Ayers v. Ziegler
| Decision Date | 16 November 2010 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 5:10CV29 (STAMP) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of West Virginia |
| Parties | CALVIN EARL AYERS, Petitioner, v. WARDEN JOEL ZIEGLER, Respondent. |
On March 5, 2010, Calvin Earl Ayers, an inmate at FCI Morgantown, filed a pro se1 petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The petitioner is currently serving a 120 month term of imprisonment for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. On August 25, 2009, while incarcerated at FCI Forrest City, the petitioner was informed he had been accepted into the Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program ("RDAP"). The petitioner was then transferred to FCI Morgantown. Successful completion of RDAP generally qualifies an inmate to be considered for up to one year of early release. The petitioner began the RDAP program at FCI Morgantown on December 14, 2009. On January 29, 2010, the petitioner's Drug Abuse Treatment Specialist noted in administrative notes that the petitioner stated that he had been sober since 1986. The petitioner's positive cocaine urinalysis during pretrial resulted from his handling cocaine, which is consistent with the petitioner's presentence report. The specialist noted that the petitioner qualified for RDAP based on an interview at FCI Forrest City in which the petitioner allegedly stated that he abused cocaine in the year prior to incarceration. The petitioner stated that he did not recall making that statement and thought he qualified for RDAP based on the positive drug test during pretrial. In a memorandum dated February 22, 2010, the petitioner was informed by FCI Morgantown's drug abuse program coordinator that he was being removed from RDAP because he did not meet the admissions criteria for the program.
The petitioner believes that he was arbitrarily and capriciously expelled from RDAP without sufficient cause or warning. He argues his due process rights were violated. He states that he signed a treatment contract which obligated him to a certain standard of performance and that he did not violate that standard. The petitioner seeks a temporary restraining order placing him in the RDAP program until he has exhausted his administrative remedies or this Court issues a ruling. He further seeks an order placing him in RDAP so he can receive the drug treatment ordered by the sentencing court in its judgment and commitment order.
The respondent believes that the petition should be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The respondent argues that Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") did not violate the petitioner's due process rights and did not err in deciding to discharge the petitioner from RDAP. In his response, the petitioner raises an equal protection argument because he was dismissed from the program.
This action was referred to United States Magistrate Judge David J. Joel, pursuant to Local Rule of Prisoner Litigation Procedure 83.09. After reviewing the parties' pleadings, the magistrate judge filed a report and recommendation in which he recommended that the respondent's motion to dismiss be granted the petitioner's motions for a temporary restraining order be denied and his § 2241 habeas corpus petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice. The magistrate judge advised the parties that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), any party may file written objections to his proposed findings and recommendations within fourteen days after being served with a copy of the magistrate judge's recommendation. The petitioner filed objections, and this matter is now ripe for review. For the reasons set forth below, this Court finds that the magistrate judge's report and recommendation should be affirmed and adopted in its entirety.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), this Court must conduct a de novo review of any portion of the magistrate judge's recommendation to which objection is timely made. As to those portions of a recommendation to which no objection is made, a magistrate judge's findings and recommendation will be upheld unless they are "clearly erroneous." See Webb v. Califano, 468 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Cal. 1979). Because the plaintiff has filed objections, this Court will undertake a de novo review as to those portions of the report and recommendation to which objections were made.
In his motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, motion for summary judgment, the respondent argues that the petition should be denied because the petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Federal inmates are generally required to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to filing a § 2241 petition. See e.g. Martinez v. Roberts, 804 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1996); Moscato v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757 (3d Cir. 1996). However, to the extent that exhaustion has been applied to habeas corpus, such a requirement is not mandated by statute. Indeed, exhaustion prerequisites in habeas corpus actions arising under § 2241 are judicially imposed. It follows then, that a court has the discretion to waive the exhaustion requirement in certain circumstances. See LaRue v. Adams, 2006 WL 1674487, at *8 (S.D. W. Va. June 12, 2006).
The magistrate judge recommends that this Court waive the exhaustion requirement in the interest of judicial economy because this case is fully briefed for adjudication on the merits. This Court agrees with the recommendation of the magistrate judge. Therefore, the exhaustion requirement is waived in this instance.
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621, the BOP provides qualified inmates with a program of substance abuse treatment. To encourage inmates to participate in such programs, Congress has authorized the BOP to reduce by up to one year the sentences of prisoners who successfully complete the program and whose crimes of convictions are for nonviolent offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B). Specifically, § 3621(e)(2)(B) provides:
The period a prisoner convicted of a nonviolent offense remains in custody after successfully completing a treatment program may be reduced by the Bureau of Prisons, but such reduction may not be for more than one year from the term the prisoner must otherwise serve.
18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B).
Regulations found in 28 C.F.R. § 550.56 provide requirements for RDAP eligibility. An inmate must have a verifiable documented drug abuse problem, must have no serious mental impairment which would substantially interfere with or preclude full participation in the program, must sign an agreement acknowledging his program responsibility, must ordinarily be within thirty-six months of release, and the security level of the residential program institution must be appropriate for the inmate. 28 C.F.R. § 550.56(a). The drug abuse treatment coordinator at the institution makes placement decisions and participation in the program is voluntary. 28 C.F.R. § 550.56(b).
The Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") provides for judicial review of federal agency action except where a statute precludes judicial review or where agency action is committed to agency discretion. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 and 702. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621, the BOP has authority to provide and administer appropriate substance abuse treatment programs to eligible prisoners and broad discretion to grant or deny sentence reductions to eligible inmates. 18 U.S.C. § 3621. The same statute that delegates this discretionary authority to the BOP forecloses judicial review under the APA of residential drug treatment placement determinations and sentence reductions earned, or not earned, thereunder. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 70 F.3d 874, 877-78 (6th Cir. 1995); Davis v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, et al., 517 F. Supp. 2d 460 (D.D.C. 2007); Landry v. Hawk-Sawyer, 123 F. Supp. 2d 17, 19 (D.D.C. 2000); Davis v. Beeler, 966 F. Supp. 483, 498 (E.D. Ky. 1997). Just as a decision to admit an inmate in a residential drug treatment program is a judicially unreviewable substantive decision by the BOP, so too is a decision to remove an inmate from such a program once placed there. However, even where judicial review under the APA is specifically excluded by statute, it is still appropriate for courts to review whether any cognizable constitutional claim has been presented and whether an agency's interpretation of a statute is contrary to well-settled law. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988); Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284 (1996).
1. Due Process Claim
The petitioner argues that the BOP's decision to expel him from RDAP violates his due process rights. To succeed on his due process claim, the petitioner must demonstrate that the BOP decision not to consider him for early release has deprived him of a liberty or property interest, in violation of his Fifth Amendment protections. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). A prisoner has no constitutional or inherent right to participate in rehabilitative programs while incarcerated nor in being released before the completion of a valid sentence. Id.; Moody v. Daggert, 42 9 U.S. 78, 88 n.9; Pelissero v. Thompson, 170 F.3d 442, 444 (4th Cir. 1999). In his objections, the petitioner does not refute this principle. Instead, he states that he was rightly admitted to the program and arbitrarily ejected from the program, which does not meet the societal interest. This Court disagrees. Because the plaintiff has no constitutional right to participate in rehabilitative programs while incarcerated, the plaintiff's due process claim has no merit.
The petitioner argues that the BOP has violated his equal protection rights by expelling only him from the RDAP program. An equal protection claim requires, as a...
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