Rogers v. State, No. 1D19-878

• Court: Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
• Writing for the Court: Rowe, J.
• Citation: 296 So.3d 500
• Docket Number: No. 1D19-878
• Decision Date: 01 May 2020
• Parties: Christine Lashay ROGERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

296 So.3d 500

Christine Lashay ROGERS, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D19-878

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

May 1, 2020

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

Rowe, J.

The State moved for rehearing en banc of our decision in this appeal, Rogers v. State , 45 Fla. L. Weekly D357 (Fla. Feb. 13, 2020). For the reasons that follow, we grant the motion, withdraw the panel opinion, and substitute this opinion in its place.

296 So.3d 503

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On July 5, 2003, law enforcement officers responded to a report of a stabbing on Belmont and Q Streets in Pensacola. When officers arrived on the scene, they found the fifteen-year-old victim lying in the middle of the street in a pool of blood.

Witnesses reported that Christine Lashay Rogers and the victim had been arguing earlier. Rogers accused the victim of hitting her with fireworks. Rogers left and returned with a butcher-style knife. The victim was standing in her yard when Rogers approached her, armed with the knife. When the victim saw Rogers, she ran, but Rogers pursued her. The victim stopped near a car and tried to punch Rogers. But Rogers stabbed the victim twice in the upper chest with the knife. One of the wounds was four inches deep and penetrated the victim's lung. Rogers fled, taking the knife with her. The victim was rushed to the hospital, but she did not survive the attack.

Rogers was thirteen years old at the time of the stabbing. She was charged and convicted of second-degree murder with a weapon. She received a forty-five-year prison sentence, with five years suspended. But we reversed her conviction and sentence because the trial court failed to conduct a competency hearing. Rogers v. State , 954 So. 2d 64, 65 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). On remand, the trial court found her competent to proceed and retried her. The jury found her guilty, and we affirmed her judgment and sentence. Rogers v. State , 75 So. 3d 726 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (unpublished table decision).

In 2017, Rogers moved for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). She argued that she was entitled to resentencing under Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), and Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010). Rogers asserted that her forty-year sentence was a de facto life sentence that violated the Eighth Amendment.¹ The State conceded error. The trial court granted Rogers’ motion and ordered resentencing.

A year later, when Rogers still had not been resentenced,² the State filed an "addendum" to its earlier concession. Citing new decisions from this Court and the Florida Supreme Court, the State argued that Rogers’ sentence was not a de facto life sentence and did not violate the Eighth Amendment. The State urged the trial court to vacate its order granting resentencing. In 2019, the trial court entered an amended order, vacating its earlier order and denying Rogers’ claim of an illegal sentence.

Rogers appealed. Citing our decision in Jordan v. State , 81 So. 3d 595 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), Rogers argued that the trial court lacked authority to rescind the original order granting relief under rule 3.800(a) because the State did not timely seek rehearing or appeal. Based on our decision in Simmons v. State , 274 So. 3d 468 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019), we reversed the trial court's order vacating its order granting Rogers relief. Rogers , 45 Fla. L. Weekly at D357. The State seeks rehearing en banc.

II. Basis for En Banc Rehearing

The State urges this Court to rehear this case and recede from Simmons . The State contends that Simmons misapplied the law governing a trial court's jurisdiction to reconsider an order granting postconviction

296 So.3d 504

relief under rule 3.800(a) when resentencing has not yet occurred. The State argues we should recede from Simmons for three reasons. First, an order granting a rule 3.800(a) motion is not a final order. Second, the State cannot appeal an order granting a rule 3.800(a) motion until resentencing has occurred. And third, the trial court has inherent authority to reconsider an order granting a rule 3.800(a) motion if resentencing has not occurred. We agree with all three arguments.³

