Automated Conveyor Systems v. Hill

• Decision Date: 05 May 2005
• Docket Number: No. 04-1256.,04-1256.
• Citation: 208 S.W.3d 136
• Parties: AUTOMATED CONVEYOR SYSTEMS, Appellant, v. Honorable Victor HILL, Judge, and Calvin Dooley, Appellees.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

208 S.W.3d 136

AUTOMATED CONVEYOR SYSTEMS, Appellant, v. Honorable Victor HILL, Judge, and Calvin Dooley, Appellees.

No. 04-1256.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

May 5, 2005.

Roberts Law Firm, P.A., by: John D. Webster, Michael L. Roberts, and Caroline L. Curry, Little Rock, for appellant.

Joe E. Rogers, West Memphis, for appellee.

BETTY C. DICKEY, Justice.

This is a petition for a writ of prohibition filed by Automated Conveyor Systems (Automated Conveyor) and stemming from a denial of a motion to dismiss by the circuit court. Accordingly, jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 1-2(a)(3).

Calvin Dooley sustained a gradual onset neck injury while employed by Automated Conveyor. Dooley filed a claim with the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission, arguing that he was entitled to compensation under the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA) because his injury was sustained while manually performing heavy lifting during his employment. The Administrative Law Judge found that Dooley's injury was not compensable because the WCA covers only those gradual onset neck injuries that are caused by rapid and repetitive motion, and although Dooley had proven that his duties were repetitive, he failed to present evidence of the rapidity of his duties. Dooley then filed a negligence claim against his employer in the Crittenden County Circuit Court. After the trial court failed to grant its motion to dismiss, Automated Conveyor filed with this court a petition for writ of prohibition, asserting that the Crittenden County Circuit Court is wholly without jurisdiction to hear Dooley's claim. According to Automated Conveyor, the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the Workers' Compensation Commission alone has jurisdiction over a claim that an employee has been injured in the course of employment.

Each of Automated Conveyor's four points in support of a writ of prohibition hinges on its assertion that the Workers' Compensation Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for injury or death arising out of, or in the course of, employment. Automated Conveyor argues: (1) the WCA remains the exclusive remedy for all non-intentional injuries arising out of the course and scope of employment; (2) strict construction of the WCA does not affect its status as the sole remedy for injuries occurring in the course and scope of employment; (3) the definition of "accidental" in Ark.Code Ann. 11-9-102(4)(A) does not exclude the injury in the present case from the WCA; and, (4) the injury in this case may not be brought in negligence because it arose during the course of employment, and the WCA is the sole and exclusive remedy for such claims. Because we hold that a circuit court has jurisdiction to hear claims for injuries that are not covered by the WCA, the petition is denied.

In The Travelers Insurance Company v. Smith, 329 Ark. 336, 947 S.W.2d 382 (1997), this court addressed the standard of review for a writ of prohibition:

A writ of prohibition is an extraordinary writ that is appropriate only when the lower court is wholly without jurisdiction. When considering the propriety of issuing the writ, this court's review of jurisdiction is limited to the pleadings. Where the encroachment on workers' compensation jurisdiction is clear, a writ of prohibition is warranted. (Citations omitted.)

Automated Conveyor first argues that Dooley may not bring an action in tort against his employer because his injury occurred in the course of his employment and the WCA is the sole and exclusive remedy for such claims. It asserts that in Gourley v. Crossett Pub. Schs., 333 Ark. 178, 968 S.W.2d 56 (1998), our court held that an employer that has secured to its employees the benefits of workers' compensation insurance cannot be sued in tort by its employees for injuries or death arising out of their employment. That was not the holding in Gourley. In Gourley, we stated that "Ms. Gourley's claim for the intentional tort is barred by the doctrine of election of remedies because she has previously pursued workers' compensation benefits to recovery for the same injuries." Id. at 181, 968 S.W.2d 56. (Emphasis added.) Our court did not hold that, as in this case, an employee who has been denied recovery under the WCA because his injury was not covered by the Act may not subsequently file a tort claim against his employer. This result is reinforced by the holding in The Travelers Insurance Company v. Smith, in which this court said:

[A]n election of remedies would bar the instant litigation if it is shown that Anna Smith either received or could have received compensation for her injury under the Workers' Compensation Act. (Citations omitted). Because Anna Smith had no remedy under the Workers' Compensation Act, her claim cannot be thwarted for election-of-remedy reasons.

Id. at 344-45, 947 S.W.2d 382.

Automated Conveyor also cites VanWagoner v. Beverly Enterprises, 334 Ark. 12, 970 S.W.2d 810 (1998), in support of its assertion that only the Workers' Compensation Commission has jurisdiction to hear claims brought by an employee whose injury occurred during the course of employment. VanWagoner, however, did not hold that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim, but that the Workers' Compensation Commission had exclusive jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction, that is, "to decide whether an employee's injuries are covered by the Workers' Compensation Act." Id. at 14, 970 S.W.2d...