VanWagoner v. Beverly Enterprises

• Decision Date: 02 July 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-1355,97-1355
• Citation: 970 S.W.2d 810,334 Ark. 12
• Parties: Laurie VanWAGONER, Appellant, v. BEVERLY ENTERPRISES, Appellee.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 810

970 S.W.2d 810

334 Ark. 12

Laurie VanWAGONER, Appellant, v. BEVERLY ENTERPRISES, Appellee.

No. 97-1355.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

July 2, 1998.

Eddie H. Walker, Jr., Fort Smith, for Appellant.

J. Rodney Mills, J. Gregory Magness, Fort Smith, for Appellee.

ARNOLD, Chief Justice.

Appellant Laurie VanWagoner appeals the judgment of the Fort Smith District of Sebastian County Circuit Court dismissing with prejudice her complaint against appellee Beverly Enterprises. The circuit court dismissed her tort action on the ground that it was barred by the exclusive-remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act, Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-105(a) (Repl.1996). Thereafter, she filed an appeal with the Arkansas Court of Appeals, which certified the case to this court under Ark. Sup.Ct. R. 1-2(d)(2), as involving an issue of significant public interest or a legal principle of major importance. Particularly, we are asked to resolve the question of whether the circuit court or the Workers' Compensation Commission has jurisdiction to determine whether the Act applies. We hold that the commission has exclusive, original jurisdiction to determine the fact issues establishing its jurisdiction. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, we affirm the circuit court's decision as modified.

Ms. VanWagoner was employed as an administrative assistant at Beverly on February 15, 1995, when she tripped and fell on a rug while walking down a hallway at her place of employment. She filed a notice of injury according to Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-701 (Repl.1996) on February 29, 1996. On October 15, 1996, Ms. VanWagoner filed a claim for benefits with the commission, claiming that the injuries to her hip resulted from a work-related injury. Thereafter, Beverly controverted the claim, alleging that Ms. VanWagoner's injuries were the result of a noncompensable preexisting condition caused by a prior slip-and-fall accident and a subsequent automobile accident. Beverly further alleged that Ms. VanWagoner's claim was not compensable because she was not performing employment services at the time of the alleged fall under Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(B)(iii) (Repl.1996). Particularly, Beverly contended that Ms. VanWagoner was not engaged in employment services because she was on her way to the break room when the fall occurred.

After a claim representative determined that Ms. VanWagoner's claim was not compensable, a hearing before the Workers' Compensation Commission on the issue of compensability was scheduled for April 9, 1997. On April 3, 1997, Ms. VanWagoner's counsel requested that the commission cancel the hearing. On May 15, 1997, Ms. VanWagoner filed suit against Beverly in circuit court, alleging that Beverly's negligence in failing to maintain its premises was the proximate cause of her injuries. Beverly moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the jurisdiction resided exclusively in the commission. The circuit court agreed and dismissed the complaint. Ms.VanWagoner appeals.

The Court of Appeals has asked us to decide whether the commission or the circuit court should determine the applicability of the Workers' Compensation Act. Along with the majority of appellate courts that have addressed this issue, we have previously adhered to the rule that the circuit courts and the commission have concurrent jurisdiction to determine the applicability of workers' compensation laws to a given case. See, e.g. Craig v. Traylor, 323 Ark. 363, 915 S.W.2d 257 (1996); Lively v. Libbey Memorial Physical Medical Ctr., Inc., 317 Ark. 5, 875 S.W.2d 507 (1994). This approach, however, is fraught with weaknesses. One practical result of this rule is that the party that acts first inevitably decides which tribunal will resolve the jurisdictional question. Conceivably, if every employee decided to file his or her claim in circuit court, under our current rule, the commission might never decide whether the rights and remedies of the Workers' Compensation Act applied, despite the fact that our legislature has chosen to entrust questions of compensation to its expertise:

(a) The rights and remedies granted to an employee subject to the provisions of this chapter, on account of injury or death, shall be exclusive of all other rights and remedies of the employee, his legal representative, dependents, next of kin, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from the employer....

Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-105(a) (Repl.1996) (emphasis added). See also Cherry v. Tanda, 327 Ark. 600, 616, 940 S.W.2d 457, 462 (1997), quoting Helms v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty, 281 Ark. 450, 664 S.W.2d 870 (1984) ("[O]ther statutes must yield to the Workers' Compensation Act because it is in the interest of the public policy to give that act priority as an exclusive remedy.").

In addition to creating a race to file, the concurrent-jurisdiction approach can lead to duplicative litigation, that is, the simultaneous pursuit of claims in both the commission and in circuit court. See, e.g. Riverside Furniture Corp. v. Rogers, 295 Ark. 452, 749 S.W.2d 664 (1988). According to one commentator, an even more fundamental problem with this rule is that "it may lead to nonuniform decisions in employee injury cases involving similar facts." Daniel Keating, Employee Injury Cases: Should Courts or Boards Decide Whether Workers' Compensation Laws Apply?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV . 258, 271 (1986). Because juries are more likely than commission officials to be sympathetic to injured plaintiffs in resolving factual issues pivotal to the jurisdictional question, the commentator explains, similar cases may lead to different results. Id.

We believe that the better rule is to recognize the administrative law rule of primary jurisdiction and to allow the Workers' Compensation Commission to decide whether an employee's injuries are covered by the Workers' Compensation Act. This rule is consistent with the purpose of the Act, and is supported by the teachings of Professor Larson:

The soundest result in these cases, both as a matter of law and as a matter of practical experience would be a simple recognition of board priority in all cases, except those in which the facts are so one-sided that the issue is no longer one of fact but one of law.

The legal rationale goes back to the fundamental administrative law rule of primary jurisdiction, enunciated by the Supreme Court in [Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 27 S.Ct. 350, 51 L.Ed. 553 (1907) ]. In the particular area of workers' compensation, this broad principle is strongly reenforced by the legislative intent to entrust questions of compensation coverage to an expert commission....

...

When it is remembered that one of the primary original reasons for adoption of the workers' compensation system was to achieve simplicity and speed in the disposition of cases, it is obvious that this objective is best served by a straightforward policy of primary jurisdiction.

6 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 67.60, at 12-205 (1997 and Cum.Supp.1998). See generally Daniel Keating, Employee Injury Cases: Should Courts or Boards Decide Whether Workers' Compensation Laws Apply?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV . 258, 274-278 (1986)(advocating the primary jurisdiction approach as advancing the interests of applying the workers' compensation laws uniformly, taking advantage of agency expertise, and eliminating wasteful duplicative litigation). See also Hannah v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 633 S.W.2d 723 (Mo.banc.1982); and Grillo v. National Bank of Washington, 540 A.2d 743 (D.C.App.1988) (adhering to the primary-jurisdiction rule in workers' compensation cases).

We hold that the exclusive remedy of an employee or her representative on account of injury or death arising out of and in the course of her employment is a claim for compensation under § 11-9-105, and that the commission has exclusive, original jurisdiction to determine the facts that establish jurisdiction, unless the facts are so one-sided that the issue is no longer one of fact but one of law, such as an intentional tort. See Angle v. Alexander, 328 Ark. 714, 719, 945 S.W.2d 933 (1997)(citing Miller v. Ensco, Inc., 286 Ark. 458, 461, 692 S.W.2d 615 (1985)(explaining that, before an employee is free to bring a tort action for damages against an employer, the facts must show that the employer had a "desire" to bring about the consequences of the acts, or that the acts were premeditated with the specific intent to injure the employee). In so holding, we overrule all prior decisions to the extent that they are inconsistent with this opinion.

Affirmed as modified.

NEWBERN and IMBER, JJ., concur.

IMBER, Justice, concurring.

The majority has forged new ground by holding that a circuit court no longer has jurisdiction to determine whether it or the Workers' Compensation Commission has jurisdiction to hear a case. Because I concur with the result but not this departure from our well-established law, I must write separately.

As we recently acknowledged in Stapleton v. M.D....