Atwell v. State

• Decision Date: 26 May 2016
• Docket Number: No. SC14–193.,SC14–193.
• Citation: 197 So.3d 1040
• Parties: Angelo ATWELL, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

197 So.3d 1040

Angelo ATWELL, Petitioner,

v.STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. SC14–193.

Supreme Court of Florida.

May 26, 2016.

Carol Stafford Haughwout, Public Defender, and Paul Edward Petillo, Assistant Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, FL, for Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL; Consiglia Terenzio, Bureau Chief, and Heidi Lynn Bettendorf, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, FL, for Respondent.

Paolo Giuseppe Annino, Florida State University College of Law, Tallahassee, FL, for Amicus Curiae Public Interest Law Center.

PARIENTE

, J.

Angelo Atwell was sixteen years old when, in August 1990, he committed armed robbery and first-degree murder. Under the statute then in effect, Atwell was sentenced for the first-degree murder to a mandatory term of life imprisonment, with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years, and was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the armed robbery.

As mandated by the existing statutory scheme, Florida's parole process requires “primary weight” to be given to the “seriousness of the offender's present offense and the offender's past criminal record.” See § 947.002, Fla. Stat. (2015)

. Under this statutory scheme, twenty-five years after Atwell was sentenced, the Commission on Offender Review conducted a parole hearing and set Atwell's presumptive parole release date, which is the earliest date he may be released from prison as determined by objective parole guidelines, for the year 2130—one hundred and forty years after the crime and far exceeding Atwell's life expectancy. Thus, while technically Atwell is parole-eligible, it is a virtual certainty that Atwell will spend the rest of his life in prison.

The issue we consider is whether Atwell's sentence for first-degree murder is constitutional, in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Alabama, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2469, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012)

, which held that the Eighth Amendment “forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” We conclude that Florida's existing parole system, as set forth by statute, does not provide for individualized consideration of Atwell's juvenile status at the time of the murder, as required by Miller, and that his sentence, which is virtually indistinguishable from a sentence of life without parole, is therefore unconstitutional.

Our conclusion is supported by three factors. First, it is consistent with this Court's precedent involving juvenile sentencing cases that has followed the spirit of the United States Supreme Court's recent juvenile sentencing jurisprudence, rather than an overly narrow interpretation. For example, this Court in Henry v. State, 175 So.3d 675 (Fla.2015)

, recently rejected a similarly narrow reading as the one the State offers of Miller here, in concluding that the underlying premise of the Supreme Court's related decision in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010)

, controlled over a reading that would have confined the scope of Graham to only sentences denominated as “life” imprisonment.

Second, our conclusion is consistent with Miller itself, which emphasized that sentencing courts must take into account “how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison”—factors Florida's parole process entirely fails to recognize. Miller, 132 S.Ct. at 2469

. Indeed, the Supreme Court even explicitly noted that its decision “requires factfinders ... to take into account the differences among defendants and crimes.” Id. at 2469 n. 8.

This requirement of individualized sentencing considerations for juvenile offenders was reiterated by the Supreme Court in its recent decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana, ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016)

, which emphasized that Miller requires prisoners sentenced as juveniles “must be given the opportunity to show their crime did not reflect irreparable corruption; and, if it did not, their hope for some years of life outside prison walls must be restored.” Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 736–37. In Montgomery, the Supreme Court held that States would not necessarily have to “relitigate sentences, let alone convictions” to comply with Miller but could parole certain juvenile offenders “whose crimes reflected only transient immaturity—and who have since matured,” so that those juvenile offenders “will not be forced to serve a disproportionate sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 736.

Although the pre–1994 first-degree murder statute under which Atwell was sentenced provided for parole eligibility, it remained a mandatory sentence that treated juveniles exactly like adults and precluded any individualized sentencing consideration. The current parole process similarly fails to take into account the offender's juvenile status at the time of the offense, and effectively forces juvenile offenders to serve disproportionate sentences of the kind forbidden by Miller.

Finally, our conclusion is consistent with the legislative intent in Florida after the issuance of the Graham and Miller decisions. Rather than offer parole as a means of complying with the principles established by the Supreme Court, the Florida Legislature chose instead to enact a wholly new and distinct sentencing framework for juvenile offenders, offering term-of-years sentencing options for trial courts and providing for subsequent judicial review of lengthy sentences. See Horsley v. State, 160 So.3d 393, 407 (Fla.2015)

. Our conclusion that Miller is implicated in this case accordingly aligns both with this Court's holding that Miller applies retroactively—a result the United States Supreme Court recently reached in Montgomery —and with our determination in Falcon v. State, 162 So.3d 954 (Fla.2015), that the “patent unfairness” of treating similar juvenile offenders differently “based solely on when their cases were decided” must be remedied. Id. at 962.

For these reasons, and all other reasons fully explained in this opinion, we quash the Fourth District Court of Appeal's underlying decision upholding Atwell's sentence for first-degree murder. See Atwell v. State, 128 So.3d 167, 169 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)

. We remand this case for resentencing on the first-degree murder count in conformance with chapter 2014–220, Laws of Florida, which has been codified in sections 775.082, 921.1401, and 921.1402 of the Florida Statutes

. See

Horsley, 160 So.3d at 395. Under that sentencing framework, the sentencing court is authorized to impose a sentence from 40 years to life imprisonment after considering youth-related sentencing factors. Importantly, unlike the parole system in place, the juvenile offender's sentence is reviewed by a trial judge after 25 years, who then determines whether a sentence modification is warranted after reviewing, among other factors, the juvenile offender's youth and its attendant characteristics at the time of the offense, the opinion of the victim or the victim's next of kin concerning the release of the juvenile offender from prison, and whether the juvenile offender remains at the same level of risk to society as he or she did at the time of the initial sentencing. But see § 921.1402(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2015) (specifying certain instances where review is not authorized, such as when the juvenile offender was previously convicted of a separate criminal offense).

FACTS AND BACKGROUND

In 1992, Atwell was convicted of first-degree murder and armed robbery. He was sixteen years old at the time of the offenses, which occurred on August 30, 1990. As for the armed robbery, he was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.¹

As for the murder conviction, the only sentencing options under the sentencing scheme then in effect were either death or life in prison with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years. Specifically, the relevant Florida statute for first-degree murder then provided:

A person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall be required to serve no less than 25 years before becoming eligible for parole, unless the proceeding held to determine sentence according to the procedure set forth in section 921.141 results in findings by the court that such person shall be punished by death, and in the latter event such person shall be punished by death.

§ 775.082(1), Fla. Stat. (1989)

.² This statute was later amended by chapter 94–228, section 1, Laws of Florida, which became effective May 25, 1994, to eliminate parole. The post–1994 statute provided instead for a sentence of either death or life without the possibility of parole for a first-degree murder conviction.³

In February 2013, Atwell moved for postconviction relief, contending that his life sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment under Miller. The trial court summarily denied Atwell's motion, concluding both that Miller did not apply retroactively—a conclusion this Court has since rejected—and that Atwell's sentence was not unconstitutional under Miller because he is eligible for parole.

On appeal, the Fourth District affirmed the trial court's denial of Atwell's motion for postconviction relief, holding that Atwell “did not establish an illegal sentence that can be corrected at any time” under the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. Atwell, 128 So.3d at 169

. Explaining that “the underpinning of the holding of both Miller and Graham was the ineligibility for release on parole,” the Fourth District concluded that “Miller is inapplicable because Miller applies only to a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole. ” Id.

Following the Fourth District's denial of rehearing, Atwell petitioned this Court to invoke its discretionary jurisdiction, asserting that the Fourth District expressly construed a provision of the federal...