Atkinson v. Railroad Employes' Mut. Relief Society

• Decision Date: 23 December 1929
• Citation: 22 S.W.2d 631,160 Tenn. 158
• Parties: ATKINSON et al. v. RAILROAD EMPLOYES' MUTUAL RELIEF SOC.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

22 S.W.2d 631

160 Tenn. 158

ATKINSON et al. v. RAILROAD EMPLOYES' MUTUAL RELIEF SOC.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

December 23, 1929

Appeal from Chancery Court, Knox County; Robert M. Jones, Judge.

Suit by James Atkinson and others against the Railroad Employés' Mutual Relief Society. From the decree, complainants appeal. Modified and affirmed.

Green Webb & Bass, of Knoxville, for appellants.

Kennerly & Key, of Knoxville, for appellee.

SWIGGART J.

The original bill was filed by James Atkinson as the holder since 1898 of a benefit certificate in the defendant society, and by the beneficiary named therein.

The certificate provided for the payment to Atkinson of "sick benefits" at the rate of $8 per week. Such benefits were claimed and paid from 1917 to and including the month of May, 1926, with two interruptions of short duration.

On September 16, 1926, Atkinson was suspended from the society for a period of five years for violating article 11, section 2, of the constitution of the society, which provided the penalty of expulsion for a member who should "feign sickness or indisposition for the purpose of drawing benefits from the funds of the Society."

The bill avers that this suspension was wrongful, and that complainant Atkinson continued the payment of his dues after his suspension until December 1, 1926, "but the last two checks issued by complainant in payment of his dues have not been cashed." The bill was filed December 4, 1926.

The prayer of the bill is for damages for breach of contract after reference to the master to determine the amount; and "in the alternative that the suspension of the complainant may be declared to be wrongful, illegal, null and void and may be set aside, and that the complainant may be reinstated to all of his rights under and by virtue of his contract and the charter and by-laws of the defendant."

The bill also contains a prayer for "general relief."

The bill having been answered and proof taken, the chancellor found that the complainant had not in fact feigned illness nor violated the constitution of the society, but that the society had given complainant a fair trial, without malice and that the action of the society in ordering the suspension would not be reviewed. The bill was accordingly dismissed.

This decree of the chancellor was reversed by the Court of Appeals by its decree, providing: "* * * That the decree of the Chancellor be, and the same is reversed and set aside; and this cause is remanded to the Chancery Court of Knox County to the end that proper decree be entered in favor of complainant and granting to him the relief prayed for in his bill."

The opinion prepared and filed by the Court of Appeals recites the concurrence of that court in the finding of the chancellor that Atkinson had not in fact violated the constitution of the society, and that his claims for benefits were bona fide made; but the Court of Appeals further found that the society had not given Atkinson a fair trial, as required by its constitution and by-laws, and that the action of the society in suspending him for a period of five years was, "under all the facts and circumstances, so unfair to him and so unjust, oppressive and arbitrary that it is our duty to set it aside." See Murray v. Supreme Hive, etc., 112 Tenn. 665, 80 S.W. 827. Certiorari to review the decree of the Court of Appeals was denied by this court.

Upon the remand, a reference to the master having first been ordered and then waived, the cause was finally heard by the chancellor upon an agreed statement of facts.

The chancellor decreed that Atkinson "be, and he is hereby restored to membership in the defendant, Railroad Employés' Mutual Relief Society, and that all the rights of such membership be restored to him, pursuant to the direction of the decree of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee."

Complainant was awarded a decree for the net amount of benefits payable from the date of his suspension to the date of the filing of the bill, after deducting the dues payable by him for that period. To this there was no exception by the appellee.

The chancellor, however, denied to complainant any recovery for benefits for the period from the date the bill was filed, December 4, 1926, to the date of the decree restoring complainant to membership, August 6, 1929, more than two and one-half years, for the stated reason that, "since the filing of the original bill in this cause on December 4, 1926, the complainant has not filed with the defendant proofs of his disability and right to seek or claim sick or disability benefits, and has not made claim therefor in the manner provided by the constitution by-laws, rules and regulations of the defendant Society, and the court further being of the opinion that the complainant James Atkinson cannot in this cause recover for any sick benefits which might have accrued to him after the filing of the original bill in this cause."

The agreed statement of facts recites the provisions of the constitution and by-laws of the society, as in the foregoing quotation from the decree of the chancellor; and it is agreed that, since May, 1926, the date the society suspended payment of benefits, the complainant made no application for benefits, and filed no proofs of disability, until after the decree of the Court of Appeals in March, 1929. The constitution of the society provides that claims for benefits must be presented to the society "every month or every two months," during disability. The constitution further makes provision for a ""sick committee" who shall visit the sick and disabled members "at least once a week during their sickness or disability," with the right "to require the claimant to submit to a medical examination before sick benefits are to be paid."

The agreed statement of facts recites: "That the physical condition of the complainant, James Atkinson, continued the same during the pendency of the suit, and is, if anything, worse now than it was at the time he brought this suit; that he has not at any time since the bringing of the said suit been able to work or perform manual labor." The suspension of the complainant from membership in the society having been finally adjudged to have been wrongful, the substantive facts which entitle complainant to all the benefits claimed are thus conceded; and the chancellor's decree must be sustained, if at all, only upon formal grounds.

It may be doubted whether the chancellor intended to deny relief to complainant because he had not filed proofs of disability or formal claims after his suspension. It is conceded that no such claims or proofs were filed from May to December, 1926; yet recovery for benefits during that period was decreed.

Nor do we think the filing of claim and proof after suspension was necessary to complainant's suit for benefits accruing thereafter.

The constitution and by-laws of the Society do not expressly declare the effect of the suspension of a member; however the provision for benefits is expressly limited in its application to "any member of this Society in good standing." Article 11, section 1. The effect of the order of suspension was to notify the complainant that he was no longer a member in good standing, and his right to claim further benefits was thereby terminated, if the order of...