Badio v. G4S Sol. USA
| Decision Date | 12 January 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 19-cv-12591-ADB |
| Parties | MARVIN BADIO, Plaintiff, v. G4S SOLUTION USA, BROCKTON POLICE DEPARTMENT, and MICHAEL SKINNER, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
BURROUGHS, D.J.
Plaintiff Marvin Badio ("Plaintiff"), appearing pro se, brings this action against G4S Solution USA ("G4S"), the Brockton Police Department ("Brockton PD"), and Brockton PD Lt. Michael Skinner ("Skinner" and, with Brockton PD, "Brockton Defendants"), alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), and his Fourteenth Amendment rights. [ECF No. 4]. Currently before the Court are motions to dismiss filed by the Brockton Defendants, [ECF No. 13], and G4S, [ECF No. 17]. For the reasons set forth below, the motions, [ECF Nos. 13, 17], are GRANTED.
For purposes of this Order, the relevant facts are drawn from Plaintiff's amended complaint, [ECF No. 4], and viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Ruivo v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 766 F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff is African and Haitian American. [ECF No. 4 ¶ 19]. From April 2015 to December 27, 2016, Plaintiff worked for G4S as an unarmed security guard. [Id. ¶¶ 1, 6]. On December 15, 2016, Plaintiff was given an opportunity to be promoted to an armed security guard, subject to his passing the Multiphasic Personality Inventory test ("MPI test"). [Id. ¶ 3]. Plaintiff took the MPI test on December 21, 2016, [id. ¶ 4], and on December 27, 2016 was informed that he was being terminated from the company because he had not passed the test, [id. ¶ 6].
On January 27, 2017, Plaintiff was offered a position as an armed security guard at another security company, Allied Universal, after passing the same MPI test which he had taken at G4S. [ECF No. 4 ¶ 7]. Plaintiff maintained his position with Allied Universal, working as an armed security guard at Bank of America, until October 12, 2017, at which point Allied Universal lost its bid for the Bank of America contract to Plaintiff's former employer, G4S. [Id. ¶¶ 8-9]. When G4S took over the Bank of America contract, it offered every armed employee currently working under the former Allied Universal contract, with the exception of Plaintiff, the opportunity to continue working at Bank of America with G4S. [Id. ¶ 9]. By way of explanation for his exclusion, G4S's human resources director told Plaintiff that he was "not welcome[] to work for G4S." [Id. ¶ 10].
In September 2018, St. Moritz, another security company, hired Plaintiff as an armed security guard. [ECF No. 4 ¶ 11]. St. Moritz required Plaintiff to purchase his own firearm. [Id.]. On September 21, 2018, Plaintiff attempted to purchase a firearm at a store in Holbrook, Massachusetts but employees at the store informed Plaintiff that there was an issue with his license to carry a firearm ("LTC"). [Id. ¶ 12]. Plaintiff was told to contact Brockton PD and to speak with Skinner regarding the issue. [Id.]. That day, Plaintiff met with Skinner, who told Plaintiff that his LTC had been suspended. [Id. ¶ 13]. On October 8, 2018, Plaintiff once againmet with Skinner, at which time Plaintiff was informed that his LTC had been revoked. [Id. ¶ 14].
Plaintiff filed his initial complaint on December 26, 2019, bringing suit against G4S and the Brockton Defendants, as well as several G4S employees, for violations of Title VII, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA"), and the Occupational Safety and Health Act ("OSHA"). [ECF No. 1]. Plaintiff also filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. [ECF No. 2]. Plaintiff timely filed an amended complaint on January 8, 2020, which added an FLSA claim against G4S and several G4S employees, [ECF No. 4], and later filed a motion to appoint counsel, [ECF No. 5].
On March 10, 2020, the Court issued an order granting Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and denying Plaintiff's motion to appoint counsel, without prejudice, determining the motion to be premature. [ECF No. 6 ¶¶ 1-2]. In that Order, the Court dismissed all of Plaintiff's claims against the individual G4S employees, the Title VII claims brought against all but G4S, as well as all HIPAA and OSHA claims, [id. ¶ 3-4], but found that Plaintiff's amended complaint could be read to allege a 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim against the Brockton Defendants, premised on the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection clause, [id. ¶ 4]. The remaining claims are therefore Counts I, II, and III (Title VII) and Count IV (FLSA) against G4S, and Count VIII (Equal Protection claim under § 1983) against the Brockton Defendants. See [ECF No. 6].
