Atlanta Journal v. Hill, 44857

• Decision Date: 10 September 1987
• Docket Number: No. 44857,44857
• Citation: 359 S.E.2d 913,257 Ga. 398
• Parties: , 14 Media L. Rep. 1668 The ATLANTA JOURNAL, et al. v. HILL, et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 913

359 S.E.2d 913

257 Ga. 398, 14 Media L. Rep. 1668

The ATLANTA JOURNAL, et al. v. HILL, et al.

No. 44857.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Sept. 10, 1987.

R. Keegan Federal, Jr., Dow, Lohnes & Albertson, Atlanta, Jonathan D. Hart, Washington, D.C., for The Atlanta Journal, et al.

Emmet J. Bondurant, Richard H. Sinkfield, Atlanta, for Jesse Hill, et al.

Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., George P. Shingler, Asst. Atty. Gen., amicus curiae.

HUNT, Justice.

The Atlanta Journal and The Atlanta Constitution and their managing editor, Glenn McCutchen (collectively referred to as the "Newspaper") appeal from the denial of their complaint for injunctive relief seeking access to meetings of the Administrative Review Panel, appointed by Atlanta Mayor Young (the "Mayor").

Appellees (collectively referred to as the "Panel"), are nine private citizens, sued in their capacity as members of the Administrative Review Panel, a group established by the Mayor by Executive Order on April 20, 1987 to "conduct a confidential review and evaluation of actions by City officials and employees following allegations concerning several prominent Atlantans which were filed with the Atlanta Bureau of Police Services on March 19, 1987." The Executive Order provides the Panel with the "right to request the authority to subpoena witnesses and documents," and to take sworn testimony before an official court reporter. On completion of its review and evaluation, the Panel is to prepare a written report setting forth its findings and recommendations. Although this final report is to be made public, the Executive Order provides that all meetings, conversations, interviews, and information concerning the Panel's investigations are to be held in strict confidence except to the extent that disclosure is legally required. The Executive Order specifically provides that Panel meetings are limited to Panel members and others authorized by the Panel or invited or required to appear before the Panel. On May 18, 1987, the Atlanta City Council amended the charter of the City of Atlanta to provide the Panel with power by subpoena to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents and other evidence. The amendment, approved by the Mayor, provides that failure to obey a subpoena issued by the Panel is punishable by fine or by imprisonment or forced labor, or both. The Newspaper filed this complaint following the Panel's refusal to allow the Newspaper access to its meetings. The trial court denied its application for injunctive relief and the Newspaper appeals, contending that public and media access to Panel meetings is required under Georgia's "Sunshine Law" or Open Meetings Act ("Act"), OCGA § 50-14-1, et seq. We affirm.

Two provisions of the Act are pertinent here. OCGA § 50-14-1(c) states "All meetings of any agency at which proposed official action is to be discussed or at which official action is to be taken shall be open to the public at all times." OCGA § 50-14-1(a)(1)(C) defines "agency" under the Act to include "[e]very department, agency, board, bureau, commission, authority, or similar body of each such county, municipal corporation, or other political subdivision of the state." We note that the Act was enacted in the public interest to protect the public--both individuals and the public generally--from "closed door" politics and the potential abuse of individuals and the misuse of power such policies entail. Therefore, the Act must be broadly construed to effect its remedial and protective purposes.

However, it was not intended that the Act cover groups which, although they function on behalf of government, have no official authority. In McLarty v. Board of Regents of University System of Georgia, 231 Ga. 22, 200 S.E.2d 117 (1973), cited as controlling by both sides to this appeal, we stated that the Act "applies to the meetings of the variously described bodies which are empowered to act officially for the State and at which such official action is taken. Official action is action which is taken by virtue of power granted by law, or by virtue of the office held, to act for and in behalf of the State. The 'Sunshine Law' does not encompass the innumerable groups which are organized and meet for the purpose of collecting information, making recommendations and rendering advice but which have no authority to make governmental decisions and act for the State. What the law seeks to eliminate are closed meetings which engender in the public a distrust of its officials who are clothed with the power to act in their name. It declares that the people, who possess ultimate sovereignty under our form of government, are entitled to observe the actions of those described bodies when exercising the power delegated to them to act on behalf of the people in the name of the State. There is no such compelling reason to require public meetings of advisory groups. They can take no official action. Generally, their reports are submitted in writing and are available to the public well in advance of any official action and are considered by the official body in public meeting[s]." In McLarty, we held that the Student Activity Fund Committee of the University of Georgia, organized by the University's Dean of Student Affairs to review the Student Senate's recommended allocation of Student Activity Funds, was not subject to the Act because the committee had no authority to take official...