Doe v. Roe
| Decision Date | 28 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | Docket: Lin-21-283 |
| Citation | 277 A.3d 369,2022 ME 39 |
| Parties | Pat DOE v. Sam ROE |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Melissa L. Martin, Esq. (orally), Pine Tree Legal Assistance, Portland, for appellant Pat Doe
Richard L. Rhoda, Esq., Houlton, and David J. Bobrow, Esq. (orally), Bedard & Bobow, P.C., Eliot, for appellee Sam Roe
Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, JABAR, HORTON, CONNORS, and LAWRENCE, JJ.*
[¶1] The principal question addressed in this appeal is whether any discovery is permitted in protection from abuse proceedings, and, if so, what limits, if any, should be imposed on such discovery.
[¶2] Pat Doe appeals from an interlocutory order of the District Court (Wiscasset, Rushlau, J. ) that (1) allowed discovery in a protection from abuse action instituted by Doe against Sam Roe and (2) granted in part and denied in part Doe's request for a discovery protective order pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 26(c). Doe argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law in allowing any discovery in a protection from abuse action and that, to the extent the trial court had any discretion to permit discovery, it abused that discretion by partially denying Doe's request for a discovery protective order.2
[¶3] We affirm the judgment. As explained below, we conclude that discovery is not flatly prohibited in protection from abuse matters. But by virtue of the nature of protection from abuse proceedings, discovery is rarely appropriate or necessary, and when it is, discovery must take place within strict parameters. The trial court's approach here properly balanced the goal of expediting such proceedings and the potential that discovery requests could exacerbate the abuse alleged by the plaintiff against the infrequent need for a defendant to take limited, minimally intrusive discovery in order to understand and defend against the plaintiff's allegations.
[¶4] The trial court record establishes the following facts and procedural history.
See Doe v. Tierney , 2018 ME 101, ¶ 2, 189 A.3d 756.
[¶5] Pat Doe and Sam Roe have a history of filing complaints for protection from abuse against each other. In 2020, Doe obtained a protection from abuse order against Roe in the District Court (Wiscasset), but she later dismissed it because she no longer felt threatened by him. She later filed a protection from abuse complaint in the District Court (Biddeford), but it was dismissed after she failed to appear for the hearing. Roe obtained a protection from abuse order against Doe in the District Court (Houlton) on June 15, 2021.
[¶6] The instant action began on July 14, 2021, when Doe filed a complaint for protection from abuse against Roe, alleging that she was in immediate and present danger of abuse. Doe further alleged, inter alia, that the abuse had been going on for five years, during which Roe had threatened her life, stalked and followed her, repeatedly called her place of employment, and stolen money from her friend. The trial court (Wiscasset, Martin, J. ) issued a temporary protection from abuse order that prohibited Roe from having any contact with Doe or entering her home or place of work.
[¶7] After he was served, Roe filed a motion to continue the final hearing so that he could prepare and conduct discovery. On July 28, 2021, the trial court (Cashman, J. ) ordered a forty-nine-day continuance over Doe's objection. Noting that Roe had included language in his motion referencing his need for discovery, the trial court denied that portion of his motion because Roe had not filed a formal discovery request, and it commented that Roe could file "something" about discovery in the future.
[¶8] Roe subsequently served a request for production of documents, asking that Doe produce financial records and law enforcement reports. See M.R. Civ. P. 34. Roe also served twenty-five interrogatories seeking information about the abuse, stalking behavior, and other allegations in the complaint, as well as various other topics such as Doe's previous substance abuse, her employment status, her earnings, and the identity of anyone with whom she lived. See M.R. Civ. P. 33. Doe subsequently filed a motion for a protective order pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 26(c), in which she argued that allowing discovery would be contrary to the purpose of the protection from abuse statutes, see 19-A M.R.S. §§ 4001 - 4014 (2021),3 and would cause an undue burden on plaintiffs.
