Avlonitis v. Seattle Dist. Court
| Decision Date | 25 February 1982 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 47562-8,47605-5,s. 47562-8 |
| Parties | Spyrodon Nicholas AVLONITIS, Petitioner, v. SEATTLE DISTRICT COURT, Judge John Ritchie, Respondent. CITY OF SEATTLE, Respondent, v. Bernard Lee CAMPBELL, Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Christine Wyatt, Seattle, Mark Leemon, Shelley Start, Seattle-King County Public Defender Ass'n., Seattle, for appellant and for petitioner.
Norman K. Maleng, King County Prosecutor, Robert C. Ryan, Deputy Pros. Atty., Douglas N. Jewett, Seattle City Atty., Rodney Eng, Asst. City Atty., Seattle, for respondents.
Avlonitis v. Seattle District Court (47562-8) and Seattle v. Campbell (47605-5) have been consolidated for review. Each involves the power of courts of limited jurisdiction to suspend sentences under statutes specifically applicable to District and to Municipal Courts, respectively.
Petitioner Avlonitis appeared in Seattle District Court and entered a plea of guilty to simple assault, a gross misdemeanor with a maximum sentence of one year in the county A review of petitioner's probation was set for August of 1979, approximately six months later. At that time petitioner asserted the court lacked jurisdiction to review his probation. It was argued, unsuccessfully, that the court lost power to revoke probation and impose sentence upon expiration of the initial 30 day sentence.
jail. On February 22, 1979 the judge sentenced petitioner to 30 days in jail. It was suspended, however, provided petitioner would comply with certain terms and conditions during one year of active probation.
The Superior Court dismissed petitioner's application for a writ of prohibition and the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. The matter is before this court on a petition for review. We reverse the Court of Appeals, 27 Wash.App. 606, 619 P.2d 704.
The justice (district) court has jurisdiction "(c)oncurrent with the superior court of all misdemeanors and gross misdemeanors ..." RCW 3.66.060. It is, however, limited to imposing a punishment not greater than a "fine of five hundred dollars, or imprisonment for six months ... unless otherwise expressly provided by statute ..." (Italics ours.) RCW 3.66.060.
RCW 9A.20.020(2) expressly provides that persons "convicted of a gross misdemeanor defined in Title 9A RCW shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for a maximum term ... of not more than one year, or by a fine ... of not more than one thousand dollars, or by both ..." (amended Laws of 1981, ch. 137, sec. 37). Thus, under RCW 9A.20.020(2), the justice court had express statutory authority to sentence petitioner to a maximum term of one year in the county jail for simple assault. RCW 9A.36.040; cf. State v. Young, 83 Wash.2d 937, 523 P.2d 934 (1974).
The justice court also had express statutory authority to defer or suspend sentences. Specifically, the justice court was empowered either to defer the imposition of petitioner's sentence and place him on probation not to exceed a period of one year from the date of conviction, RCW 3.66.067, or to suspend the execution of all or any part of his sentence for a period not to exceed one year following imposition The legislature also provided for the revocation of deferred or suspended sentences in the event a defendant should violate or fail to carry out any of the conditions of the deferral or suspension. Upon revocation the justice court is authorized to "impose the sentence previously suspended or any unexecuted portion thereof." RCW 3.66.069.
of sentence, RCW 3.66.068.
It should be noted, however, that while RCW 3.66.068 and .069 are involved with the suspending of sentences and the revocation thereof, neither is concerned with the question before us, i.e. whether the period for which a sentence may be suspended is limited to the term of the sentence actually imposed. For this answer RCW 3.66.010 (effective until July 1, 1980) directs us to the laws governing courts of record. RCW 9.95.210 governing courts of record provides, insofar as relevant here:
The court in granting probation, may suspend the ... execution of the sentence and may direct that such suspension may continue for such period of time, not exceeding the maximum term of sentence ...
(Italics ours.)
The italicized portion of RCW 9.95.210 has been interpreted by this court as permitting the suspension of a sentence only for the term of the sentence actually imposed rather than for the maximum term for which it could have been imposed. State v. Monday, 85 Wash.2d 906, 540 P.2d 416 (1975). Although Monday involved a felony conviction in superior court, its holding was made applicable to gross misdemeanor convictions by State v. Mortrud, 89 Wash.2d 720, 575 P.2d 227 (1978).
We have been given no logical or compelling reason why the justice court, which has concurrent jurisdiction, should be excluded from the rules of Monday and Mortrud. Consequently, we hold that the rules of Monday, and Mortrud apply equally to the justice court. The justice court could have imposed a sentence of one year in the county jail and suspended all or any part of it, thus retaining jurisdiction to revoke the suspension during the entire period. Having The State contends that such a rule will be too harsh for the justice courts. It is said that it will compel justice court judges to sentence defendants to the maximum term possible so as to enable them to suspend a sentence anytime during the term of the sentence, thereby ensuring adequate probation and supervision. We do not agree, for, as we stated in Monday at 909, 540 P.2d 416,
sentenced petitioner to only 30 days, however, the justice court retained jurisdiction only for the term of the sentence actually imposed, i.e. 30 days, rather than for the 1 year maximum imposable term.
if the object of the judge is to insure that, in the event of a revocation of probation, the defendant will not be subjected to a potentially long jail term ... this can be accomplished by deferring the original sentence for the maximum term possible (i.e., 1 year in the case of petitioner Avlonitis).
The Court of Appeals is reversed and we hold the justice (district) court had the power to suspend Avlonitis' sentence only during the term of the sentence actually imposed.
Appellant Campbell was tried in Seattle Municipal Court and convicted of assault in violation of the Seattle Municipal Code. On August 20, 1979 the municipal court judge sentenced him to 30 days in jail and suspended the sentence for one year on certain terms and conditions.
Campbell violated the terms of suspension and was brought before the municipal court on August 19, 1980 for a revocation hearing. At that hearing, the court revoked 2 of the 30 days which had been imposed and suspended approximately one year earlier.
Campbell petitioned the Superior Court for a writ of habeas corpus asserting the municipal court lacked jurisdiction to suspend a sentence for a period in excess of 6 months. Appellant contends that since 6 months was the maximum possible time for which the court could have imposed a sentence, the municipal court lost jurisdiction to revoke the suspended sentence after expiration of the 6 month period. The Superior Court denied the writ, holding the Seattle Municipal Court had jurisdiction to suspend a sentence for up to one year under the provisions of RCW 3.66.068.
Campbell appealed to this court and the cause was consolidated for review with Avlonitis v. Seattle District Court.
The sole question is whether the Seattle Municipal Court has authority to suspend sentences for up to one year. We reverse the superior court and hold the maximum period of suspension is limited to 6 months.
The City contends RCW 35.20.250 grants municipal courts concurrent jurisdiction with justice courts and, thus, it is said, RCW 3.66.068 granting justice courts the power to suspend the execution of sentences for a period of one year must apply equally to municipal courts. We do not agree. The City's position misinterprets the nature of the concurrent jurisdiction granted to municipal courts. The grant of concurrent jurisdiction contained in RCW 35.20.250 is not unlimited. Rather, it grants municipal courts concurrent jurisdiction in those civil and criminal matters which are by law placed within the jurisdiction of justice courts (i.e. violations of state laws as opposed to violations of municipal ordinances). 1 The municipal courts, however, retain exclusive original jurisdiction to try all violations of municipal ordinances subject only to review by...
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