Austin Nursing Center, Inc. v. Lovato

• Decision Date: 13 May 2005
• Docket Number: No. 03-0659.,03-0659.
• Citation: 171 S.W.3d 845
• Parties: AUSTIN NURSING CENTER, INC. d/b/a Austin Nursing Center; Century Care of America, Inc.; Paul Gray; Paul Hanlon; and Guadalupe Zamora, M.D., Petitioners, v. Pauline Wilson LOVATO, Independent Administratrix of the Estate of Margarita Torres Wilson, Respondent.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 845

171 S.W.3d 845

AUSTIN NURSING CENTER, INC. d/b/a Austin Nursing Center; Century Care of America, Inc.; Paul Gray; Paul Hanlon; and Guadalupe Zamora, M.D., Petitioners, v. Pauline Wilson LOVATO, Independent Administratrix of the Estate of Margarita Torres Wilson, Respondent.

No. 03-0659.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued November 10, 2004.

Decided May 13, 2005.

Rehearing Denied October 14, 2005.

Ruth G. Malinas, Christopher John Deeves, Cynthia Day Grimes, Ball & Weed, P.C., San Antonio, Laura Swarbrick, David M. Davis, V. Elizabeth Ledbetter and Peter R. Meeker, Davis & Wilkerson, P.C., Austin, for Petitioner.

Alfonso L. Melendez, Anna Nigel Marketto, Melendez & Marketto, P.C., El Paso, and Raul Steven Pastrana, Pastrana Law Firm, Austin, for Respondent.

Chief Justice JEFFERSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

On behalf of her deceased mother, Pauline Wilson Lovato filed a survival action against Guadalupe Zamora, M.D., Austin Nursing Center, Inc., and related entities and individuals (collectively "Austin Nursing Center"). In her original petition, filed within the statute of limitations, Lovato asserted that she was the personal representative of her mother's estate. In actuality, Lovato was not appointed independent administrator until after the statute of limitations on the survival action expired. Austin Nursing Center moved for summary judgment, arguing that Lovato lacked standing to bring the survival action at the time the case was filed, and the trial court granted the motion. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Lovato's later-acquired status as the estate's personal representative gave her standing, which related back to the time of the lawsuit's original filing.

We hold that the standing doctrine's requirements were satisfied and that the trial court had jurisdiction to hear the case. We further hold that although Lovato may have lacked capacity to bring the survival action at the time the lawsuit was filed, any defect in her capacity was later cured by her appointment as the estate's administrator. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals' judgment.

I

Background

Ninety-two-year-old Margarita Torres Wilson allegedly developed pressure ulcers while a resident at Austin Nursing Center from May to June 1998. She was discharged from the center in June and transferred to another care facility. Wilson died on August 18, 1998.

On January 27, 2000, before limitations expired, Lovato filed this survival action on behalf of her mother's estate pursuant to the survival statute, which provides that "[a] personal injury action survives to and in favor of the heirs, legal representatives, and estate of the injured person." TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE § 71.021(b). Lovato alleged that she was the "Personal Representative" of Wilson's estate, but also that "no administrator [of the estate] ha[d] been appointed." Lovato asserted that Austin Nursing Center's medical negligence harmed Wilson, resulting in physical pain and impairment, mental anguish, medical expenses, and disfigurement.

Two months after she brought the survival action, Lovato filed an application for independent administration of Wilson's estate in the probate court, asking that she be appointed administrator of the estate and alleging that her mother died intestate, had no real property, and had personal property valued at less than $2,000. The probate court appointed Lovato administrator nearly two years later, on May 9, 2002, after the statute of limitations on the survival action had expired.

On April 22, 2002, Austin Nursing Center moved for summary judgment, arguing that because Lovato did not prove she was an heir or the estate's personal representative, she lacked standing to bring the survival claim, depriving the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. Austin Nursing Center argued alternatively that the survival claim was barred by limitations because a party with standing did not timely assert it.

Lovato filed her fourth amended petition and her first supplemental petition on May 20, 2002. In these petitions, Lovato alleged that she was the "Independent Administratrix" of her mother's estate. Lovato then responded to Austin Nursing Center's motion for summary judgment, arguing that her fourth amended petition related back; that she fulfilled the purpose and intent of the statute of limitations by notifying the defendants of the survival claim; and that she had standing to bring the survival claim because she was an heir at the time the original petition was filed, and no administration was pending or necessary.

