Ba Mar, Inc. v. County of Rockland

• Decision Date: 22 January 1991
• Docket Number: No. 1,No. 2,1,2
• Citation: 164 A.D.2d 605,566 N.Y.S.2d 298
• Parties: BA MAR, INC., Respondent, v. The COUNTY OF ROCKLAND, Appellant. (Action) John G. GRESS, Jr., et al., Appellants, v. PUTNAM COUNTY, Respondent. (Action)
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 298

566 N.Y.S.2d 298

164 A.D.2d 605

BA MAR, INC., Respondent, v. The COUNTY OF ROCKLAND, Appellant. (Action No. 1)

John G. GRESS, Jr., et al., Appellants, v. PUTNAM COUNTY, Respondent. (Action No. 2)

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Second Department.

Jan. 22, 1991.

Ilan S. Schoenberger, County Atty., New City (Martin Hurwitz, of counsel), for appellant in Action No. 1.

Donald Tirschwell, New City, for respondent in Action No. 1.

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen., Poughkeepsie (O. Peter Sherwood, John Corwin and G. Nicholas Garin, of counsel), for the State of N.Y. amicus curiae in Action No. 1.

Bond, Schoeneck & King, Albany (Richard L. Smith, of counsel), for appellants in Action No. 2.

William D. Spain, Jr., County Atty., Carmel (Bonnie Feinsiz, of counsel), for respondent in Action No. 2.

Before MANGANO, P.J., and BROWN, KOOPER and LAWRENCE, JJ.

BROWN, Justice.

The primary issue presented on these appeals is whether certain local laws enacted by the Counties of Rockland and Putnam, which regulate the operation of mobile home parks, are either preempted by or inconsistent with State law. We hold that by enacting Real Property Law § 233, the State has preempted the field of mobile home park regulation. Moreover, we find that the local laws are inconsistent with Real Property Law § 233. Accordingly, the local laws are invalid.

I

In June 1989 Rockland County adopted Local Laws, 1989, No. 3, of the County of Rockland (hereinafter Rockland County Local Law No. 3), entitled "A local law requiring good cause to evict mobile home owners and protecting their right to sell their homes". As its title suggests, the legislation establishes the grounds upon which a mobile home park owner/operator can evict a mobile home owner, and places certain limitations on the owner/operator's power to deny a mobile home owner the right to sell his or her mobile home. In addition, the legislation contains provisions with respect to the continuance and renewal of leases, the imposition of penalties for its violation, and the manner in which the legislation is to be enforced. Similarly, earlier that year Putnam County adopted Local Laws, 1989, No. 1 of the County of Putnam, and in July 1989 amended it by adopting Local Laws, 1989, No. 9 of the County of Putnam (hereinafter referred to collectively as Putnam County Local Law No. 1). Like the legislation enacted in Rockland County, the Putnam County local law establishes the grounds in Putnam County upon which a mobile home owner can be evicted, limits the owner/operator's ability to restrict the mobile home owner's right to sell, and creates its own enforcement mechanism.

The plaintiff, Ba Mar, Inc. (hereinafter Ba Mar), is the owner and operator of a 148-unit mobile home park in the Town of Stony Point in Rockland County. In September 1989 Ba Mar commenced an action in the Supreme Court, Rockland County, seeking a judgment declaring Rockland County Local Law No. 3 to be unconstitutional, in violation of the Municipal Home Rule Law, and preempted by State statute. Ba Mar also asserted a cause of action to recover damages for inverse condemnation, claiming that the adoption of Rockland County Local Law No. 3 effected an unconstitutional taking of property without due process of law by reducing the value of its mobile home park.

The plaintiffs John G. Gress, Jr., and Josephine Gress d/b/a Mac's Mobile Court, Joseph F. Lois, Sr., and Joseph F. Lois, Jr., d/b/a Post Road Mobile Home Park and Adrienne G. Tibbetts d/b/a Brookside Mobile Home Park are owners of mobile home parks in the Towns of Brewster and Cold Springs in Putnam County. Similar to the plaintiffs in the Rockland County case, the Putnam County plaintiffs sought a judgment declaring invalid the local laws enacted by the County of Putnam on both preemption and inconsistency grounds. Their case was submitted to the Supreme Court, Putnam County, by means of a submission of the controversy pursuant to CPLR 3222.

