Back v. State
| Docket Number | A20-1098 |
| Decision Date | 24 May 2023 |
| Parties | Danna Rochelle Back, Appellant/Cross-Respondent, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent/Cross-Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Court of Appeals Office of Appellate Courts
Joseph A. Gangi, Daniel J. Bellig, Farrish Johnson Law Office Chtd., Mankato, Minnesota, for appellant/cross-respondent.
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and Mary F Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Brittany D. Lawonn Senior Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent/cross-appellant.
When a petitioner's claim of innocence is not restricted to or based on facts and turns on an issue of legal significance the petitioner has not established "any evidence of factual innocence," as required by Minnesota Statutes section 590.11, subdivision 1(c)(2) (2022), and therefore is not eligible for compensation based on exoneration.
Reversed.
In this case, we must once again decide whether appellant/cross-respondent Danna Rochelle Back is entitled to an order from the district court declaring her eligible to submit a petition seeking compensation based on exoneration under Minnesota's Incarceration and Exoneration Remedies Act, Minnesota Statutes sections 611.362 to 611.368 (2022). The central issue in this case is whether Back has established, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that she is "exonerated" within the meaning of Minnesota Statutes section 590.11 (2022) (the eligibility-for-exoneration-compensation statute). See Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 3 (2022). In order to meet that standard, Back must prove that a court "vacated, reversed, or set aside a judgment of conviction on grounds consistent with innocence," requiring a showing of "any evidence of factual innocence." Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 1.
After a hearing, the district court found Back was eligible for compensation based on a finding of exoneration. The court of appeals agreed that Back was "exonerated," but it also concluded that the eligibility-for-exoneration-compensation statute gives a district court the discretion to determine whether those exonerated from their criminal convictions on grounds consistent with innocence are eligible for compensation, even if they meet the other statutory criteria, and that the district court failed to exercise that discretion. Back v. State, 964 N.W.2d 159, 165-66 (Minn.App. 2021), rev. granted (Minn. Aug. 24, 2021). The court of appeals reversed and remanded to the district court to exercise that discretion, id. at 166, and we accepted the parties' petitions for further review. We conclude that Back has not presented "any evidence of factual innocence," Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 1(c)(2), for the reason that her claim turns on an issue of legal significance instead of being restricted to or based on facts. Therefore, we hold that Back is not eligible for compensation based on exoneration, and we reverse the decision of the court of appeals.
The facts and circumstances leading to Back's conviction for second-degree manslaughter are described in detail in State v. Back (Back I), 775 N.W.2d 866 (Minn. 2009), and are summarized here. On January 1, 2007, Back asked Nicholas Super, one of her former boyfriends, to drive her to the house of Daniel Holliday, another of her former boyfriends. Id. at 867. Back was aware of tensions between Super and Holliday and that Super had threatened Holliday with a gun several times. Id. After arriving, Back entered the house while Super remained outside. Id. at 868. Back and Holliday began arguing, Back caused commotion inside the house, Holliday asked her to leave, and their argument continued as they left the house. Id. Super intervened and fatally shot Holliday. Id. Following a trial, a jury found Back guilty of second-degree manslaughter, Minn. Stat. § 609.205(1) (2022), which requires a person to cause the death of another by "culpable negligence."
On direct appeal, we reversed Back's conviction. Back I, 775 N.W.2d at 867. Specifically, we explained that "[a] defendant cannot be negligent, culpably or otherwise, unless the defendant has a duty that he or she breached." Id. at 869. The State was trying "to hold Back criminally responsible for the criminal action of a third party" and as a result, the State had to "prove that Back had a special relationship with either [the shooter] or with [the victim] that gave rise to a duty to control [the shooter] or to a duty to protect [the victim] against the actions of [the shooter]." Id. at 871. Because the State presented no evidence to support the existence of a special relationship with either the shooter or the victim, we held that the evidence was not sufficient to prove that Back committed second-degree manslaughter. Id. at 872.