On July 18, 2002, the trial court granted Austin Nursing Center's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the survival action. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that (1) Lovato had "filed her original petition within the limitations period, with authority to bring the survival action as an heir"; and (2) "Lovato became the independent administrator of her mother's estate and filed an amended petition in that capacity." 113 S.W.3d 45, 55. The court reasoned that "Lovato cured her defective standing as personal representative of the estate," because her post-limitations petition "relate[d] back to the original filing of her case." Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE § 16.068). Thus, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court had jurisdiction to hear the survival action. Id.

We granted Austin Nursing Center's petition for review. 47 Tex. Sup.Ct. J. 658 (June 18, 2004).

III

Discussion

Austin Nursing Center argues that the court of appeals erred because, under our decision in Shepherd v. Ledford, Lovato had standing as an heir only if she could plead and prove that there was no administration pending in probate court and none was necessary. See Shepherd v. Ledford, 962 S.W.2d 28, 31-32 (Tex.1998). According to Austin Nursing Center, Lovato failed to meet this burden. Austin Nursing Center also contends that the court of appeals incorrectly permitted Lovato's post-limitations appointment as administrator to cure her pre-limitations lack of standing, an incurable jurisdictional defect.

Lovato contends that the court of appeals' judgment should be affirmed because she had standing as an heir when she originally filed the survival action within the limitations period. Alternatively, Lovato contends that even if she lacked standing as an heir when she originally filed the survival action, her post-limitations amended petition, which she filed as independent administrator of Wilson's estate, related back to the original filing of the survival action, thereby correcting any deficiency in standing. We turn first to the issue of standing.

A Standing Versus Capacity

The parties dispute whether Lovato had standing to assert a survival claim on behalf of Wilson's estate. Although courts and parties have sometimes blurred the distinction between standing and capacity,¹ we believe that the issue presented here is more appropriately characterized as one of capacity.

A plaintiff must have both standing and capacity to bring a lawsuit. Coastal Liquids Transp., 46 S.W.3d at 884. The issue of standing focuses on whether a party has a sufficient relationship with the lawsuit so as to have a "justiciable interest" in its outcome, whereas the issue of capacity "is conceived of as a procedural issue dealing with the personal qualifications of a party to litigate." 6A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, AND MARY KAY KANE, WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 1559, at 441 (2d ed.1990). We have previously distinguished between these two threshold requirements as follows:

A plaintiff has standing when it is personally aggrieved, regardless of whether it is acting with legal authority; a party has capacity when it has the legal authority to act, regardless of whether it has a justiciable interest in the controversy.

Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson County Appraisal Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex.1996); see also 6A WRIGHT, MILLER, & KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 1559, at 441 ("Capacity has been defined as a party's personal right to come into court, and should not be confused with the question of whether a party has an enforceable right or interest.").

In Texas, the standing doctrine requires that there be (1) "a real controversy between the parties," that (2) "will be actually determined by the judicial declaration sought." Nootsie, 925 S.W.2d at 662 (quoting Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443-44 (Tex.1993)). Implicit in these requirements is that litigants are "properly situated to be entitled to [a] judicial determination." 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, AND EDWARD H. COOPER, WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 2D § 3531, at 338-39 (2d ed.1984). Without standing, a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. Tex. Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 443. Thus, the issue of standing may be raised for the first time on appeal. Id. at 445.

In addition to standing, a plaintiff must have the capacity to pursue a claim. For example, minors and incompetents are considered to be under a legal disability and are therefore unable to sue or be sued in their individual capacities; such persons are required to appear in court through a legal guardian, a "next friend," or a guardian ad litem. See Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 666-67 (Tex.1983); Peek v. DeBerry, 819 S.W.2d 217, 218 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1991, writ denied); see also TEX. PROBATE CODE §§ 601(14), 773; TEX.R. CIV. P. 44, 173. Similarly, a decedent's estate "is not a legal entity and may not properly sue or be sued as such." Price v. Estate of Anderson, 522 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tex.1975); see also Henson v. Crow, 734 S.W.2d 648, 649 (Tex.1987). Although a minor, incompetent, or estate may have suffered an injury and thus have a justiciable interest in the controversy, these parties lack the legal...