Atwood v. Tullos
| Decision Date | 24 April 2018 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17CV250TSL–RHW |
| Citation | 312 F.Supp.3d 553 |
| Parties | Alan ATWOOD, Plaintiff v. Tracy TULLOS, Rob Heflin and Melvin Young, d/b/a/ Young Repair and Towing Service, Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi |
David M. Sessums, Varner, Parker & Sessums, P.A., 1110 Jackson Street, Paul Kelly Loyacono, Paul Kelly Loyacono, PLLC, 727 Fort Hill, Vicksburg, MS 39183, for Plaintiff.
Douglas T. Miracle, Mississippi Attorney General's Office, P.O. Box 220, Jackson, MS 39205, Michael Verdier Cory, Jr., Danks, Miller & Cory, P.O. Box 1759, Jackson, MS 39215–1759, Elliott V. Haller, William Holcomb Hussey, Maxey Wann, PLLC, P.O. Box 3977, Jackson, MS 39207–3977, for Defendants
The case is before the court on separate motions by defendants Tracy Tullos and Rob Heflin for summary judgment based on qualified immunity pursuant to Rules 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c). Plaintiff Alan Atwood has responded in opposition to the motion. The court, having considered the memoranda of authorities, together with attachments, submitted by the parties, concludes that defendants' motions are well-taken and should be granted.
Alan Atwood (Atwood) has brought the present action against Rob Heflin and Tracy Tullos, officers with the Mississippi Department of Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks (MDWFP), alleging federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure and for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, together with myriad state law claims relating to his December 27, 2015 arrest and subsequent prosecution on various charges.1 The basic facts are undisputed. On the night of December 27, 2015, around 9:00 p.m., Atwood was driving his truck along Summerall Road in Issaquena County. Miles Hallberg, a friend, was in the passenger seat and Atwood's wife, Donna, was in the backseat. Sergeant Rob Heflin saw the truck from some distance away, as the truck was brightly lit, with LED lights shining to the front, sides and rear. Sergeant Heflin suspected the truck's occupants were headlighting deer, so he pulled the truck over. When he got to the truck, Heflin observed a .223 rifle in plain view in the front seat, next to Hallberg's leg. He inquired whether the gun was loaded, and Atwood responded that it was. Sergeant Heflin ordered the occupants out of the vehicle and placed Atwood and Hallberg in handcuffs. He asked Donna Atwood to activate the truck's auxiliary lights, which he then photographed.
In the meantime, Lieutenant Tracy Tullos, Heflin's supervisor, arrived at the scene. At Heflin's request, Tullos contacted the Issaqeuna County Sheriff's Department to request a deputy to transport the arrestees to the county jail and called for a tow truck for Atwood's truck. Both took a long time to arrive, since they were some distance away. While they waited, Atwood and Hallberg stood beside the truck, handcuffed behind their backs, and Heflin filled out paperwork.
By the time the tow truck arrived, Heflin had decided that he was not going to arrest Donna. Because she was not being arrested, Atwood asked the officers to let Donna drive the truck instead of having it towed. According to Atwood, the officers refused to release the truck to Donna until Atwood paid the tow truck driver $250 in cash.
Atwood and Hallberg were charged with headlighting deer in violation of Mississippi Code Ann. § 49–7–95 ; hunting from a public road in violation of § 95–15–13; unlawful shot size in violation of MDWFP regulations; and unauthorized use of auxiliary lights in violation of § 63–7–17. Atwood appeared before the Issaquena County Justice Court on March 3, 2016. The court sua sponte reduced the charge of headlighting deer to a charge of harassment of wildlife in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated § 49–7–95(5) and found Atwood guilty of that offense.2 The court also found him guilty on the charges of unauthorized shot size and unauthorized use of auxiliary driving lamps but found him not guilty on the charge of hunting from a public road. On appeal, the Issaquena County Circuit Court, by order entered December 5, 2016, granted a motion by Atwood to dismiss the charges of unauthorized shot size and unauthorized use of auxiliary driving lamps. The court set a February 13, 2016 trial date on the remaining charge of harassment of wildlife. On February 13, 2016, following the trial, the court found Atwood guilty of violating § 47–9–95(5).
Atwood filed the present action on March 7, 2017 asserting federal and state claims relating to these events. As to Atwood's federal claims under § 1983, defendants contend they are entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. As to his state claims, they seek dismissal via summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment is required when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Typically on a summary judgment motion, the moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed. 2d 265 (1986). If the moving party demonstrates an absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party's case, then the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to come forward with specific facts showing that a genuine issue for trial does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed. 2d 538 (1986). However, a government official's good faith assertion of a qualified immunity defense alters the usual summary judgment burden of proof. Michalik v. Hermann, 422 F.3d 252, 262 (5th Cir. 2005). Once the official asserts qualified immunity, the plaintiff has the burden to show there is a genuine and material dispute as to whether qualified immunity applies. Castorena v. Zamora, 684 Fed.Appx. 360, 363 (5th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). See also Thompson v. Upshur Cty., TX, 245 F.3d 447, 456 (5th Cir. 2001) () (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). When evaluating whether a genuine dispute as to any material fact exists, the court considers "all of the evidence in the record but refrain[s] from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence." Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398–99 (5th Cir. 2008). In so doing, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, even on a summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity. See Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010) ().
The purpose of Rule 12(c) is to dispose of cases where the material facts are not in dispute and a judgment on the merits can be rendered by looking to the substance of the pleadings and any judicially noticed facts. Great Plains Trust. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2002). In deciding a 12(c) motion, the court "accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff."
In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007). To avoid dismissal, a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed. 2d 929 (2007).
To prevail on a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must (1) prove a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Anderson v. Valdez, 845 F.3d 580, 599 (5th Cir. 2016). Here, Atwood alleges that the defendant officers, acting under state law, violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment by stopping him without reasonable suspicion; arresting him for various offenses without probable cause; and handcuffing him behind his back for more than two hours before transporting him to jail. Defendants contend they are entitled to summary judgment on these claims based on qualified immunity.
The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct " ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ " Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed. 2d 565 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed. 2d 396 (1982) ). Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2085, 179 L.Ed. 2d 1149 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). When an official raises qualified immunity, the plaintiff has the burden to overcome the defense by showing that "(1) the defendant violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights and (2) the defendant's actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the violation." Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 445 (5th Cir. 2011).
"A government official's conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, ‘[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear’ that every ...
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