays were taken. Plaintiff then went to the office of Dr. Robitshek in the same building. According to plaintiff, he was informed by Dr. Robitshek that there were no broken bones and that he could go back to work that night. Plaintiff went to his home and was unable to work for a period of ten days. On August 24 he went to the Deauville Inn, near Brainerd, to rest and convalesce. The next day he consulted Dr. Eyers at Pequot Lakes, Minnesota, who took further X rays and gave the plates to plaintiff. Dr. Eyers advised plaintiff to procure a rib binder. When plaintiff returned to Minneapolis he took Dr. Eyers' X-ray plates to Dr. Robitshek and informed him that Dr. Eyers had found two fractured ribs and arthritis in the spine. Plaintiff testified that Dr. Robitshek then remarked that everybody gets arthritis. On November 10, 1945, plaintiff took the X-ray plates originally prepared by Dr. Allison to Dr. Walter H. Ude, an X-ray specialist. He also consulted Dr. Daniel F. Noonan on November 23. Since neither Doctors Eyers, Ude, or Noonan were called as witnesses in the trial of the case, we have no way of knowing what their findings were. Plaintiff returned to his employment on August 31, 1945. On September 26, 1945, he called at the law offices of Durham & Swanson, who then represented defendant's insurer. Durham offered him $50 and his medical expenses in settlement, but plaintiff refused to accept the offer. On January 3, 1946, he again called at the offices of Durham & Swanson, and he then accepted the offer and signed a release, which contains the following provision, among other things:

'Know All Men by These Presents, that the Undersigned do(es) hereby acknowledge receipt of Seventy-five and 48/100 in addition to $22.50 Dollars ($75.48) paid direct to Dr. Allison and $15.00 paid direct to Dr. Robitshek, which sum is accepted in full compromise settlement and satisfaction of, and as sole consideration for the final release and discharge of, all actions, claims and demands whatsoever, that now exist, or may hereafter accrue, against Central Hanover Bank & Trust Company and or Morris G. Levy and Dyckman Hotel and any other person, corporation, association or partnership charged with responsibility for injuries to the person and property of the Undersigned, and the treatment thereof, and the consequences flowing therefrom, as a result of an accident, casualty or event which occurred on or about the 21st day of August 1945 at or near stairway leading to barber shop of Dyckman Hotel and for which the Undersigned claims the above named persons or parties are legally liable in damages; which legal liability and damages are disputed and denied, and;

'The Undersigned Agrees, as a further consideration and inducement for this compromise settlement, that it shall apply to all unknown and unanticipated injuries and damages resulting from said accident, casualty or event, as well as to those now disclosed.'

Plaintiff's employment was terminated on January 28, 1946. On that date he consulted Dr. Frank Gratzek, an X-ray specialist, who found that plaintiff had an ununited fracture of the eighth rib; that the sixth, seventh, and eighth vertebrae were wedge-shaped and irregular; that there was considerable curvature of the spine; and that there was evidence of arthritis. He could not say whether the wedge-shaped vertebrae were due to trauma or natural causes.

On October 10, 1946, plaintiff consulted Dr. J. P. Korchik, complaining of pain over the lower right chest, pain over the sixth, seventh, and eighth vertebrae, and pain across the lower back. Dr. Korchik was of the opinion that plaintiff had sustained an injury to the soft tissue; that such injuries had not cleared up because of plaintiff's abnormal posture and his overweight; and that the soft tissue bruising which he found on October 10 was attributable to the fall.

This action was commenced on May 17, 1949. In the meantime, Dr. Robitshek had died on June 23, 1947, and Dr. Allison had died on March 20, 1946. Plaintiff based his right to recover on defendant's negligence. Defendant interposed the release signed by plaintiff as a bar to the action. Plaintiff, in his reply, admitted the signing of the release but sought to avoid it on the ground that it was executed as the result of a mutual mistake of the parties concerning the nature of plaintiff's injuries and also on the ground of constructive fraud. The court left it to the jury to determine whether plaintiff was chargeable with laches, among other things. The jury returned a verdict for defendant. Upon motion of plaintiff, the court set aside the verdict and granted a new trial exclusively upon errors of law in submitting the question of laches to the jury. This appeal followed from the order so granting a new trial.

1. It is the position of defendant that where a party bringing an action for the recovery of damages for a tort, the time for the commencement of which action is governed by our statute of limitations, seeks equitable relief by way of avoidance of a release the doctrine of laches applies to such equitable relief. Plaintiff contends, and the court relying upon our decision in Hanson v. Northern States Power Co., 198 Minn. 24, 268 N.W. 642, concluded, that laches has no application where the main action is brought within the time prescribed by our statute of limitations.

Where a party is seeking a legal remedy upon a legal right, we have held that the doctrine of laches has no application and that the remedy will be barred only by the statute of limitations. Morris v. McClary, 43 Minn. 346, 46 N.W. 238; O'Mulcahey v. Gragg, 45 Minn. 112, 47 N.W. 543; State v. Brooks-Scanlon Lumber Co., 122 Minn. 400, 142 N.W. 717.

2. We have held in a number of cases that where an action is governed by the statute of limitations the doctrine of laches has no application. 4 Dunnell, Dig. & Supp. § 5354; Kremer v. Lewis, 137 Minn. 368, 163 N.W. 732; Greenfield v. Hill City Land, Loan & Lumber Co., 141 Minn. 393, 170 N.W. 343; Vadnais v. State, 224 Minn. 439, 28 N.W.2d 694.

We have applied the same rule to equitable actions, at least unless it could be shown that the delay would result in substantial injury to innocent parties. In McRae v. Feigh, 143 Minn. 241, 246, 173 N.W. 655, 657, we said:

'* * * A court of equity will not bar a claim, enforceable in an action at law, for a delay of less than the statutory period, at least, unless it be shown that the enforcement of the claim will result in substantial injury to innocent parties.'

In Helvetia Copper Co. v. Hart-Parr Co., 142 Minn. 74, 171 N.W. 272, 767, we indicated that the doctrine might be applied to an action involving the disaffirmance of a settlement if it conclusively appeared that the defendant was prejudiced by a delay. There is much respectable authority holding that in equitable actions the doctrine of laches applies even though the action is governed by a statute of limitations. Walsh, Equity, p. 474; 2 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, 5th Ed., § 419d; Patterson v. Hewitt, 195 U.S. 309, 319, 25 S.Ct. 35, 37, 49 L.Ed. 214, 218...