Kingbird v. State

• Decision Date: 04 May 2022
• Docket Number: A19-1850
• Citation: 973 N.W.2d 633
• Parties: Vaundell Duwayne KINGBIRD, Appellant/Cross-Respondent, v. STATE of Minnesota, Respondent/Cross-Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

973 N.W.2d 633

Vaundell Duwayne KINGBIRD, Appellant/Cross-Respondent,

v.STATE of Minnesota, Respondent/Cross-Appellant.

A19-1850

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Filed: May 4, 2022

Robert J. Shane, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for appellant/cross-respondent.

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; Matti R. Adam, Itasca County Attorney, Grand Rapids, Minnesota; and Adam E. Petras, Special Assistant Itasca County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent/cross-appellant.

OPINION

McKEIG, Justice.

At issue in this case is whether appellant/cross-respondent Vaundell Duwayne Kingbird was exonerated for purposes of the statute used to determine if a person whose conviction has been reversed, vacated, or set aside is eligible for compensation based on exoneration, Minn. Stat. § 590.11 (2020) (the eligibility-for-exoneration-compensation-statute). The applicable definition of "exonerated" requires Kingbird to establish "any evidence of factual innocence." Id. , subd. 1(b)(1), 1(c)(2). We must therefore determine whether Kingbird has established any evidence of factual innocence.

Kingbird was convicted in 2010 of violating Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1b(a) (2014), which makes it a crime for certain convicted felons to possess a firearm. After we held in State v. Haywood , 886 N.W.2d 485, 487 (Minn. 2016), that an air-compressed BB gun is not a "firearm" under this statute, Kingbird's conviction was vacated. Kingbird then filed a petition for an order determining that he was eligible for compensation based on exoneration. The district court denied the petition, and the court of appeals affirmed. We conclude that Kingbird has not provided any evidence of factual innocence. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

FACTS

In May 2010, a caller reported to law enforcement that a man, later identified as Kingbird, had a handgun and was holding a woman against her will at his residence. When the officers responded to the call, they noticed Kingbird walking outside the house with his hands in his pockets. The officers drew their weapons and ordered Kingbird to show them his hands and to get on the ground; he did not comply. One of the officers used a taser on Kingbird and the officers then placed him under arrest. After the arrest, the officers found a black air-compressed BB gun behind the house.

The next day, the State charged Kingbird with one count of ineligible-person-in possession of a firearm, Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1b(a) ;¹ two counts of misdemeanor domestic assault, Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1(2) (2020) ; and one count of misdemeanor obstructing legal process, Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subd. 1(2) (2020). At that time, courts had stated that the term "firearm," as used in several criminal statutes, included an air-compressed BB gun. See State v. Seifert , 256 N.W.2d 87, 88 (Minn. 1977) (stating in dicta that the term "firearm," as used in Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 6 (1992), "should be defined broadly to include guns using newer types of projectile propellants and should not be restricted in meaning to guns using gunpowder."); State v. Newman , 538 N.W.2d 476, 477–78 (Minn. App. 1995) (holding that a BB gun is a firearm within the meaning of the driveby shooting statute), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 30, 1995). One of these cases involved another statute, which like Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1b, makes it a crime for a person convicted of a crime of violence to possess a firearm.² State v. Fleming , 724 N.W.2d 537, 538, 541 (Minn. App. 2006) (holding that a BB gun is a firearm under Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(b) (2006) ).

As part of a plea agreement, Kingbird admitted that he possessed an air-compressed BB gun and pleaded guilty to being an ineligible person in possession of a firearm, Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1b(a) ; in return, the State dismissed the other charges. The district court stayed execution of the presumptive 60-month prison sentence and placed Kingbird on probation for 10 years. In August 2011, Kingbird violated the terms of his probation by committing a domestic assault. The district court revoked his probation and executed the stayed 60-month sentence.

In 2016, we held that an air-compressed BB gun is not a "firearm" under Minn. Stat. § 609.165. Haywood , 886 N.W.2d at 487. Soon after this decision, the State moved to vacate Kingbird's conviction pursuant to Haywood . The district court agreed, and on January 5, 2017, Kingbird's conviction was vacated.