In July 2019, Back filed a petition for an order declaring her eligible for compensation based on exoneration.[1] The district court granted Back's petition, determined that she was exonerated, and held that she is eligible to file a claim for exoneration compensation. But in coming to this conclusion, the district court noted that two subdivisions of the eligibility-for-exoneration-compensation statute were "at odds in this case." The district court made a "specific finding" that if it were allowed "to balance [Back's] acts and the other considerations" referenced in section 590.11, subdivision 4, against Back's showing of exoneration in subdivision 3 (), then Back "would not be entitled to compensation for any period before the conviction was reversed." However, the district court ultimately concluded that the statute did not afford it discretion to weigh those factors and instead held that "the actual wording of the statute . . . requires an order finding [Back] is eligible for compensation."
The State appealed. The court of appeals held that because our decision reversing Back's conviction was not a clarification of the law, and instead "an application of existing law," Back was exonerated within the meaning of the eligibility-for-exoneration-compensation statute. Back v. State, 964 N.W.2d 159, 164 (Minn.App. 2021). However, the court of appeals also determined that "the legislature unambiguously granted the district court discretion to consider the evidence" referred to in subdivision 4 of section 590.11 when determining "whether an exonerated petitioner is eligible for compensation." 964 N.W.2d at 165. The court of appeals held that the district court abused its discretion by failing to exercise this discretion, and as a result, the court of appeals reversed and remanded to the district court to exercise its discretion. Id.
Back petitioned for review and the State filed a conditional cross-petition. We granted both petitions and stayed the case pending final disposition in Kingbird v. State, 973 N.W.2d 633 (Minn. 2022). After we decided Kingbird, we lifted the stay and ordered the appeal to proceed.
The State argues that the court of appeals erred in determining that Back is "exonerated" within the meaning of the eligibility-for-exoneration-compensation statute, Minn. Stat § 590.11. Back argues that the court of appeals erred by holding that the statute affords the district court discretion to deny a petition to an otherwise exonerated petitioner.
For the reasons articulated below, we conclude that Back is not exonerated. Because this determination disposes of the appeal, we need not address Back's argument.
Minnesota's Incarceration and Exoneration Remedies Act allows formerly convicted people to obtain compensation after exoneration if they meet specified criteria. Minn. Stat. §§ 611.362-.368. The Act establishes a multistep process for receiving compensation, but only the first step, petitioning the district court, is at issue here. Under that first step, a petitioner must obtain a district court order "under section 590.11 determining that the person is entitled to compensation based on exoneration." Minn. Stat. § 611.362, subd. 1.
"[W]hether an individual has been 'exonerated'" is the "threshold determination" under the eligibility-for-exoneration-compensation statute. Back v. State, 902 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Minn. 2017). As relevant here, a petitioner is exonerated if a court reverses a "conviction on grounds consistent with innocence." Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 1(b)(1)(i). "On grounds consistent with innocence," for purposes of this appeal, means that a petitioner is exonerated because a court reversed their conviction "and there is any evidence of factual innocence whether it was available at the time of investigation or trial or is newly discovered evidence." Id., subd. 1(c)(2) (emphasis added).
"We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo." State v. Miller, 977 N.W.2d 592, 597 (Minn. 2022). Since Back's second petition for exoneration compensation was decided by the court of appeals in 2021, we interpreted the phrase "any evidence of factual innocence" in Kingbird v. State, 973 N.W.2d 633 (Minn. 2022).[2] Because that interpretation applies to Back's case, a review of Kingbird is essential before turning to Back's exoneration-compensation claim.
Vaundell Duwayne Kingbird was initially convicted in 2010 of the illegal possession of a firearm as a felon in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.165, subdivision 1b(a) (2014) because he possessed a BB gun after he had been convicted of a qualifying offense. Kingbird, 973 N.W.2d at 635-36. But after Kingbird's conviction had become final, we held in State v. Haywood that an "air-powered BB gun is not a firearm, and thus [the] possession of it did not violate section 609.165." 886 N.W.2d 485, 490 (Minn. 2016). Based on Haywood, the district court vacated Kingbird's...
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