Badler v. Univ. of Me. Sys.

• Decision Date: 28 June 2022
• Docket Number: Docket: Fra-21-264
• Citation: 277 A.3d 379,2022 ME 40
• Parties: Eric BADLER v. UNIVERSITY OF MAINE SYSTEM
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

277 A.3d 379

2022 ME 40

Eric BADLER

v.UNIVERSITY OF MAINE SYSTEM

Docket: Fra-21-264

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: March 9, 2022

Decided: June 28, 2022

Christiane D. Williams, Esq. (orally), Mann Law, LLC, Yarmouth, for appellant Eric Badler

Laura A. Maher, Esq. (orally), Monaghan Leahy, LLP, Portland, for appellee University of Maine System

Stephen W. Koerting, Esq., and Shea H. Watson, Esq., Kelly, Remmel & Zimmerman, Portland, for amicus curiae Maine Trial Lawyers Association

Panel: MEAD, JABAR, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ.^*

Majority: MEAD, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ.

Dissent: JABAR, J.

HORTON, J.

[¶1] Eric Badler appeals from a summary judgment entered by the Superior Court (Franklin County, Mills, A.R.J. ) in favor of the University of Maine System on Badler's claim of negligence based on an injury he sustained from an industrial kitchen mixer. The court concluded that the University is immune from suit, but Badler contends that the court erred because the mixer falls within the "[o]ther machinery or equipment" exception to immunity under the Maine Tort Claims Act (MTCA). 14 M.R.S. § 8104-A(1)(G) (2022). Because we agree with the court that the mixer is not within that exception, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] The following facts are drawn from the parties’ supported statements of material fact and are viewed in the light most favorable to Badler. See Connary v. Shea , 2021 ME 44, ¶ 3, 259 A.3d 118. Badler was employed as a baker by Sodexo, a company that provides food and dining services to the University of Maine System. While working at the University's Farmington campus on November 4, 2017, Badler severely injured his right index finger while using an industrial, motorized kitchen mixer, which was supplied and owned by the University. The bowl that the University provided for use with the mixer was incompatible with the mixer. Badler's injury occurred when the bowl became dislodged and its sharp-edged handle cut his finger. As a result of the injury, Badler required significant medical treatment and has experienced pain, lost wages, and permanent impairment.

[¶3] Badler filed a complaint on October 29, 2019, alleging that the University acted negligently in providing him with a dangerous mixer, which resulted in a severe injury to his finger. The University moved for summary judgment, claiming immunity from liability based on the MTCA, 14 M.R.S. §§ 8101 - 8118 (2022). Badler opposed the motion, arguing that the University was not immune because the alleged negligent act fell within the MTCA's exception for negligence related to the University's "ownership, maintenance or use of ... [o]ther machinery or equipment, whether mobile or stationary." Id. § 8104-A(1). On August 5, 2021, the court entered an order granting the University's motion for summary judgment against Badler, concluding that the University was immune under the MTCA because the mixer did not fall within the section 8104-A(1)(G) exception. Badler timely appealed.¹ See 14 M.R.S. § 1851 (2022) ; M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1).

II. DISCUSSION

[¶4] The sole issue on appeal is whether the court erred in granting the University's motion for summary judgment based on its conclusion that the mixer is not within the MTCA's exception for negligence related to "[o]ther machinery or equipment, whether mobile or stationary." 14 M.R.S. § 8104-A(1)(G).

[¶5] "We review a grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Klein v. Univ. of Me. Sys. , 2022 ME 17, ¶ 6, 271 A.3d 777. "A grant of summary judgment will be affirmed if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the undisputed facts show that the prevailing party was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Id. "Absent a dispute of material fact, whether or not a governmental entity is entitled to immunity is a question of law that we review de novo." McDonald v. City of Portland , 2020 ME 119, ¶ 11, 239 A.3d 662.

[¶6] "The MTCA provides immunity to all governmental entities from suit on all tort claims seeking recovery for damages, except as otherwise expressly provided by statute." New Orleans Tanker Corp. v. Dep't of Transp. , 1999 ME 67, ¶ 4, 728 A.2d 673 (quotation marks omitted). In crafting the MTCA, the Legislature took an "exception-to-immunity" approach, instead of an "exception-to-liability" approach, and we have thus construed the exceptions narrowly. Id. ¶ 5 (quotation marks omitted); see Klein , 2022 ME 17, ¶ 8, 271 A.3d 777 ("We construe this waiver strictly in order to adhere to the Legislature's directive that immunity for a governmental entity remains the general rule."). Title 14 M.R.S. § 8104-A(1) provides such an exception:

1. Ownership; maintenance or use of vehicles, machinery and equipment. A governmental entity is liable for its negligent acts or omissions in its ownership, maintenance or use of any:

A. Motor vehicle, as defined in Title 29-A, section 101, subsection 42;

B. Special mobile equipment, as defined in Title 29-A, section 101, subsection 70;

C. Trailers, as defined in Title 29-A, section 101, subsection 86;

D. Aircraft, as defined in Title 6, section 3, subsection 5;

E. Watercraft, as defined in Title 12, section 1872, subsection 14;

F. Snowmobiles, as defined in Title 12, section 13001, subsection 25; and

G. Other machinery or equipment, whether mobile or stationary.

[¶7] We have on several occasions addressed the meaning of section 8104-A(1)(G) ’s provision concerning "[o]ther machinery or equipment, whether mobile or stationary." In McNally v. Town of Freeport , we held that a hypodermic syringe used to draw blood from the plaintiff did not fall within the section 8104-A(1)(G) exception. 414 A.2d 904, 905-06 (Me. 1980). We "cautiously applied the interpretive principle of ejusdem generis in which the meaning of general words of a phrase is limited to things or items of the same general class as those expressly mentioned." New Orleans Tanker , 1999 ME 67, ¶ 7, 728 A.2d 673. Accordingly, we explained that, to fall within the exception, a device "must, as a result of its negligent ownership, maintenance or use, create a risk of injury to person or property comparable to the risk created by the negligent ownership, maintenance or use of the specifically enumerated items of machinery and equipment" in section 8104-A(1)(A) through (F). McNally , 414 A.2d at 906.

[¶8] In New Orleans Tanker , we concluded that a drawbridge leaf did not fall under the "[o]ther machinery or equipment" exception. 1999 ME 67, ¶¶ 2, 14, 728 A.2d 673. We noted that the items enumerated in section 8104-A(1)(A) through (F) have qualities in common:

It is readily apparent that the listed items in section 8104-A(1)(A) through (F) are items capable of transportation. They are mobile and likely to come into contact with the general public. Most are fairly ordinary transportation devices with which people have a fair degree of familiarity. Accidents with these items are common, and insurance is readily available....

... The major risk from the negligent use of vehicles with the power to move is that they will be driven or transported in locations where the general public is exposed to the possibility of a collision and resulting harm.

New Orleans Tanker , 1999 ME 67, ¶¶ 8-9, 728 A.2d 673. We declined to determine precisely how the phrase "whether mobile or stationary" affects the meaning of the "[o]ther machinery or equipment" exception, but we explained that the phrase does not enlarge the exception "such that the phrase encompasses all the innumerable machines and equipment which governmental units could conceivably own or use." Id. ¶ 11.

[¶9] We have interpreted section 8104-A(1)(G) on other occasions, but none of them involved machinery or equipment that presented a risk of injury remotely similar to that presented by the machines and equipment listed in sections (A) through (F). See Reid v. Town of Mount Vernon , 2007 ME 125, ¶¶ 4, 25-27, 932 A.2d 539 (in-ground dumpster); Petillo v. City of Portland , 657 A.2d 325, 327 (Me. 1995) (golf course sprinkler system); J.R.M., Inc. v. City of Portland , 669 A.2d 159, 161 (Me. 1995) (fire protection system); Harris v. City of Old Town , 667 A.2d 611, 612-13 (Me. 1995) (railroad tracks).

[¶10] In arguing that the kitchen mixer falls under the "[o]ther machinery or equipment" exception, Badler effectively asks us both to depart from our precedent and to ignore our obligation to construe the MTCA's exceptions to immunity strictly. See, e.g. , New Orleans Tanker , 1999 ME 67, ¶ 5, 728 A.2d 673. Under Badler's interpretation of the statute, a governmental entity would be liable for injury caused by virtually any machine or piece of equipment with a motor. But if the Legislature had intended the "[o]ther machinery or equipment" exception to reach so broadly, it would have had no reason to enumerate separately the motorized machines and equipment in subsections (A) through (F) of section 8104-A(1). In other words, Badler's interpretation would convert most of section 8104-A(1) into surplusage. See Riemann v. Toland , 2022 ME 13, ¶ 28, 269 A.3d 229 ("[N]o words [in a statute] are to be treated as surplusage if they can be reasonably construed." (quotation marks omitted)).

[¶11] We cannot conclude that a kitchen mixer falls within the same general class as the items enumerated in section 8104-A(1)(A) through (F). Other than being a machine, the mixer does not meet the criteria we defined in New Orleans Tanker : it is not a transportation device, it is unlikely to be transported, it is unlikely to come into contact with the general public, and it is unlikely to be covered by an insurance policy.² See New Orleans Tanker , 1999 ME 67, ¶¶ 8-9, 728 A.2d 673.

[¶12] The mixer also poses a risk of injury different from the risk associated with the items in section 8104-A(1)(A) through (F). See New Orleans Tanker , 1999 ME 67, ¶ 9, 728 A.2d 673. Although a mixer does pose a risk of injury, that risk is inherently...