On September 25, 2017, Kingbird filed a petition for an order declaring him eligible for exoneration compensation, contending that he was "exonerated" as defined by Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 1(1)(i) (2018).³ But 2 days later, in Back v. State , 902 N.W.2d 23, 28–30 (Minn. 2017), we held that the definition of exoneration on which Kingbird relied was unconstitutional. We severed that portion of the statute, which meant that a person could be exonerated only if they satisfied the definition found in Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 1(1)(ii) (2018).⁴

Back , 902 N.W.2d at 30–33. On October 5, 2017, in light of our decision in Back , Kingbird voluntarily dismissed his petition without prejudice.

In 2019, the Minnesota Legislature amended the eligibility-for-exoneration-compensation statute. The Legislature adopted a new definition of "exonerated," added new language to explain the meaning of "on grounds consistent with innocence," and established a special deadline for some people impacted by our decision in Back to bring a petition. Act of May 30, 2019, ch. 5, art. 2, § 13, 2019 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 965, 965–66 (codified at Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subds. 1(b)(1)(i), 1(c)(1)–(2), 2 (2020) ). On July 15, 2019, Kingbird filed a second petition to be declared eligible for exoneration compensation based on his vacated conviction, asserting that his claim was timely under the amended and extended limitations period.

On October 3, 2019, the district court denied Kingbird's second petition, concluding that he did not meet the definition of "exonerated." Specifically, the court noted that because the statutory phrase "on grounds consistent with innocence" is further defined as meaning "any evidence of factual innocence," Kingbird must show evidence of factual innocence. Further, the district court concluded that Kingbird had "not advanced an argument that he did not commit the act for which he was arrested and convicted. Rather, his conviction was vacated due to a change in the law." The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Kingbird was not "exonerated" within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 1(c)(2), because his conviction was vacated based on a clarification of the law. Kingbird v. State , 949 N.W.2d 744, 750–51 (Minn. App. 2020). We granted Kingbird's petition for review.

ANALYSIS

I.

There are two issues before us. First, we consider whether the district court had jurisdiction to hear Kingbird's petition. This jurisdictional question is a threshold issue that we raise sua sponte. See Dead Lake Ass'n, Inc. v. Otter Tail Cnty. , 695 N.W.2d 129, 134 (Minn. 2005) (stating that "lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time ... sua sponte by the court."). We directed the parties to submit supplemental briefing on this issue.

At issue is whether the 2-year statute of limitations in Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 2, is a jurisdictional bar to review if a petition is not timely filed, or if that deadline is subject to waiver. The 2-year time limit found in subdivision 2 of section 590.11 states as follows:

A petition must be brought within two years, but no less than 60 days after the petitioner is exonerated. If before July 1, 2019, a person did not meet both requirements of Minnesota Statutes 2018, section 590.11, subdivision 1, clause (1), item (i), and did not file a petition or the petition was denied, that person may commence an action meeting the requirements under subdivision 1, paragraph (b), clause (1), item (i), on or after July 1, 2019, and before July 1, 2021.

Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 2. The first sentence provides a general requirement that a petition be filed within 2 years of the date a person is exonerated. The second sentence, added in 2019, however, creates an exception to this general requirement and provides an expanded window for some people impacted by our decision in Back to file a petition.

In their supplemental briefs, Kingbird and the State agreed that Kingbird's 2019 petition was timely. Moreover, they agreed that the State waived any statute of limitation defense by failing to assert it below. This agreement by the parties, however, does not end the matter. The waiver by the State is only conclusive if the time bar is in fact a waivable statute of limitations rather than a jurisdictional requirement. If it is the latter, it cannot be waived by the parties, and we must still independently confirm jurisdiction and determine whether the petition was timely. See Dead Lake Ass'n, Inc. , 695 N.W.2d at 134 (noting that "lack of subject matter jurisdiction ... cannot be waived by the parties.").

We thus consider whether the 2-year limitations period in the eligibility-for-exoneration-compensation statute is a jurisdictional bar to review if a petition is not timely filed,⁵ or if that deadline is a statute of limitations subject to waiver. In Carlton v. State , 816 N.W.2d 590, 600–02 (Minn. 2012), we explained the distinction between a waivable limitations period and a limitations period that serves as a jurisdictional bar to hearing the claim. It is "well established" that a statute of limitations "may be waived by a defendant who fails to assert it." See id. at 600 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). When, however, a "statute gives a new right of action, not existing at common law, a statutory time limit constitutes an element in the right itself, such that failure to comply with the time limit will deprive the court of jurisdiction to hear the claim." Id. at 601 (...