The Brockton Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on May 25, 2020, [ECF No. 13], and G4S filed a motion to dismiss on July 6, 2020, [ECF No. 17]. Plaintiff opposed both motions. [ECF Nos. 14, 22].
In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts, analyze those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Gilbert v. City of Chicopee, 915 F.3d 74, 80 (1st Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). "[D]etailed factual allegations" are not required, but the complaint must set forth "more than labels and conclusions," see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), and must contain "factual allegations, either direct or inferential, respecting each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable legal theory," Gagliardi v. Sullivan, 513 F.3d 301, 305 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Centro Médico del Turabo, Inc. v. Feliciano de Melecio, 406 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2005)). The alleged facts must be sufficient to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
"To cross the plausibility threshold a claim does not need to be probable, but it must give rise to more than a mere possibility of liability." Grajales v. P.R. Ports Auth., 682 F.3d 40, 44-45 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). "A determination of plausibility is 'a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.'" Id. at 44 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). "[T]he complaint should be read as a whole, not parsed piece by piece to determine whether each allegation, in isolation, is plausible . . . ." Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor, 723 F.3d 91, 103 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2011)). "The plausibility standard invites a two-step pavane." A.G. ex rel. Maddox v. Elsevier, Inc., 732 F.3d 77, 80 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing Grajales, 682 F.3d at 45). First, the Court "must separate the complaint's factual allegations (which must be accepted as true) from its conclusory legal allegations (which need not be credited)." Id. (quoting Morales-Cruz v. Univ. of P.R., 676 F.3d 220, 224 (1st Cir.2012)). Secondly, the Court "must determine whether the remaining factual content allows a 'reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'" Id. (quoting Morales-Cruz, 676 F.3d at 224).
In addition to the general standard applicable to a motion to dismiss, "[a] document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "However, pro se status does not insulate a party from complying with procedural and substantive law." Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 118 F.3d 886, 890 (1st Cir. 1997). That being said, the Court "hold[s] pro se pleadings to less demanding standards . . . to guard against the loss of pro se claims due to technical defects," Dutil v. Murphy, 550 F.3d 154, 158 (1st Cir. 2008), and must generously construe arguments which a pro se Plaintiff makes in their briefing, Ahmed, 118 F.3d at 890.
Plaintiff asserts that G4S discriminated against him on the basis of his race in violation of Title VII. [ECF No 4 ¶¶ 18-22]. G4S moves to dismiss this claim, asserting that Plaintiff did not file a timely charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and therefore failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. [ECF No. 18 at 3-5].
"Title VII is a vehicle through which an individual may seek recovery for employment discrimination on the grounds of race, color, religion, gender, or national origin." Franceschi v. U.S. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 514 F.3d 81, 85 (1st Cir. 2008). Because the EEOC is the primary resource for pursuing a Title VII charge, id., "Title VII requires exhaustion ofadministrative remedies as a condition precedent to suit in federal district court," Jensen v. Frank, 912 F.2d 517, 520 (1st Cir. 1990). "[T]he failure to exhaust this administrative process 'bars the courthouse door.'" Franceschi, 514 F.3d at 85 (quoting Bonilla v. Muebles J.J. Álvarez, Inc., 194 F.3d 275, 278 (1st Cir. 1999)). "[A]ny person seeking relief under Title VII must file a charge with the EEOC 'within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged employment practice occurred,' or, if a claim is filed instead with a state or local agency, 'within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred." Rodriguez v. Smithkline Beecham, 224 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2000) (internal citation omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that G4S violated Title VII when it refused to rehire him in October 2017, [ECF No. 4 ¶¶ 9, 26], but he did not file a complaint with the EEOC until October 4, 2019, [ECF No. 17-1 at 2 (copy of EEOC complaint)], which was well after the...
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