The Rockland and Putnam County local laws were enacted, in part, based upon findings that the State law regulating mobile home parks, Real Property Law § 233, was ambiguous and inadequate to protect mobile home owners from arbitrary eviction and to protect the right of mobile home owners to sell their homes. In spite of the fact that the two local legislative enactments are identical in many respects, the Supreme Court in Rockland and Putnam Counties reached opposite conclusions as to whether the State had preempted the field of mobile home park regulation by enacting Real Property Law § 233, and whether the local laws were inconsistent with Real Property Law § 233. The Supreme Court, Rockland County, determined that the State had preempted the field of mobile home park regulation and that, in any event, the local law was inconsistent with the State Law; the Supreme Court, Putnam County held to the contrary.

We find both preemption and inconsistency and, accordingly, uphold the Supreme Court's finding in the Rockland County action and reverse the determination in the Putnam County action.

II

Mobile home ownership is unique in that it combines aspects of both home ownership and tenancy. Most mobile home owners own their mobile homes but rent a site within a mobile home park upon which their home is situated. Although their homes are called "mobile", 96% of the so-called "mobile homes" are never moved from their initial siting due to the high cost and physical difficulty of relocation. In addition, zoning for mobile homes is done on a local basis. If local authorities so require, mobile home owners must live within a mobile home park. In New York State, approximately 60% of all mobile homes are situated in mobile home parks. This being the case, these homeowners are subject to the authority of the owner/operator of the park in which they reside. Such a situation is conducive to a gross disparity in bargaining power between the homeowner and the park owner/operator, and the potential exists for exploitative conduct by park owners/operators. The Court of Appeals aptly summed up the situation as follows:

"Mobile home owners are not apartment or condominium dwellers; nor are they campers. They have different needs and distinct concerns. Whatever the economic and qualitative benefits of year-round mobile home living, the fact remains that, nomenclature notwithstanding, the homes themselves are relatively immobile. Once 'planted' and 'plugged in', they are not easily relocated. Yet they lack the protective enclosure of apartment buildings. As a result, owners and operators of mobile home parks are in a unique position to take advantage of a more or less captive audience" (Miller v. Valley Forge Vil., 43 N.Y.2d 626, 628-629, 403 N.Y.S.2d 207, 374 N.E.2d 118).

Nevertheless, mobile homes have become an attractive low-cost housing alternative for both the young and the elderly, and mobile home parks are rapidly increasing in number throughout New York State.

In 1973, based upon concerns that mobile home park owners/operators were engaging in a series of unfair practices including (1) the charging of a sales commission on the sale of a mobile home as a condition precedent to permitting a new tenant to remain in occupancy even though the owner/operator did not help effectuate the sale, (2) the eviction of tenants without justification or in reprisal, and (3) the imposition of unnecessary fees and arbitrary regulations and the nondisclosure of such fees and regulations, and in an effort to encourage the development of low-cost housing, the State Legislature enacted Real Property Law § 233 (the "Mobile Home Owners Bill of Rights") (see, L. 1973, ch. 1012, § 1; L. 1974, ch. 973, § 1; Bill Jacket, 1973, ch. 1012). Since 1974, the statute has been amended five times, most recently in 1989 (see, L. 1989, ch. 596, § 1). As it now reads, the statute regulates many, if not all, of the rights, duties, obligations and responsibilities of mobile home park owners/operators and those who reside in mobile home parks. As the Court of Appeals has commented, "Viewed in its entirety, the statute imposes a common sense rule of thumb: Inherent economic imbalance may not be exploited by park owners either through unfair monopolistic practices or by threat of eviction for failure to comply with burdensome park rules" (Miller v. valley forge Vil., supra, at 629, 403 N.Y.S.2d 207, 374 N.E.2d 118).

In order to appreciate the breadth of the State Legislature's effort to regulate the mobile home park field, one has but to examine the provisions of Real Property Law § 233. Subdivision (a) of the statute defines the basic terms "mobile home tenant," "mobile home owner," and "mobile home park." Subdivision (b) limits to five the grounds upon which a mobile home park owner/operator may evict a mobile home tenant. Subdivision (c) permits a mobile home tenant to raise as an affirmative defense the provisions of subdivision (b) if the owner/operator attempts to evict for other grounds. Subdivision (d) establishes the procedure to be followed in evicting a tenant.

The statute continues, in subdivision (e) thereof, to require that mobile home park owners/operators offer tenants the opportunity to sign a lease for a minimum of one year. Subdivision (f) establishes the guidelines under which the owner/operator may promulgate or modify mobile home park rules and regulations. Subdivision (g) contains several provisions relating to rents, fees, charges, and security deposits, including (1) the requirement that all rents and fees be reasonable, (2) the procedures to be used in increasing rents and charges, and (3) the requirement that security deposits be held in trust separate from the funds of the owner/operator. Subdivision (h) places restrictions on the owner/operator's ability to charge additional fees to those tenants installing electric or gas appliances and to require that tenants purchase certain equipment and services from the...