Dittus v. Cranston

• Citation: 53 Cal.2d 284,1 Cal.Rptr. 327,347 P.2d 671
• Parties: , 347 P.2d 671 Beatrice V. DITTUS, as Secretary, State Board of Control, Petitioner, v. Alan CRANSTON, as State Controller, Respondent. Sac. 7096.
• Decision Date: 18 December 1959
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)

Page 327

1 Cal.Rptr. 327

53 Cal.2d 284, 347 P.2d 671

Beatrice V. DITTUS, as Secretary, State Board of Control, Petitioner, v. Alan CRANSTON, as State Controller, Respondent.

Sac. 7096.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Dec. 18, 1959.

Louis J. Heinzer, Jr., and Joseph E. Coomes, Jr., Sacramento, for petitioner.

Ralph N. Kleps, Legislative Counsel, Angus C. Morrison, Chief Deputy Legislative Counsel, and Lawrence G. Allyn, Deputy Legislative Counsel, Sacramento, as amici curiae on behalf of petitioner.

Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., B. Abbott Goldberg, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ralph W. Scott and Preble Stolz, Deputy Attys. Gen., for respondent.

GIBSON, Chief Justice.

The Budget Act of 1958, St.1959, pp. 465, 521 appropriated the sum of $594.089 to be paid from the Fish and Game Preservation Fund to the Secretary of the State Board of Control. ¹ This sum was reduced by the Governor to $350,000, and petitioner filed a claim with respondent for a warrant in that amount. Respondent rejected the claim, stating that the Attorney General had advised that its validity should be determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. In this proceeding in mandamus petitioner seeks to compel respondent to honor her claim.

Two questions are presented for decision: First, is the sum appropriated to be expended for a purpose prohibited by the Constitution? Second, can the appropriation be constitutionally administered?

3] There are certain fundamental rules which govern us in the consideration of these questions. Courts should exercise judicial restraint in passing upon the acts of co-ordinate branches of government; the presumption is in favor of constitutionality, and the invalidity of the legislation must be clear before it can be declared unconstitutional. Lundberg v. County of Alameda, 46 Cal.2d 644, 652, 298 P.2d 1. The power to determine the facts upon which appropriations are based rests exclusively in the legislative and executive branches of the government, and the function of the courts is to determine the issues of law presented by the face of the legislation and relevant facts of which they can take judicial notice. Stevenson v. Colgan, 91 Cal. 649, 652, 27 P. 1089, 14 L.R.A. 459.

It appears from recors of the State Board of Control that the purpose of the appropriation to petitioner is to provide money for the payment of claims of fishermen and fish processing companies arising out of the enactment of two statutes in 1957. One of the statutes, known as the anti-netting bill, closed certain waters to commercial fishing for shad and salmon. Fish & G.Code, § 8670. The other, which will hereafter be referred to as chapter 2099, declared that it was the public policy of the state to reimburse, where possible, persons whose boats, nets and other fishing equipment were rendered valueless by the anti-netting bill. Persons so affected were given permission to file claims with the Board of Control, which was to analyze and evaluate them and report to the Legislature. It was provided that the equipment would become the property of the state upon payment of the claims. Stats.1957, ch. 2099, p. 3722. ²

The appropriation in question, as we have seen, is made payable from the Fish and Game Rpeservation Fund, and respondent takes the position that the purposes for which that fund may be expended are limited by section 25 5/8 of article IV of the Constitution in such a manner as to prohibit use of the fund for claims filed under chapter 2099. The Fish and Game Preservation Fund is composed of revenue obtained in connection with laws for the protection and preservation of fish and game (Fish & G.Code, § 13001), and section 25 5/8 provides that all such revenue 'shall be used and expended exclusively for the protection, conservation, propagation, and preservation of fish, game, mollusks, or crustaceans and for the administration and enforcement of laws relating thereto.'

4] The Legislature could have concluded that the purchase by the state of equipment affected by the anti-netting bill would promoto the administration and enforcement of laws for the protection of fish by taking out of circulation equipment which might be used for illegal fishing in the closed waters, encouraging fishermen to leave the area and fish in other parts of the state, and permitting enforcement personnel who might otherwise be occupied in the area to work elsewhere. (Cf. Patrick v. Riley, 209 Cal. 350, 357-358, 287 P. 455 (holding that, although the Legislature could enact a statute requiring the destruction of tubercular cattle without including a provision for compensation of the owners, such a provision could constitutionally be included as an inducement to compliance with the statute).) The Legislature could also have concluded that, in enforcing and administering the laws referred to in section 25 5/8, the Department of Fish and Game could make use of the equipment purchased by the state pursuant to chapter 2099. It thus appears that the appropriation promotes the purposes of section 25 5/8, and, since the purposes of that section are public in character, it follows that there is no violation of section 31 of article IV of the Constitution, which prohibits a gift of public funds.

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