We followed Jordan in Rogers and Simmons . In Jordan , we determined that a trial court lacked jurisdiction to reconsider an order granting relief under rule 3.800(a) when the State did not challenge the order by timely moving for rehearing or appealing. 81 So. 3d at 596. Both Simmons and Jordan misapplied the law. We now conclude that orders granting relief under rule 3.800(a) are not final or appealable, and so the trial court retains its inherent authority to reconsider such orders.⁴

En banc rehearing is appropriate⁵ because this case presents issues of exceptional importance. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.331(a) ("En banc hearings and rehearing

296 So.3d 505

shall not be ordered unless the case or issue is of exceptional importance or unless necessary to maintain uniformity in the court's decisions."). In the eleven months since this Court decided Simmons , we have followed Simmons in nine cases. The Fourth and the Fifth Districts have also adopted the reasoning of Simmons . See Jones v. State , 279 So. 3d 172 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) ; Magill v. State , 287 So. 3d 1262 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019). Statewide, seventeen opinions have issued citing Simmons to reverse trial court orders.⁶ Because of the continuing effect of Simmons on resentencing proceedings throughout Florida, we consider this case en banc as one of exceptional importance and recede from Simmons , Jordan , and the decisions from this Court following those cases.

III. Simmons

Lester Simmons was fifteen years old when he raped an adult woman. He was convicted in 1967, after pleading guilty in exchange for the prosecutor's agreement not to recommend a sentence of death.⁷ See Simmons , 274 So. 3d at 469. At the sentencing hearing, the victim recounted how Simmons surreptitiously entered her home and raped her. Simmons was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole.

Simmons was granted parole twice and spent nearly eighteen years on parole, before his parole was revoked for a second time. Id . In 2016, nearly fifty years after his sentence became final, Simmons moved for postconviction relief under rule 3.800(a). Simmons argued that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, citing Graham and Atwell v. State , 197 So. 3d 1040 (Fla. 2016).

The State conceded error. See id. at 470. The trial court granted Simmons’ motion and ordered resentencing. But before resentencing occurred, this Court decided Currie v. State , 219 So. 3d 960 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017). There, we held that a sentence of life with the possibility of parole, like the one Simmons received, was not the functional equivalent of a life sentence without the possibility of parole when the defendant was in fact released on parole.⁸

296 So.3d 506

See id. at 960. Based on this change in the law, the trial court rescinded its original order and denied the rule 3.800(a) motion. Simmons , 274 So. 3d at 470.

Simmons appealed. He argued that because the State did not challenge the original order by timely moving for rehearing or appealing, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rescind the order. See id. The State countered that because resentencing had yet to occur, the original order was not final and the trial court retained the inherent authority to revisit the ruling. Id. at 471. We rejected the State's argument and held that the trial court lacked procedural jurisdiction to rescind its order granting relief under rule 3.800(a) because the order became final when neither party moved for rehearing or appealed. Id. at 471–72. In so holding, we relied on our decisions in Jordan and Slocum v. State , 95 So. 3d 911 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), and the supreme court's decision in Taylor v. State , 140 So. 3d 526 (Fla. 2014). As explained below, we erred in relying on Taylor and Slocum because neither case involved an order granting relief under rule 3.800(a). And although Jordan did involve an order granting relief under rule 3.800(a), we now conclude that the Jordan court misapplied the law.

IV. Orders Granting Relief Under Rule 3.800(a) Are Not Final

In Simmons , we held that a trial court lacks jurisdiction to reconsider an order granting relief under rule 3.800(a) because such an order becomes final when the State fails to appeal or seek rehearing. 274 So. 3d at 471–72. In concluding that an order granting relief under 3.800(a) is a final order, we cited our earlier decision in Jordan .

Jordan involved an order granting a postconviction motion filed under rule 3.800(a). Before resentencing occurred, the trial judge passed away and a successor judge was appointed. See Jordan , 81 So. 3d at 596. The successor judge granted the State's motion for reconsideration and denied Jordan's rule 3.800(a) motion. Id.

Jordan appealed, arguing that the successor judge lacked jurisdiction to...