Austelle v. Austelle, 1032
Decision Date | 22 September 1987 |
Docket Number | No. 1032,1032 |
Citation | 294 S.C. 19,362 S.E.2d 181 |
Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
Parties | Marguerite S. AUSTELLE, Respondent-Appellant, v. Wallace T. AUSTELLE, Appellant-Respondent. . Heard |
Ronald M. Childress of Childress & Mille, Columbia, for appellant-respondent.
Eugene F. Rogers of Rogers & Koon, P.A., Columbia, for respondent-appellant.
This is a domestic case. The parties were divorced by order of the County Court of Orangeburg County on November 8, 1976. Prior to the divorce, they executed a support and property settlement agreement. At the request of the wife, the agreement was confirmed and made a part of the county court's order as if it were fully set forth. This action was commenced by the wife in 1986 in the Family Court of Orangeburg County. She alleged the husband was in contempt of court for failing to comply with the alimony, vacation, and life insurance provisions of the prior agreement. The husband denied the allegations and asked the family court to amend the settlement agreement due to a change in his financial circumstances. The court found the husband in contempt regarding the alimony payments but not with respect to the insurance or vacation matters. Both parties appeal. We vacate for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The issue concerns the "Support and Property Settlement Agreement" (hereafter referred to as the agreement) and the power of the family court to enforce or modify it. When the parties were divorced in 1976 there were no family courts and the action was handled by the County Court of Orangeburg County. County courts were later abolished and their jurisdiction devolved upon the unified court system. Act. No. 690, Article VII, Section 5, 1976 S.C.Acts 1859, 1874.
The 1976 agreement contains, in part, the following provisions:
The husband argues for the first time on appeal the family court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the parties' agreement. Of course, it is axiomatic that subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. Fielden v. Fielden, 274 S.C. 219, 262 S.E.2d 43 (1980). This court, therefore, unfortunately again finds itself bogged in the quagmire of judicial interpretation of marriage dissolution contracts executed prior to Moseley v. Mosier, 279 S.C. 348, 306 S.E.2d 624 (1983).
Under pre-Moseley case law, an alimony award based upon an agreement of the parties did not defeat the family court of subject-matter jurisdiction to enforce and modify the award provided the agreement had become an integral part of a court decree and had lost its character as a separate agreement. See, Kelly v. Edwards, 276 S.C. 368, 278 S.E.2d 773 (1981); Zwerling v. Zwerling, 273 S.C. 292, 255 S.E.2d 850 (1979); Jeanes v. Jeanes, 255 S.C. 161, 177 S.E.2d 537 (1970). The question of whether or not the agreement retains its separate character revolves around the intent of the parties. Bryant v. Varat, 278 S.C. 77, 292 S.E.2d 298 (1982).
The threshold question is whether this agreement, the decree and record in the 1976 divorce action, evidences the intention that it would retain its separate existence as a contract. The county court order states, "the court has reviewed [the agreement] and finds it to be in proper form and confirms its contents and makes it a part of this order." We note from the order Mr. Austelle was not present at the 1976 hearing. No Transcript of that hearing is contained in the record.
Both parties refer to the agreement as having been incorporated into the decree. As stated in Moseley, the word "incorporate" is a word of art. The litany of such words of art includes "incorporate," "merge," "adopt," and "approve." Moseley, 279 S.C....
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...agreement had become an integral part of a court decree and had lost its character as a separate agreement. [Austelle v. Austelle, 294 S.C. 19, 22, 362 S.E.2d 181, 183 (Ct.App.1987).] However, "agreements which were incorporated but not merged furnished the family court no subject-matter ju......
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Treadaway v. Smith, 2600
...controlled by the law in South Carolina prior to Moseley v. Mosier, 279 S.C. 348, 306 S.E.2d 624 (1983). Austelle v. Austelle, 294 S.C. 19, 21-22, 362 S.E.2d 181, 183 (Ct.App.1987). In Moseley, the supreme court decreed that thereafter "jurisdiction for all domestic matters, whether by decr......