A.B. v. S.U.
| Docket Number | 22-AP-200 |
| Decision Date | 09 June 2023 |
| Parties | A.B. v. S.U. et al |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
On Appeal from Superior Court, Caledonia Unit, Civil Division March Term, 2023 Mary Miles Teachout, J.
Thomas C. Nuovo of Bauer Gravel Farnham, LLP, Colchester, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Tristram J. Coffin and Evan J. O'Brien of Downs Rachlin Martin PLLC, Burlington, for Defendant-Appellant S.U.
Charity R. Clark, Attorney General, Eleanor L.P. Spottswood Solicitor General, and Rachel E. Smith, Deputy Solicitor General, Montpelier, for Intervenor-Appellee State.
PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., Eaton, Carroll, Cohen and Waples, JJ.
¶ 1. Plaintiff[1] sued defendants alleging childhood sexual abuse, and defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that the statute, which eliminated the prior limitations period, was unconstitutional. The civil division denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that the limitations period was a procedural bar and defendants had no vested right in the expiration of the prior statute of limitations. Defendants[2] now bring this interlocutory appeal to determine whether 12 V.S.A. § 522 violates Chapter I, Article 4 of the Vermont Constitution by reviving an otherwise time-barred claim of childhood sexual abuse. We conclude that there is no constitutional violation and affirm. I. Statutory Backdrop
¶ 2. In 1990, the Vermont Legislature enacted 12 V.S.A. § 522, which created Vermont's first statute of limitations specific to claims for childhood sexual abuse. The statute required actions alleging childhood sexual abuse to be commenced within six years of the act or six years of the time the victim discovered the injury. 1989, No. 292 (Adj. Sess.), § 2. Prior to that enactment, claims of sexual abuse were subject to the general three-year limitations period for personal injuries. 12 V.S.A. § 512. Under 1 V.S.A. § 214(b)(1), legislative enactments generally do not "affect the operation of the act or provision prior to the effective date of the amendment." Notwithstanding this general provision, the 1990 enactment contained a retroactivity clause, making the six-year limitations period applicable to "all causes of action commenced on or after the effective date of this act, so long as either the act of sexual abuse or the discovery that the injury or condition was caused by the act of sexual abuse occurred on or after July 1, 1984." 1989, No. 292, § 4(b).
¶ 3. In 2019, the Legislature amended § 522 to remove the limitations period and allow claims of childhood sexual abuse to be commenced "at any time after the act alleged to have caused the injury or condition." 2019, No. 37, § 1. The amendment contained the following retroactivity provision:
Notwithstanding 1 V.S.A. § 214, this section shall apply retroactively to childhood sexual abuse that occurred prior to the effective date of this act, irrespective of any statute of limitations in effect at the time the abuse occurred. In an action based on childhood sexual abuse that would have been barred by any statute of limitations in effect on June 30, 2019, damages may be awarded against an entity that employed, supervised, or had responsibility for the person allegedly committing the sexual abuse only if there is a finding of gross negligence on the part of the entity.
12 V.S.A. § 512(d).
II. Facts and Procedural Background
¶ 4. In May 2020, plaintiff filed suit against defendants alleging that in 1983, when he was fifteen years old, he was at a retreat operated by defendant organization and was sexually assaulted by a second defendant who was an adult employee of the organization. Plaintiff alleged three counts: child sexual abuse, nuisance, and grossly negligent supervision and retention. Although the claims were previously time-barred, plaintiff relied on the 2019 amendment to 12 V.S.A. § 522 and its retroactivity provision.
¶ 5. In lieu of filing an answer, defendants moved to dismiss.[3] Defendants argued that § 522(d)'s retroactivity provision eliminating the previous limitations period violated the Due Process Clause of the Vermont Constitution. See Vt. Const. ch. I, art. 4. Defendants asserted that § 522(d) unfairly revived an ancient claim that had long been barred by the limitations period and this amounted to a denial of due process because it violated their right to no longer be sued. Following notice from the court, the State of Vermont intervened to defend the constitutionality of § 522. See V.R.C.P. 24(d) ().