[¶9] On September 1, 2021, the trial court (Rushlau, J. ) issued an order stating:
[¶10] The trial court held the discovery conference the next day. Consistent with its order, the trial court noted at the conference that although discovery would be infeasible and unnecessary in most protection from abuse cases, limited discovery was appropriate in this case based on the previous protection from abuse orders between the parties and the complexity of Doe's stalking allegations. After reviewing and addressing each of Roe's discovery requests, the trial court granted in part and denied in part Doe's request for a protective order, ordering her to respond to thirteen of Roe's interrogatories. The court did not require her to respond to the other twelve interrogatories or to Roe's document requests, and then it ordered a continuance to provide Doe time to respond.
[¶11] Doe filed a notice of appeal on September 8, 2021, along with a motion for leave to file an interlocutory appeal. We (Gorman, J. ) deferred ruling on the motion, requiring the parties to address in their briefing the reviewability of the trial court's interlocutory order.4
A. Doe's challenge to the availability of any discovery in protection from abuse proceedings falls within the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule.
[¶12] Before reaching the merits, we must address the interlocutory nature of this appeal. Doe asserts that the appeal falls within the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule. We agree.
[¶13] The final judgment rule requires that, "[w]ith limited exceptions, a party may not appeal a decision until a final judgment has been rendered in the case." Irving Oil Ltd. v. ACE INA Ins. , 2014 ME 62, ¶ 8, 91 A.3d 594 (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). Although compliance with the final judgment rule is not a jurisdictional requirement, the rule conserves judicial resources, minimizes interference with the trial court, and advances other salutary goals. See id. ; Maples v. Compass Harbor Vill. Condo. Ass'n , 2022 ME 26, ¶ 15, 273 A.3d 358.
[¶14] The trial court's order permitting discovery in this case is not a final judgment because it did not "fully decide[ ] and dispose[ ] of the entire matter pending before the court." Maples , 2022 ME 26, ¶ 15, 273 A.3d 358 (quotation marks omitted); see Lewellyn v. Bell , 635 A.2d 945, 946-47 (Me. 1993). Hence, this appeal is immediately reviewable only if it falls within one of our recognized exceptions to the final judgment rule. See Maples , 2022 ME 26, ¶ 16, 273 A.3d 358 ; Lewellyn , 635 A.2d at 947. Because Doe is the party seeking immediate review, she bears the burden of showing that one of the exceptions applies. See Maples , 2022 ME 26, ¶ 16, 273 A.3d 358 ; State v. Carrillo , 2018 ME 84, ¶ 4, 187 A.3d 621.
[¶15] The collateral order exception applies "when the appellant can establish that (1) the decision is a final determination of a claim separable from the gravamen of the litigation; (2) it presents a major unsettled question of law; and (3) it would result in irreparable loss of the rights claimed, absent immediate review." Bond v. Bond , 2011 ME 105, ¶ 11, 30 A.3d 816 (quotation marks omitted). Each of these requirements is met here.
[¶16] First, whether discovery is available in a protection from abuse action is "a claim separable from the gravamen of the litigation" because resolution of the discovery issue has no bearing on the merits of Doe's complaint for protection from abuse. Second, given the potential implications for future protection from abuse actions and the possibility that trial courts may come to different conclusions, this issue qualifies as a "major unsettled question of law" on which we have never spoken. Finally, the rights claimed by Doe—namely that the protection from abuse statutes provide immunity from discovery and engender a right to prompt disposition of her complaint—would be irreparably lost in the absence of immediate review.5 See Hamilton v. Drummond Woodsum , 2020 ME 8, ¶ 2 n.2, 223 A.3d 904 ; Salerno v. Spectrum Med. Grp. , P.A. , 2019 ME 139, ¶ 12, 215 A.3d 804 ; Schelling v. Lindell , 2008 ME 59, ¶ 8, 942 A.2d 1226 ; Lord v. Murphy , 561 A.2d 1013, 1015-16 (Me. 1989). If discovery was unavailable and yet allowed to proceed, Doe would be permanently deprived of her claimed right to be free from that process. Cf. Salerno , 2019 ME 139, ¶ 12, 215 A.3d 804 ; Schelling , 2008 ME 59, ¶ 8, 942 A.2d 1226.
B. The trial court did not err as a matter of law in allowing discovery in a protection from abuse action and did not abuse its discretion in partially denying Doe's motion for a protective order.
[¶17] Doe argues that the structure and purpose of the protection from abuse process is...
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