¶ 6. In June 2022, the civil division denied defendants' motion to dismiss the remaining counts-child sexual abuse and grossly negligent supervision-on constitutional grounds. The court construed defendants' motion to be an as-applied challenge to the statute. The court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held that retroactive changes to a statute of limitation do not violate due process because there is no liberty or property interest in an expired limitations period. The trial court concluded that the analysis was similar under the Vermont Constitution, and that the limitations statute was not a vested right but a legislated bar to a remedy. Without a vested right, the court concluded that defendants failed to demonstrate any due-process violation.
¶ 7. Defendants filed a motion for interlocutory appeal, and this Court accepted the interlocutory appeal on the question of whether 12 V.S.A. § 522 violates Chapter I, Article 4 of the Vermont Constitution by reviving long time-barred claims of childhood sexual abuse.[4]V.R.A.P. 5(b).
III. Analysis
¶ 8. Statutes are presumed constitutional and reasonable. Badgley v. Walton, 2010 VT 68, ¶ 20, 188 Vt. 367, 10 A.3d 469. "[T]he proponent of a constitutional challenge has a very weighty burden to overcome." Id.
¶ 9. Article 4 states: "Every person within this state ought to find a certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs which one may receive in person, property or character ...." Vt. Const. ch. I, art. 4. This Court has treated Article 4 as the Vermont equivalent of the federal Due Process Clause. Quesnel v. Town of Middlebury, 167 Vt. 252, 258, 706 A.2d 436, 439 (1997). "Though Article 4 does not create substantive rights, it does ensure access to the judicial process." Shields v. Gerhart, 163 Vt. 219, 223, 658 A.2d 924, 928 (1995).
¶ 10. In general, our cases have treated claims under Article 4 similarly to those made under the U.S. Constitution, and we have employed the federal standards to evaluate Article 4 claims. See, e.g., Holton v. Dep't of Emp. &Training, 2005 VT 42, ¶ 27, 178 Vt. 147, 878 A.2d 1051 (). The Vermont Constitution may provide greater protection than analogous provisions in the U.S. Constitution, but the proponent of such an argument "bears the burden of explaining how or why the Vermont Constitution provides greater protection." State v. Read, 165 Vt. 141, 153, 680 A.2d 944, 951 (1996). Some tools that may be used to evaluate whether the Vermont Constitution provides greater protection include historical materials, textual differences, comparison with other state constitutions, and prudential considerations. See State v. Jewett, 146 Vt. 221, 225-27, 500 A.2d 233, 236-37 (1985) ().
¶ 11. Here, defendants argue that 12 V.S.A. § 522 violates Chapter I, Article 4 of the Vermont Constitution. Defendants do not clarify whether they are asserting a procedural or substantive due process claim. "Procedural due process requirements apply only with respect to governmental adjudicative decisions rather than legislative decisions." Gould v. Town of Monkton, 2016 VT 84, ¶ 20, 202 Vt. 535, 150 A.3d 1084. Further, "[t]o maintain a procedural due process claim properly, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that governmental action deprived plaintiff of a property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. ¶ 19. Defendants assert that they had a "vested right" in the expired limitations period and the Legislature's action deprived them of this right. Whether intended as a procedural or substantive due process claim, we conclude that defendants do not have a vested right subject to Article 4 protection.
¶ 12. Although federal jurisprudence is not controlling in this case involving the Vermont Constitution, it is helpful to understand how the analogous federal provision has been interpreted given that our cases have generally viewed Article 4 as equivalent to the federal Due Process Clause. The U.S. Supreme Court has long held that in the civil context an expired limitations period as a defense to an action does not create a vested right and therefore a legislature does not violate the U.S. Constitution by altering an existing limitations period and making it apply retroactively. This principle was articulated in Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620 (1885), a case in which the limitations period lapsed for a contract claim but was revived by generally applicable subsequent legislation. After the plaintiff filed suit under the revised statute, the defendants argued that their limitations defense had been perfected and the subsequent reinstatement violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 622. In rejecting the defendants' arguments, the U.S Supreme Court explained the difference between statutes that attempt to alter title to property and those that affect a remedy. ...
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